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Policing Cross-Border Crimes between China and Hong Kong:
A Preliminary Assessment

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ABSTRACT
This article is a first attempt to investigate into Hong Kong Police (HKP) and Public Security Bureau (PSB) cooperative practices in dealing with cross-border crimes penetrating the two jurisdictions, in the backdrop of "one country two systems" political settlement. The article begins by observing that despite growing cross-border crimes between People's Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), these two jurisdictions have failed to develop a framework of cooperation. However, in spite of the lack of formal agreement, the PSB and HKP have been working closely together to deal with cross-border crimes through official INTERPOL and other unofficial channels. The article closed by observing that in order to effectively control cross-border criminality PSB and HKP must learn to work more cooperatively with each other.

"Thus reality circumscribes the concept of sovereignty in operation and increases the necessity for world-wide coordination of matters …"

Malcolm M. Shaw (1997:97)

Introduction

On Tuesday, October 20, 1998, Cheung Tse-keung, also known as the "Big Spender," and 35 others accomplices went on trial in China for a host of criminal charges, ranging from murder to kidnapping to smuggling of explosives committed in Hong Kong and China from 1991 to 1997 (SCMP, 11/6/98). The "Big Spender" case is the first time a Hong Kong legal resident was prosecuted, tried and executed in China under the PRC Criminal Law for criminal acts largely perpetrated in Hong Kong. The "Big Spender" case forced the HKSAR and PRC to come to terms with the many contentious jurisdictional (Hong Kong Standard, 12/6/98: 3) and protracted policy issues (Hong Kong Economic Journal, 11/7/98) attending the cross-border crime control debate; the most salient of which is how the PSB and HKP should be working together to deal with cross-border crimes (Bing 2000:323 - 358).

This article is a first attempt to investigate into HKP and PSB cooperative practices in dealing with cross-border crimes penetrating the two jurisdictions (Vagg 1992: 310), in the backdrop of "one country two systems" political settlement, provided for under the Basic Law of Hong Kong.[1]   It is hoped that findings from this investigation

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[1] The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (April 1990) (Basic Law). (Adopted on 4 April 1990 by the Seventh National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China at its Third Session). Article 2 provides: "The National People's Congress authorizes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of the law." Article 8 provides: "The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region." Article 18 provides: "The laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be this Law, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong as provided in Article 8 of this Law, and laws enacted by the legislature of the Region. National laws shall not applied in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region except for those in Annex III to this Law. The laws listed therein shall be applied locally by way of promulgation or legislative by the Region." Article 19: "The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The court of the Hong Kong Administrative Region shall have jurisdiction over all cases in the Region, except that the restrictions on their jurisdiction imposed by the legal system and principles previously in force in Hong Kong shall be maintained." Article 22: "No department of the Central People's Government and no province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the central Government may interfere in the affairs which the Hong Kong Special administers on its own in accordance with this Law."

can be used to inform upon future discussion and facilitate prospective handling of cross-border crimes and criminals.

This article is organized into six parts. After this brief introduction, Part II describes "The nature and extent of cross-border crime problem in China." Part III: "Problems with cross-border crimes between PRC-Hong Kong" gives a brief account of the problems and issues raised by PRC - Hong Kong cross-border crimes calling for mutual assistance and cooperation. Part IV: "PRC – Hong Kong police practices towards cross-border crimes" looks into why there is a lack of formal cooperative framework between the PSB and HKP and how, in spite of the lack of formal agreement, the PSB-HKP have been working closely together to deal with cross-border crimes in practice. Part V: "PSB's perspective on cross-border cooperation between PSB-HKP" discusses the perceived lack of cooperation by the HKP to the PSB calls for help in fighting cross-border crimes, a thorny issue standing in the way of a better working relationship between the two agencies. Part VI: "Conclusion" summarizes as it reflects upon how best to improve the working relationship between HKP-PSB in the face of exploding cross-border crimes.

The nature and extent of cross-border crime problem in China
Cross-border crime defined

In China an "international crime" ("guoji fanzui") is a crime that is perpetrated by foreign nationals with either its conduct or consequence(s) overlapping two or more international criminal jurisdictions. "Cross-border crime" is a species of "international crime" (Xian 1997: 27-363).

From traditional to cross-border crime

The opening of China in 1979 brought new criminality of all kinds. Between 1984 and 1993, the gross crime rate rose from 510,000 to 1,618,000 reported cases, i.e. an increase of 217%, with major crimes rising from 63,000 cases to 539,000 cases, i.e. an increase of 755.5%. More recently, in 2002, Ministry of Public Security (MPS) reported investigating 509,000 criminal cases and clearing 221,000 of them (MPS 2001: 84). The 2000 MPS data were 525,099 and 24100, respectively (MPS 2000:92). The crimes were also getting more serious, violence, sophisticated and organized (Feng 1994: 20-39).

The crime problem noted included cross-border crimes, a species of crime attracting increased attention and generating mounting concerns, e.g. cross-border crimes increased by 230% from 1980 to 1990 (Feng 1994: 27-8). This has led State Councilor and Public Security Minister Zhou Yongkang to call for more domestic effort and international cooperation in fighting cross-border crime (People's Daily Online 9/23/03)

The prevalence and nature of cross-border crime in China

As noted, since the opening of China, cross-border crimes have been on the rise, precipitously and unrelentingly. This is particularly the case between the border of PRC and HKSAR.

Since the opening of China in 1979, cross-border crimes have taken on a number of defining characteristics as reflected by several definitive trends, namely:

First, cross-border crimes are spreading from coastal Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the 1980s, e.g. Shenzhen, to inner economic development areas in the 1990s, e.g. Yunan.

Second, cross-border crimes take many forms, e.g. smuggling, drugs trafficking, illegal migration, and financial crime. They implicate many law enforcement agencies, e.g. police, custom, and immigration.

Third, special types of cross-border crimes are increasingly regionalized. For example, smuggling of cultural relics is limited to four provinces, i.e. Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Henan, and Xianxi. Together, they accounted for 90% of the reported relics crimes nation wide. Drug trafficking is limited to Yunan, Guangxi, and Guangdong. The former two provinces are responsible for over 90% of the drug haul. Illegal immigration is concentrated mainly in Fujian and Zhejian. Economic crimes, especially smuggling, are found in the coastal provinces of Guangdong, Zhejian, Shandong and Liaoning. Lastly the killing, selling and exportation of endangered spices happen mostly in the interior provinces of Xinjian, Yunan and Jinxu (Xian 1997: 210-212).

Fourth, cross-border crimes are increasing in frequency, magnitude and seriousness. For example:

- In the case of smuggling, it has spread from the costal areas in the south-east, e.g. Hong Kong and Macau, to the north of Changjiang, e.g. Shandong and Liaoning.

- Since 1992, smuggling activities are getting more organized, internationalized and out in the open. The smuggling vessels are getting larger. The smuggled goods are getting more expensive. The smugglers are getting better equipped and armed. For example, from January 1992 to August 1993, the Guangdong PSB seized 87 smuggling vessels and a total of RMB 1.56 billion worth of goods. In 1988 there were forty-two RMB 1 million seizures. In 1994, there were 767 seizures of such values (Xian 1997: 214).

- In 1995, there were 57,524 drug trafficking cases, an increase of 51.2% (38,033) from 1994. This represents 4,564 more cases than the total of all cases from 1990 to 1993 combined (Xian 1997: 215).

- In 1992 there were 17,166 illegal immigrants arrests, an increase of 17% from 1991 (Xian 1997:218).

- Finally in the case of cross-border organized crime, criminal gangs (*heshehui*) are extending their influence from the south-eastern costal cities, e.g. Shenzhen and Hainan, to inland provinces, e.g. to Helungjian, Shanxi, Liaonin, Hunan, Sichuan and Beijing. Between 1983 to 1996, the PSB has uncovered 80 cross-border gangs, operating in ten provinces and involving many countries, e.g. Hong Kong (10 gangs), Macau (15 gangs) and Taiwan (20 gangs) and others (USA, UK, Japan) (Xian 1997: 229).

The causes of cross- border crimes in China

There are many reasons accounting for the growth, spread, proliferation and deterioration of cross-border crimes in China, chief amongst which is China's decision to modernize itself by way of economic reform and market opening (Beijing Review: 1978: 6-15). The other factor is globalization of trade (Times 4/13/98). The convergence of domestic modernization efforts and international globalization trend resulted in the movement of people, things, ideas and culture in an unprecedented scale. This created ideal conditions for across border crimes, i.e. a lot of motivated offenders, many criminal opportunities and decrease in guardianship over things and people (Cohen and Felson 1979: 588-605).

Problems with cross-border crimes between PRC-Hong Kong

The cross-border crime problem is most acutely felt along the coastal areas of China, e.g. Guangzhou, especially in SEZs, e.g. Shenzhen and Zhuhai. The Shenzhen SEZ was established by "Guangdong Province Special Economic Zone Regulations" in August of 1980 to attract foreign investment, facilitate technology transfer and promote trade. In the economic developmental process, the SEZ attracted a large number investors and alien workers, as well as criminals (Wang 1990: 1). "As mainland China opens up to the world, outside criminals -- especially Hong Kong and Taiwan triads, along with those living in overseas Chinatowns -- are helping to swell the ranks of the several thousand triad societies estimated to exist in the country." (CNN.com 3/18/2002).

Cross-border criminals have few local ties and escape local control. One of the major characteristics of cross-border crimes in Shenzhen is that most of them are perpetrated by residents from Hong Kong and Macau. Some of the most common cross-border crimes are smuggling between Hong Kong and Shenzhen (China Daily 1/9/2002). Others include Hong Kong gangs going to Shenzhen to commit crime and exhort money (San Francisco Chronicle 5/28/97) Hong Kong and PRC criminals avoid justice by fleeing into the other jurisdiction (China Daily 8/12/2003). Hong Kong people going to Shenzhen for prostitution (Reuters 9/9/98) PRC criminals going to Hong Kong to commit crimes (Wang 1990: 2-5).

There are a number of reasons contributing to cross-border crimes between PRC-HKSAR. First, the border between PRC-HKSAR is long and porous. This makes for ease of entry and exit. Second, there is a wide economic disparity between PRC and Hong Kong. This creates incentives and opportunities for criminals from both sides of the border to make a "fast buck" on the other side (Vagg 1992:301), e.g. with stolen vehicles moving north and prostitutes going south. Third, HKSAR has a more matured legal process and humane penal system. PRC criminals prefer "doing business" in Hong Kong; the associated risks and costs are much lower. Fourth, PRC has a more corrupted and inefficient criminal justice system; officials can be bribed and the system can be compromised (People's Daily 12/1/03). Hong Kong criminals prefer to "buying justice" in China (People's Daily 12/18/2000). Fifth, PRC and Hong Kong has no cross-border cooperative agreement. This encourages criminals to exploit the incompatibility in criminal justice systems to their advantage, e.g. PRC police cannot investigate crimes in HK (Leung 1999).

PRC – Hong Kong practices towards cross-border crimes

  This part of the article examines PRC – Hong Kong cooperative efforts and joint ventures in fighting cross-border crimes; past and present. Particularly, it addresses the question of how PRC – HK police deal with cross-border crimes without the existence of a formal cooperation structure and official assistance agreement? More significantly, what are the problems and issues confronting PSB and HKP when fighting cross-border crimes under "one country two systems."

Obstacles to cross-border cooperation

  Currently there is no formal cooperative structure or process, e.g. rendition or mutual assistant agreement, between PRC and HKSAR government to facilitate the handling – investigation or prosecution - of cross-border crimes and criminals (Wong 1999). Existing cooperation is carried on in an informal, ad hoc and contingent basis.

  The lack of an official agreement is not due to the failure of efforts, but in spite of them. The lack of meaningful cooperation between HKP and PSB resulted from a number of factors; historical, ideological, and legal.

  Historically, Hong Kong was a British colony.   It was fiercely independent and anti-communist. Up until 1997, the British - Hong Kong government has few incentives to work with the PRC government, which was perceived to be a hostile regime. For the most part, the relationship was a detached and antagonistic one. The Chinese government rejected the British colonialists on nationalistic and ideological grounds. The British government resented the Chinese communists for political and cultural reasons (Welsh 1993). After 1997, the British colonialists might have left but the mutual suspicion and antagonism between the two states did not dissipate overnight.   This makes cooperation between PSB and HKP a most difficult undertaking.

  Ideological, PRC and Hong Kong cannot be further apart. Up until 1979, China was a communist state and totalitarian regime. Since 1979, under the leadership of Mao, Deng and Jiang, the country has adopted a water-down version of communism ideology, i.e. socialism with Chinese characteristics. Still, ideological purity is required of the Party officials and political correctness is expected of common citizens. From the beginning of time and until very recently (after 1997), Hong Kong thrives on capitalistic first principles and operated as a free port. Political Ideologies are not welcomed in Hong Kong. People in Hong Kong are a pragmatic lot (Hughes 1968). This has led Prof. Endacott to observe that Hong Kong people are not politically apathetic as much they cannot be bothered with politics (Endacott 1964:244). Given this apolitical ethos, the Hong Kong people have reasons to be suspicious, if not even fearful, of PRC regime. June 4, 1989 is a good political lesson for Hong Kong. To the Hong Kong people and the Hong Kong government, then as now, it is best to avoid any unnecessary contacts with the PRC government. It is feared that any such contacts - cooperation or collaboration – might lead to the diminution of Hong Kong's way of life, e.g. corruption free government and rule of law judiciary (Fordham 1999).

  Finally, legally, the British and PRC governments have negotiated for the return of Hong Kong under Deng's "one country two system" formula. The political – constitutional settlement provided that HKSAR is to be administered independently and autonomously from the PRC for 50 years. The "one country two systems" as secured by

the Basic Law has been interpreted *literally* to preclude any ideological convergence, policy coordination and operational cooperation between PRC and HKSAR, including law and order issues (Zhao and He 1995).

Attempts at cooperative agreements

In the past, the PRC and Hong Kong governments have made many unsuccessful attempts to set-up a cooperative framework to deal with cross-border crime issues, e.g. transferring of criminals between PRC and HKSAR (Xian 1997:458-460; Wong 1999; Chan and Lam 2001). The main obstacle in reaching a rendition agreement resulted a lack of confidence in PRC criminal justice system by the Hong Kong public and officials alike (Wong 2002). Specifically, Hong Kong insisted that criminals returning to China not having to face capital punishment (Tai Kung Pao 11/13/98). It was feared that the return of criminals to China without such a written guarantee would violate Hong Kong's domestic commitment to the rule of law and international obligations under human rights treaties. The PRC government saw it as a challenge to their political sovereignty and violation of "one country two system" constitutional principles.[2]

In this regard, HKSAR government is bound by domestic legislation, i.e. Chinese Expatriation Ordinance (Cap. 235) which provides that fugitives will not be extradited or rendered without an undertaking by the requesting country that the fugitive would not be sentenced to death upon return.

The "FINAL REPORT ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS, EXTRADITION, AND OTHER RELATED ISSUES" (Special Group on Law 1997) further suggests that any agreement to return criminals to China must follow international norms and practice (The Extradition (Hong Kong) Ordinance), i.e. double criminality (First Schedule), prima facie rule (Section 10), political crimes not extraditable (Section 3), and previous crime not sought for extradition not to be tried upon return (Section 19). (Compare Fugitive Offenders Ordinance; Chan and Lam 2001: 24-27).

During the Basic Law drafting process, there were extensive discussions over the issue of judicial assistance. At that time Hong Kong's negotiation stance was informed by three basic principles (***Ming Bao***, 11/9/98):

(1)   the rendition offense must also be a crime in Hong Kong, i.e. the double criminality rule;
(2)   the difference in punishment between PRC and HK should not be too wide, e.g. PRC with death penalty vs. HK without any death penalty;
(3)   there must be clear criminal procedures safeguarding the rights of defendants.

Finally, on November 27, 1998, the HKSAR government established the following principles in its future negotiation with China over a rendition agreement: (1) rendition agreement must conform to Article 95 of the Basic Law; (2) any rendition arrangement

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[2] United Nation has a model rendition/extradition agreement. The model agreement does not mandate that the returned criminal be exempted from capital punishment. For example, England and Canada both have discretion not to return in capital cases. However, England has on two occasions returned to Germany two capital offenders without extracting a promise of exemption from death penalty. Hong Kong has strictly abided by a no capital punishment rule in the past (*Hong Kong Economic Journal* 12/ 4/98).

must follow Hong Kong Laws; (3) any rendition agreement must be acceptable to Hong Kong and the PRC; (4) any agreement must take into account the principle of "one country two systems" and the differences between the two legal systems. Such a rendition agreement should protect people's right s well as preventing cross-border crime from avoiding justice; (5) all rendition must comply with Article 19 of the Basic Law (Hong Kong Economic Journal 11/28/98:4)

On December 8, 1998, the Secretary for Security has made one critical change to her five earlier principles for negotiating a rendition agreement with the PRC, i.e. Hong Kong will not insist on a waiver of death penalty by the PRC as a condition of return mainland China criminals captured in Hong Kong (Hong Kong Economic Journal 12/4/98).

The existence of alternate working arrangements

The lack of formal cooperative structure and official agreement between PRC and HKSAR does not deny the need for cross-border cooperation, e.g. in exchanging criminal intelligence, in investigating crimes, in executing court papers, in locating suspects, in surrendering fugitives and in mounting joint operations (Chen 1996: 45).

Lacking a local agreement, PRC-Hong Kong-Macau pursued police cooperation by and through the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), first established in 1923 (Xian 1997: 461). Hong Kong and PRC are both members of the INTERPOL. They both share criminal intelligence and provide mutual assistance as fellow INTERPOL members and according to INTERPOL protocols (Xian 1997: Ch. 7). China has established an INTERPOL National Central Bureaux in Beijing in the 1984. Hong Kong has always been an INTERPOL member on account of British colonial rule.

Active cooperation between PSB and HKP began in earnest in 1985 when China invited the Commissioner of then Royal Hong Kong Police Hong Kong in his capacity as the INTERPOL representative to Beijing to exchange views and set forth avenue for cooperation (Beijing Review 1/17/94). The parties agreed upon five areas of cooperation:

(1)   Both parties agreed to establish regular channels and ad hoc working sessions to exchange views and discuss matters on how to improve and expand the scope of mutual cooperation. China agreed to establish an INTERPOL liaison center in Guangdong in 1987 to facilitate liaison work with Hong Kong.
(2)   Both sides agreed to exchange information on hijacking.
(3)   Both sides agreed to exchange intelligence and information over currency crimes. Hong Kong agreed to provide experts to train PRC police in examining and discriminating counterfeit money.
(4)   Both sides agreed to exchange intelligence and information over drugs. Both sides would exchange drug enforcement officers.
(5)   Both sides agreed to exchange intelligence and information of smuggling of cultural relics. Hong Kong further agreed to stop the flow of Chinese cultural relics from being smuggled to Hong Kong and exported abroad.

Since then, PRC and HKSAR police officials have agreed to meet twice a year in a joint forum called: "China-Hong Kong INTERPOL bilateral working session" (Wu 1996: 361) to be held alternatively in Hong Kong and Beijing. By 1995, there were 21 such

meetings. In 2000, Guangdong, Hong Kong, Macau police has agreed to meet three times a year to increase cooperation and intensify crack down on cross-border crime (China Daily 8/23/2002).

According to unconfirmed data, from 1985 to 1995, the PSB have assisted the HKP with 10,000 more criminal cases. In return the HKP have only assisted China through the INTERPOL in handling 500 cases (Xian 1997: 459). For example, in the early part of 1986, two mainland police officers were allowed to visit Hong Kong twice to investigate three major corruption cases happened in Hubei, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. In 1987, HKP assisted PSB officers in investiating a corruption case involving a Dongfang (Oriental) Hotel manger.

In 1992 the PSB and HKP decided to improve their level of cooperation as a result of increased in cross-border violence and gang instigated crimes. Thus, at the fifteenth "China-Hong Kong INTERPOL bilateral working session" both sides agreed upon the following measures to increase communication and exchange of information: (1) The Ministry of Public Security would stationed an permanent official in Hong Kong to facilitate the gathering and transmission of information. (2) In order to improve upon the effectiveness of the PRC - INTERPOL liaison centre in Guangdong, the center would be upgraded and led by Guangdong PSB head, Chen Shaoji. This allowed for more effective communication and better coordination between HKP and Guangdong PSB. (3) In order to improve upon coordination of operations and facilitation of communication between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, Shenzhen-Hong Kong liaison office would be directed by Shenzhen PSB head, Liang Da. (4) To improve upon communication and exchange of intelligence and information, both sides agreed to establish a 24 hrs duty officer (Xian 1997:460).

In practice, the Hong Kong police routinely inform the PSB about the existence of dangerous or at large Hong Kong criminals, as part of INTERPOL protocol; especially when they fled into China or planned on committing crimes in China (McClean 1992). This is an open secret. Granville Cross, the Director of Public Prosecution has observed: "Without such an (rendition) agreement, the mainland authorities, nonetheless, have assisted Hong Kong through administrative arrangements to secure the return of suspected criminals who are Hong Kong residents." Information, such as request for mutual assistance, is transmitted to the other side by way of a "speaking note." (*suo tie*) (SCMP 11/4/1998).

The working relationship between PSB and HKP by and through the "China-Hong Kong INTERPOL bilateral working session" and "Guangdong-Hong Kong border liaison annual working meeting" is a cordial and effective one. Since 1987 and until 1997, Guangdong and Hong Kong have exchanged 471 "speaking notes" for mutual assistance. Through the years PSB and especially Guangdong police has provided material assistance in the investigation of many serious crimes, e.g. robberies, drugs smuggling, commercial crimes, kidnappings and car thefts. Theoretically, PSB is free to act or not to act upon the information supplied or request initiated by HKP officials. However, in practice, the PSB usually act upon the information with due diligence, zealousness and in a timely fashion. Upon finding the suspect or criminal, the PSB would inform the HKP about when and where the criminal suspect would be "expelled" from

the PRC and into the welcome arms of the HKP.[3] Between 1990 and 1995, the Guangdong PSB arrested and transferred to Hong Kong 70 Hong Kong criminals, including the number two most wanted person from Hong Kong, Ye Yusheng (Wu 1996: 362). In 1995 alone, there were 18 cases of criminals transfers (Wu 1996: 366). By October 1997, there were 111 such transfers altogether.

Guangdong PSB also helped HKP in the interdiction of drugs, rescue of kidnap victims, and recovery of stolen properties, e.g. thus far PRC has returned 110 stolen vehicles and 9 luxury yachts to Hong Kong. In 1998 (Jan. to Nov. 5) there were 17 cases of transfer of criminals (Hong Kong Economic Journal 12/12/98).

The impression one gather from such official data is that the pattern of PSB returning criminals to Hong Kong is a consistent one (Table 1):

- from 1990 – 1994 (52/48 or 1.1/month)
- from 1994-1995 (18/12 or 1.5/month)
- from 1995 – 1997 (31/24 or 1.3/month)
- from 1997 - Nov. 5 1998 (17 or 1.54/month)

Table 1: Numbers of Hong Kong fugitives transferred from the mainland: 1990 – 1997:

Nature of Offence	1990 to 1997	Jan. 1998 to Nov. 11, 1999
Murder, manslaughter, homicide	15	1
Assault, injury to person	6	--
Rape	3	3
Kidnapping, unlawful detention	5	2
Robbery	21	--
Blackmail	4	1
Arson	2	--
Burglary, theft, receiving stolen property	20	5
Fraud, forgery, coinage	6	3
Dangerous drugs offenses	19	1
Possession of arms and ammunition	2	--
Others	8	1
Total	111	17

Source: Figures supplied by Secretary for Security.
Notes: (1) Transferring of fugitives from PRC is only an informal administrative arrangement. (2) The transfer of fugitives only involved transferring of fugitives from PRC to Hong Kong. (3) Such transfers only applied to fugitives who were Hong Kong residents committing crimes in Hong Kong. (4) If the fugitive had committed crime in mainland, he would have to return to

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[3] Interview with a retired Chief Superintendent of Police, HKP, who was in charge of PSB-HKP border liaison, numerous discussions, 1999 to 2000.

Hong Kong after the mainland criminal proceeding was completed (Hong Kong Economic Journal 12/12/98).

A typical 'Guangzhou-Hong Kong border working meeting" (1999) agenda would have the Guangzhou party raising the following issues: management of the Shenzhen river project, transfer of Guanzhou-Hong Kong criminals, compensation for dead fishes at Dingling island outside Zhuhai municipality, proper scope and issues of Guangzhou-Hong Kong border work meeting and cross-border smuggling issues.

Since 1991, the level of cooperation and material assistance offered by PSB in fighting cross-border crimes has been openly acknowledged by past HKP Commissioners of Police (CP) in growing terms. In 1991, the CP complemented the PSB for offering cooperation and assistance to HKP in foiling a number of smuggling rings (Police Annual Report 1991). In 1992, the CP observed that the cooperation between HKP and PSB continued to improve. This was attested to by the fact that many Hong Kong fugitives were being returned by the PSB during the year (Police Annual Report 1992). In 1993, the CP noted that PSB and HKP cooperation led to the breaking up of a number of key cross-border gangs and returning of many Hong Kong criminals on the run (Police Annual Report 1993). In 1994, the CP commented that problems of cross-border crimes and fugitives were increasingly being controlled as a result of the excellent working relationship and active cooperation between HKP and PSB (Police Annual Report 1994). In 1995, the CP welcomed the MPS public affirmation that China would not tolerate criminals entering China from Hong Kong. CP wanted more PSB and HKP cooperation, in sharing information or mounting join operations. Finally, CP applauded successful PSB-HKP cooperation thus far, as evident by continue and consistent monthly return of Hong Kong fugitives by PSB (Police Annual Report 1994).

The overall conclusion one obtains from this brief historical account of PRC-HKSAR cooperation over cross-border crimes is that there is at all time a healthy dialogue between PSB and HKP officials, especially in cases involving the location of serious criminals and foiling of dangerous gangs. However, the record also shows that with respect to the return of suspects and fugitives, the exchange has always been very much a one-way street, i.e. from China to Hong Kong, and not the other way around. This picture of police cooperation is best depicted by Hong Kong CP in a press conference over Hong Kong public order in January of 1996:

> "Hong Kong police has been cooperating with the mainland public
> security now for over ten years, the achievements are everywhere in
> evidence. In 1995 alone, with the cooperation of the mainland public
> security, there were 18 criminals repatriated to Hong Kong. With car
> thefts, 14 container tractors and 8 luxury cars were recovered and returned
> in 1995. Two other luxury yachts were also found and returned." (Wu
> 1996: 366)

It is thus not correct to assert, as some did, that the PRC political authority in general and the PSB in particular has been interfering with Hong Kong's justice administration and legal autonomy. It appears that Hong Kong has not been cooperative in rendering police and judicial assistance to PRC legal and police authorities (Liu 1997: 32-37). This lop-

sided cross-border mutual PSB – HKP cooperation scheme has been described by a PRC author as an "unequal" (*bu pingdeng*) relationship:

> "For example, in cases of extradition of criminals, when Hong Kong residents committed crime in Hong Kong and fled to China, the Guanzhou (police) would use heir utmost effort to arrest the suspect and transfer him to Hong Kong once they received a request to do so. However when Hong Kong residents or mainland criminals committed crimes in the mainland and fled to Hong Kong, Hong Kong police often received the request for assistant to investigate, but would not extradite the criminals on account of differences in legal system." (Wu 1996: 367)

Illustrative cases of successful PSB-HKP cooperation

The following cases best describe the nature and degree of PSB-HKP cross-border crime cooperation. These reported cases contribute to our understanding of how PSB and HKP worked together in fighting cross-border crimes in a professional manner (Wu 1996: 379-390).

1. "King Fook" and "Po Shing" jewelry shops armed robbery
On August 28, 1990, two jewelry shops in Hong Kong – "King Fook" and "Po Shing" – were robbed by armed robbers of $4 million Hong Kong dollars of jewelry. The HKP quickly identified two suspects (from mainland) who later fled into China. The HKP sent two police officers to Guangdong – PSB to ask for assistance. Within 12 hours, the two mainland suspects were arrested. Both were prosecuted and tried in China according to PRC criminal law since they were PRC nationals.

2. Armored car armed robbery
On July 12, 1991, an armored cash vehicle from Kai Tak Airport was robbed at gun point of 169 million U.S. dollars. The HKP Deputy Assistant of Commissioner of Police went to Guangzhou to seek help from the Guangzhou – PSB. The Guangdong police notified all banks in Guangzhou province of the robbery. They were instructed to be on the looked out for the criminals and the loots. When one of the major robbers appeared with the robbed US dollars, he was arrested and returned to Hong Kong.

3. Chow Sang Sang jewelry shop armed robbery
On April 23, 1992 at 6.50 p.m. the Chow Sang Sang Jewelry Shop at 529 Nathan Road in Kowloon was robbed by five people with machine guns. They escaped. On April 24, 1992 the five suspected robbers had a firefight with the HKP officers using AK47 and grenades. 17 people were injured, including 5 police officers and 12 citizens. On April 28, 1992 the HKP requested the Guangdong – PSB to assist in the arrest of the five suspected criminals, including: Feng Wei-han, "rat An", Pan Wei-xue, and Pan Wei-min. On May 8, 1992 the PSB arrested Feng Wei-han (a HK resident) and turned him over to the HKP for disposition.

4. Shui Hing majong shop armed robbery and murder

In the evening of May 5, 1995, Hong Kong criminal Wong Kin-wai conspired with three China criminals to rob Shui Hing majong shop in Kowloon. Three Hong Kong people were killed. The police shot and injured three criminals. On May 10, 1992, the HKP requested the assistance of Guangdong – PSB through the INTERPOL. Upon receiving the request, the Guangdong – PSB formed a special task force and arrested the three mainland criminal defendants – Cen Wei-hong, Li Ganfei, and Tang Yuzhang (all mainland residents). The Guangdong – PSB further sent a team of police officers to Hong Kong to work with HKP on sharing intelligence information and developing leads. Cen and Li were later arrested, tried and executed in China according to PRC law. Tang was sentenced to death with execution suspended.

The overall impression one gets from these cases is that when the crime was committed in Hong Kong by mainland residents they would be prosecuted and punished inside China. When crimes were committed in Hong Kong by Hong Kong residents they would be transferred back to Hong Kong for prosecution. The HKP-PSB has a good working relationship in seeing to it that cross-border criminals are getting their share of justice wherever they are.

PSB's perspective on cross-border cooperation between PSB-HKP
The problem of lack of cooperation
Overall, the PSB has reasons to be concerned about the level of cooperation they are getting from the HKP. Notwithstanding the rise in cross-border crimes between China and Hong Kong, the HKP has been less than helpful, for legal and political reasons, to assist PSB in their law enforcement activities. For example, a typical case in 1989 involved a criminal who have robbed and killed people in Guangzhou. He fled to Hong Kong. The Goungdong PSB requested the HKP to arrest the fugitive and turn him over to the Chinese authority. The HKP refused do so. The fugitive was arrested and charged with possession of illegal immigration documents. He was sentenced to 20 months in prison.
Consistent with the above cited case, the Hong Kong government has routinely rejected rendition requests from the mainland based on numerous, some say spurious, grounds: no crime has been committed in Hong Kong; not sufficient evidence has been produced by PSB; the capital crime offender is not extraditable on humanitarian grounds; the criminal should be prosecuted in Hong Kong (SCMP 6/30/95).   This has led one seasoned PSB official to observe that Hong Kong has been made a safe haven for PRC fugitives from justice. In fact, once a criminal fled into Hong Kong there is little the PRC police can do to bring him to justice in China (Liu 1997: 32-7).
This lack of cooperation has led the PSB, on occasions, to take the law into their own hands, e.g. by luring suspects, criminals and fugitives who has fled from China into in Hong Kong back to China by extra-legal means. More disturbingly, the PSB officers have entered Hong Kong territory to conduct investigation or make arrests without noticing HKSAR and in violation of "one country two system" principles. For example, the HKP CP Hui Ki-an has acknowledged in public that PRC pubic security has been entering Hong Kong waters to arrest criminals on many occasions, such as in hot pursuit of smugglers (Hong Kong Economic Journal 1/18/1995).

Illustrative cases of failure of co-operations between PSB-HKP

The multi-jurisdictional cross-border robbery on board of the hydrofoil "Eastern Star" best illustrates the lack of reciprocal cooperation by the HKP to PSB police request for assistance. On June 13, 1995, Liang Bin, the suspect who masterminded the robbery of "Eastern Star" fled to Hong Kong. In November of 1995, the Chinese INTERPOL National Central Bureaux Chief, Zhu Yin-tao, formally asked Hong Kong to return Liang Bin to China at the "Guangdong-Hong Kong border liaison annual working meeting" but to no avail. He complained to the Hong Kong press that Hong Kong should not be a safe haven for cross-border criminals (Wu 1966: 368).

Another case is the Wah Ye watch and jewelry shop murder and robbery case. On December 28, 1989 at about 9 p.m. the Wah Ye watch and jewelry shop in Guangzhou was robbed by three armed robbers. The robbers killed one shopkeeper and a security guard. They escaped with RMB 100,000 of jewelry. In May of 1990 the Guangzhou PSB arrested two suspects – Guo Rui and Li Ping-wei. They were prosecuted and sentenced to death. The other principle criminal – Lu Jing escaped to Hong Kong. The Guangzhou PSB sought help from HKP through the INTERPOL. In early December of 1991 the suspect Lu Jing was arrested by the Hong Kong immigration authority for entering Hong Kong with a false passport. The Guangzhou PSB again asked for Lu's return to stand trial. The HKP refused to turn Lu Jing over but prosecuted him for using a false passport and illegal stay. The HKP however promised to return Lu Jing after he served his sentence in Hong Kong.

Conclusion:

This article of first impression reported upon how the PSB and HKP come to work together in fighting growing and pressing cross-border problems; notwithstanding historical, ideological and legal factors keeping the two legal jurisdictions apart.

The article began by observing that notwithstanding a lack of formal cooperative structure and official agreement the HKP and PSB has developed official channels of communication and informal working arrangements to deal with cross-border criminality at the operational level since 1985.

One such channel of cooperation is the INTERPOL. In 1987, the PSB set up an INTERPOL (branch) liaison centre in Guangdong to work with HKP. PSB and HKP officials meet twice a year in the "China-Hong Kong INTERPOL bilateral working session" to share intelligence and discuss mutual concerns. PSB and HKP also established an INTERPOL liaison officer system in Shenzhen to facilitate mutual cooperation on a daily basis on such matters as sharing of criminal intelligence, assisting in criminal investigation, authenticating documents, identifying accident victims, locating missing persons, searching for evidence, summoning witnesses, enforcing confiscation and forfeiture orders, attacking drug smuggling and searching wanted suspects and criminals (Wu 1996: 362).

It is the central thesis of this article that in order to effectively combat cross-border crimes, meaningful cooperation between PSB and HKP is a necessary, though not sufficient condition. Such a cooperative arrangement, in order to be successful, must be able to address the question of: How to structure a functional working relationship

between PSB and HKP under the rubric of "one country two systems" such that their mutual interested are enhanced and respective sovereignty is protected.

On the surface, the challenge appears to be a legal one. Particularly, how to give meaning to the principle of "one-country two systems" or interpret the phrase of "a high degree of autonomy." With deeper reflection, the answer depends on how to creatively resolve day-to-day working issues between two radically different criminal justice systems that are separated by history but joint by destiny, such that both parties can derive mutual satisfaction and receive common benefits from the working compact. In practical terms, this means forging consensus instead of accentuating differences and fostering cooperation instead of creating alienation between two drastically different criminal justice systems that are not only forced to live with each other under one roof ("one country two systems") but also compelled to work with each other to deal with common concerns (cross-border crimes).

In the final analysis, cross-border cooperation is about structuring a functional relationship between strategic partners with divergent values but share common interests. More simply put, it is about seeking (relative) independence within an (absolute) inter-dependent world.

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Assessing the relationship of Organizational Culture and Private Security Officer's perceptions of Police and Auxiliary Police Officers in Singapore

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Abstract

In this paper, security guards perceptions of police officers and auxiliary police officers in Singapore are examined. More specifically, this study examines whether there are systematic differences among guards' perceptions from various companies on various issues of relationships with police and auxiliary police officers. Responses were received from 300 private security guards and supervisors (of 400 distributed surveys) employed in four security guard companies. The findings suggest that respondents generally held positive views of their relationship with both Singapore Police Officers as well as Singapore Auxiliary Officers. Further, there were systematic differences in how security officers from different security companies perceived their relationship with police officers and auxiliary police officers. Findings and implications are discussed.

Introduction

Organizations, like all communities are identifiable by distinct cultural elements such as values, leadership, and rituals. The manner in which specific organizations conduct their business, treat their employees and customers, interact with their customers reflects corporate culture. The specific organizational attributes of leadership, goals, and values of a company determine the type of employees hired, the nature of training offered, and how employees think and act (Deal and Kennedy 1982). The company's culture is easily distinguishable by its unique traits. For instance, Detroit, Michigan is the home of three major automobile producers in the world. They are located adjacent to each other (Nalla and Newman 1990). Though the major goals of all three companies are the same, they have very distinct and identifiable culture. Key factors, which shape the culture, include strong leadership and core set of shared values and beliefs, which shape the way they conduct business (Deal and Kennedy 1982; Weitz 2004).

Private security organizations are no different. Leadership and core set of shared values and beliefs shape how security firms operate. These factors shape how organizations select and train security guards, how guards dress and perform duties, how much they are paid and how they view the world (Nalla and Newman). One of the dimensions they deal with in their normal course of work is interactions with customers and other similarly situated personnel in public life, that is, police officers and auxiliary police officers. With the increase in the number of people employed in the security guard industry in Singapore has given rise to increasing contacts with Singapore police officers, and Auxiliary police officers on a regular basis. However, no systematic analysis has been conducted to examine the nature of these relationships. Popular culture suggests that law enforcement officers do not have favorable opinions of private security in the developed market economies such as the United States (Nalla and Hummer 1999). It is unclear, however, if such assumptions are accurate in emerging economies such as Singapore, South Korea, and India. In this paper, we examine private security officers' views of their relationship with Singapore Police Officers and Auxiliary Police Officers and if these differences are influenced by organizational cultures of their respective companies.

Background

The private security industry in Singapore has seen a considerable growth in the number of people employing security guards and ancillary services. Spurred on by the heightened challenges in protecting national security, the government has committed the Singapore Police Force (SPF) to working with private security to enhance security awareness and professionalism (Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs 2002). The data suggests that in 2001 there were 11,102 full-time SPF officers, including 7,534 regular officers, 1,051 civilian officers and 2,517 National Servicemen available to serve a population of 4.13 million (Singapore Police Force 2002, Singapore Department of Statistics 2002). This represents a gradual decrease of 1,471 officers over the four-year period of 1998-2001, while during the same period the population increased by about 210,000. However, during that same time the SPF increased support from its reservist forces, which increased by 1,103 from 19,374 in 1998 to 20,477 in 2001.

Besides the state police and private security, Singapore has a hybrid law enforcement called the auxiliary police officer (APO). Typically these officers have the same powers as do the state police within their area of jurisdiction for example, for guarding the airport or some other government facility. (Singapore Statutes 1985, Chapter 235, Section 71[1]). Auxiliary police forces have mandatory training requirements, which are similar to the training requirements of state police; they carry firearms, have the same ranking system and wear uniforms, which are sometimes identical to those of state police. Auxiliary police forces provide security services such as cash-in-transit armed escort, crowd control and guarding of key installations which private security officers are not legally qualified or trained to undertake. Auxiliary police forces work for profit and are paid by specific customers.

Private security providers in Singapore generally offer three types of services – guarding, investigation, and consulting services. There are licensing requirements for persons wishing to establish agencies offering guarding and investigation services under the Private Investigation and Security Agencies Act (Singapore Statutes 1985, Chapter 249). Licenses are issued by the Licensing Division of the Police Operations Department, which also provides guidelines and other requirements (Nalla and Lim 2003). The Licensing Division issues some public guidelines on the eligibility criteria for a security guard agency license. Data suggests that in 2002, there were 301 security guard agencies holding licenses and employing a total of 10,433 guards (Nalla and Lim 2003).

Prior Literature on Private Security in Singapore

Very little research was available on the nature of the private security industry in Singapore. Nalla and Hoffman in 1996 examined Singapore security guards' perceptions of training needs. The findings suggest that security guards viewed that government-sponsored training will greatly enhance their image, as well as to upgrade their professionalism. The findings also suggest that there was a consensus on the specific elements of training necessary for security guards. In a related study, Nalla and Lim (2003) examined the attitudes of college students toward security guards. The findings suggest that respondents generally held positive attitudes toward private security officers. While they held less positive views on some issues, it was more likely that they were less certain than negative about security officers. Further analysis reveals observable differences based on subjects' demographic characteristics. These differences were strongest for income, work status, and "contact" variables, with some support gained for variables related to years in school, residence in parents' homes, and family employment in law enforcement.

The study by Nalla, Hoffman, and Christian (1996) in which they examined Singapore security guards' views on the nature of their relationship with Singapore police officers may be more closely related to the focus of the present study. Nalla and his colleagues found in their study that security guards do not have a positive view of their relationships with police officers. However, the respondents were optimistic that in the future these relationships will improve if police organizations are more responsible in promoting private security's role in protecting the wider community. The present study not only reexamines this issue seven years later, but also incorporates the question of

variations, if any, that are present among security guards from different security companies and how they view their relationships with not only Singapore police officers but also Singapore auxiliary police officers.

THE PRESENT STUDY

The data for this research were gathered from four security companies in Singapore who agreed to randomly distribute the surveys among their security officers. The four companies have distinct organizational cultures and are acknowledged in the industry to be significant players due to their staff size, strength and previous track record. They are listed as companies A, B, C, and D. Interviews were conducted with managers in all of the four companies. A list of questions was developed to ascertain specific information on the same issues from all the four chosen companies.

To assess the security officers' perceptions, a questionnaire was developed with items from earlier research conducted in the United States by the first author. The questionnaire was modified to suit the demographic characteristics of Singapore. Questions were asked concerning the issues of the nature of security officers' relationships with police officers and auxiliary police, strategies for improving relationships with police officers and auxiliary police, and finally, the expected nature of their relationships in the future. Responses were elicited on a Likert Scale with the range of 1 (Strongly agree) to 4 (Strongly disagree). A total of 400 questionnaires were distributed to security guards in the four chosen companies out of which 300 surveys were returned representing a 75 percent response rate.

Characteristics of the Security Companies

Company A

This company, started in 1981 and incorporated in 1983, is one of oldest established security companies. Its founder is a retired military personnel and the company's chief executive officer. This company consists of a force of about 560 guards through its operation managers and operation executives, many of whom are former military and police personnel. The company does not market its services actively, but relies on its word-of-mouth reputation to obtain new clients.

Company A pays its guards salaries that are slightly higher than market rates, but which are probably the lowest of the four companies surveyed. It runs its own training school and ensures its guards undergo basic training at the school and its supervisors undergo executive courses. As for staff benefits, they are in compliance with legislative requirements in terms of annual leave and working hours. Staff is encouraged to give feedback through their immediate supervisors; however, if and when guards resign from work, the founder personally conducts exit interviews to ascertain the reasons and to see if they can be dissuaded from leaving. Its clients are a mix of private and public sector entities. Of the four companies surveyed, Company A appears relatively flexible in the rates it charges its clients, and hence is able to charge at the lower end of the range for the four companies.

Company B

Though incorporated in 2001, the founder of this company had been carrying on a security services agency as a sole proprietorship (unincorporated) since 1990. The founder, a retired police officer, runs the company, with his wife performing a largely supportive role. Its turnover is growing and currently stands at about S$10 million.

The founder, now in his late fifties, manages the company through his operation managers, all of whom are former police officers. Naturally, the corporate culture incorporates aspects of police culture, with procedures akin to police procedures being adopted.

There is a high emphasis on training in Company B, and the founder is demonstrates impressive commitment and up-to-date knowledge about national training schemes, courses available and pending reforms. Company B runs its own training school. The staff is paid relatively well and has reasonable employment benefits. Feedback from guards is usually given to their immediate supervisors (the operation executives) through daily interactions at the job sites. Its clients are mainly private sector organizations such as banks and other commercial organizations.

Company C

Formed in 1992, Company C is the only company out of the four surveyed to be situated in the Central Business District. There are three shareholders who are business partners, two of them executive directors and one a nonexecutive director. The directors are from private security and commercial backgrounds rather than law enforcement or the military. Each of them holds about one-third of the total paid up share capital of S$25,000 The two executive directors are in their forties, energetic and flamboyant.

The commercial focus of the company is evident. Its executive office is plush and retrofitted with modern furnishings. Its informative website carries a clearly articulated mission statement and operating philosophy, espousing its aim to be a market leader in delivering quality guard services to its customers rather than emphasizing the number of sites serviced. Its avowed policies include paying wages above market rates and providing a career path for its employees. Other employee benefits include health and medical coverage, being sent for training and executive programs. It does not run its own training school. It has a staff of about 500 including administration and management. Staff feedback is usually to the immediate supervisors but the directors' contact numbers are given to the guards. Its clients are mainly from the private sector.

Company D

Company D is the only company out of the four surveyed which has an injection of foreign corporate culture. It was incorporated in 1985 by a local company in partnership with a foreign company established in providing security systems. Sometime in 1990, the local company decided to divest its share in the company and sold it to a Singaporean individual with a background in finance, who is now its Managing Director. There are four directors, of which two are nominees of the foreign corporate shareholder and are based overseas and therefore seldom are involved in executive decisions. The other two directors are the Singaporean and his wife, the latter of whom plays no part in running the business.

The company provides guard services as part of a range of other services including consultancy and security systems. Since its inception, Company D had imbibed the culture of the foreign partner by investing in quality manpower and training,

and has carried on marketing itself as a brand name in security manpower for which its clients pay a premium. In 1985, this company already had a training school, which was fairly progressive for the Singapore security manpower industry.

The Singaporean Managing Director holds similar views regarding the retention of quality employees and through the provision of good benefits. This, in turn, enables the Company to provide the best service to its clients. Its guard force is about 450 strong, is the smallest of the four companies surveyed, yet interestingly has the highest annual turnover from the guard business at about S$15 to S$16 million.

Staff has good benefits and is able to progress within the company if they prove themselves, e.g. there are two Operating Managers reporting to the General Manager, both of whom joined the company as guards in 1985. The immediate supervisors obtain feedback from staff usually, though guards have been known to send direct e-mails to the Managing Director and General Manager about their grievances.

Competitors of Company D acknowledge that it is able to command significantly higher fees than other companies by providing high quality manpower. Its clients are private sector organizations, as their high rates preclude them from being competitive in tendering for public sector jobs.

FINDINGS

Respondent Characteristics

The demographic characteristics of all survey respondents are presented in Table 1. Data for each of the four companies, as well as the combined responses, are presented. Overall, respondents were evenly split in terms of age, with 49 percent in the age group of 15 to 40 years and 51 percent over 41 years. Comparisons among the specific companies did not show any significant differences. Almost all the respondents are male

Table 1. General Characteristics of Respondents by Company (N = 300)

Demographics	$x^2(df)$	Comp.A	Comp.B.	Comp.C	Comp.D	Total
Age	2.04 (3)					
15 – 40		34/52.3 [a]	37/52.9 [a]	35/42.7[a]	36/50.0[a]	142/49.1[a]
41 – 68		31/47.7	33/47.1	47/57.3	36/50.0	147/50.9
Education	26.24 (9)**					
Primary		1/ 1.6	16/23.5	4/ 5.4	6/ 8.2	27/ 9.7
Some secondary		29/46.8	21/30.9	33/44.6	36/49.3	119/43.0
GCE "O"		26/41.9	29/42.6	29/39.2	25/34.2	109/39.4
GEC "A"		6/9.7	2/ 2.9	8/10.8	6/ 8.2	22/ 7.9
Gender	8.70 (3)*					
Female		5/ 8.1	0/ 0	1/ 1.3	5/ 6.3	11/ 3.8
Male		57/91.9	70/100	79/98.8	74/93.7	280/96.2
Marital Status	10.41 (6)					
Now married		40/64.5	39/60.0	51/66.2	61/79.2	191/68.0
Divor/Separated		5/8.1	11/16.9	6/ 7.8	5/ 6.5	27/ 9.6
Never Married		17/27.4	15/23.1	20/26.0	11/14.3	63/22.4
Years of Work	.19 (3)					
Less than 4years		32/51.6	35/54.7	29/51.8	39/51.3	135/52.3

4 years and more	30/48.4	29/45.3	27/48.2	37/48.7	123/47.7
Prior Experience 14.04 (3)**					
No	22/34.9	40/61.5	28/38.9	44/57.1	134/48.4
Yes	41/65.1	25/38.5	44/61.1	33/42.9	143/51.6
Title or Desig. 13.30 (6)*					
Guard	24/45.3	34/56.7	16/27.1	33/51.6	107/45.3
Guard Superv.	20/37.7	20/33.3	32/54.2	20/31.3	92/39.0
Other	9/17.0	6/10.0	11/18.6	11/17.2	37/15.7

* Missing cases not reported
ᵃ = N / %
 (*** <= .001 **<= .01 *<= .05)

(96%). Of those who responded, 43 percent have some secondary education and almost 40 percent have GCE "O" level education. The remaining 10 percent have primary education and 8 percent have GEC "A" level and higher levels of education. Though there are marginal differences in the levels of education among respondents in each company, the mean differences were found to be statistically significant. A majority of the respondents are married (68%). The remaining were never married (22%) or divorced or separated (10%). Just over half of the respondents (52%) have been working in the field for less than four years, and the rest have been in the field for four years or more. Interestingly, almost half of all the respondents (48%) indicated that they do not have prior experience in law enforcement or security work. A comparison among the companies indicate that companies B (62%) and D (57%) had the highest percentage with no prior work experience in law enforcement or security. In terms of job title, 45 percent of all respondents are guards, 39 percent guard supervisors, and 16 percent are "other."

Views on Working Relationships in General
Table 2 displays the percentage of respondents' views on their relationship with police and auxiliary police officers. Data for individual companies are also presented in this table. Note that while in the original survey there are four response categories, for purposes of presentation, the "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" categories were collapsed into one category, as were the "Strongly Disagree" and "Disagree." However, only the collapsed category of Strongly Agree is represented in the table as well as the mean score on a 4 point scale with 4 representing strongly agree and 1 being strongly disagree. A total of twelve questions were asked. Security officers were asked a set of six questions each on their general views on the working relationships with SFO and APO respectively.
Overall, security officers think very highly of the officers of SPOs (95%) representing a mean score of 3.23 on a four-point scale (with 4 being Strongly Agree and 1 being Strongly Disagree) compared to APOs (90%) representing a mean score of 3.05. A comparison of data on these questions for individual companies suggests that there are some variations in terms of the how strongly they agree with the questions. However, these differences were not found to be significant. Further, in general, security officers held a very high opinion of SPOs (92%) and APOs (88%) representing mean scores of

Table 2 Perceptions of guards (PSO) on their working relationships with police (SFO) and auxiliary officers)APO) in Singapore (N=300)

Variable	$x^2(df)$	Comp.A.		Comp.B.		Comp.C		Comp.D		Total	
		A/SA[a]	Mean[b]	A/SA	Mean	A/SA	Mean	A/SA	Mean	A/SA	Mean
Working Relationships in General											
1. In general, PSO have a positive opinion of APOs	28.71 (9)**	57/92.0	2.98	61/85.9	2.97	77/93.9	3.24	64/82.1	2.92	259/88.4	3.04
2. In general, PSO have a positive opinion of SPOs	23.57 (9)**	57/90.5	3.14	69/98.6	3.13	76/93.8	3.32	67/85.9	3.08	269/92.1	3.17
3. PSO and APO cooperate in crime prevention activities	30.08 (9)***	50/83.3	2.90	60/94.5	3.00	80/96.4	3.37	64/83.1	3.09	254/87.2	3.11
4. PSO and SPOs cooperate in crime prevention	16.97 (9)*	57/90.5	3.13	67/94.3	3.17	78/96.3	3.40	74/97.4	3.32	276/94.0	3.26
5. Current relationship between PSO and APOs is good	17.65 (9)*	51/80.9	2.84	63/88.8	2.99	67/82.8	3.02	60/77.9	2.99	241/82.6	2.97
6. Relationship between PSO and SPOs very good	16.07 (9)	51/86.5	2.93	67/94.4	3.08	72/87.8	3.11	71/91.0	3.19	261/90.0	3.09
7. PSO agencies willing to share information with SPOs	20.14 (9)*	53/86.9	3.03	68/95.8	3.21	81/100	3.32	69/89.6	3.25	271/93.5	3.21
8. PSO agencies willing to share information with APOs	15.56 (9)	46/73.0	2.76	60/84.5	2.97	70/84.3	3.07	60/76.9	2.96	236/80.0	2.95
9. PSO should do more to improve relations with APOs	7.28 (9)	58/93.5	3.24	64/90.1	3.04	70/87.5	3.11	69/89.6	3.14	261/90.0	3.13
10. PSO should do more to improve relations with SPOs	18.29 (9)*	58/95.1	3.18	69/97.2	3.23	79/95.2	3.33	69/88.4	3.28	275/93.8	3.26
11. Overall, my view of APOs is very positive	10.38 (9)	58/92.1	3.03	65/92.9	3.06	70/84.3	3.06	70/89.7	3.04	263/89.5	3.05
12. Overall, my view of SPOs is very positive	13.39 (9)	62/98.4	3.29	68/97.1	3.19	77/92.7	3.29	73/93.6	3.18	280/95.2	3.23

[a] = A= Agree; SA=Strongly agree; N / %
[b] = 1:Strongly Disagree, 2: Disagree, 3:Agree, 4:Strongly Agree
(*** <= .001 **<= .01 *<= .05)

3.17 and 3.04 respectively. Additionally, the mean differences among individual companies for this issue were statistically significant. Security officers also believe that police officers cooperate with them in crime prevention activities slightly more (94%, mean=3.26) than auxiliary police officers (88%, mean=3.11). Over 93 percent (mean=3.26) of the security officers believe that could do more to improve relationships with SPO, while 90 percent of the security officers (mean = 3.13) believe that they could do more to improve relations with the APOs. A similar discrepancy was found in security officers' views on which group was more willing to share information with them. Ninety four percent of the respondents (mean =3.21) believe that security agencies are more willing to share information with police officers than they are willing to share with auxiliary police (80%, mean =2.95). Finally, 90 percent of security officers (mean=3.09) believe that their current relationship with police officers is very good compared to 83% (mean = 2.97) who indicated that their current relationship is very good with auxiliary police. These findings suggest that an overwhelming majority of security officers expressed good relationships with officers of both organizations.

Views on Improving Relationships with Police Officers

Findings on security officers' views on improving relationships with Singapore Police Officers are presented in Table 3. Once again, security officers exhibited positive views of the areas in which the working relationships with the police officers could be improved. A whopping 97 percent (Mean = 3.3) felt that inter-agency communication could be improved. This finding is similar to the views of security officers in other countries, such as the U.S. (Nalla and Newman 1999a). The mean differences between companies on this issue were found to be statistically significant. Another 95 percent of

Table 3. Perceptions of guards (PSO) on improving working relationships with police agencies (SPF) in Singapore (N=300)

Variable	$x^2(df)$	Comp.A.		Comp.B.		Comp.C		Comp.D		Total	
		A/SA[a]	Mean[b]	A/SA	Mean	A/SA	Mean	A/SA	Mean	A/SA	Mean
On Improving relationships with SPOs											
1. Improve inter-agency communication	**14.97 (6)***	**57/98.2**	**3.29**	**67/97.1**	**3.23**	**79/98.8**	**3.46**	**63/94.0**	**3.16**	**266/97.1**	**3.30**
2. Create information database for joint usage	**8.07 (6)**	**55/96.5**	**3.28**	**63/91.3**	**3.07**	**74/94.8**	**3.28**	**61/91.1**	**3.19**	**253/93.4**	**3.21**
3. Exchange personnel for training	**18.65 (9)***	**54/93.1**	**3.28**	**59/85.5**	**2.97**	**69/86.3**	**3.20**	**59/88.1**	**3.25**	**241/88.0 3.17**	
4. Conduct regular meetings of agency representatives	**10.35 (6)**	**55/96.5**	**3.23**	**63/91.3**	**3.10**	**72/92.3**	**3.31**	**65/97.1**	**3.25**	**255/94.1**	**3.23**
5. Provide funds to police to establish better communication	**19.02 (9)***	**47/82.5**	**3.07**	**52/75.3**	**2.80**	**57/74.0**	**2.97**	**43/64.2**	**2.78**	**255/94.1 3.23**	
6. Work together on specific types of crime	**33.13 (9)***	**54/96.4**	**3.05**	**63/91.3**	**2.99**	**71/89.9**	**3.23**	**60/89.5**	**3.22**	**248/91.5 3.13**	
7. Network with area law enforcement agencies	**17.88 (6)****	**56/98.3**	**3.23**	**60/87.0**	**3.01**	**71/89.9**	**3.27**	**63/96.9**	**3.25**	**250/92.6**	**3.19**
8. Participate in joint training programs	**19.80 (9)***	**56/96.6**	**3.29**	**61/88.4**	**3.07**	**73/91.3**	**3.31**	**63/94.0**	**3.37**	**253/92.4**	**3.26**
9. Joint community efforts to protect citizens	**39.32 (9)***	**55/94.8**	**3.45**	**65/94.2**	**3.01**	**74/92.5**	**3.36**	**66/98.5**	**3.42**	**260/94.9 3.31**	

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[a] **= A= Agree; SA=Strongly agree; N / %**
[b] **= 1:Strongly Disagree, 2: Disagree, 3:Agree, 4:Strongly Agree**
(* <= .001 **<= .01 * <= .05)**

security officers (Mean = 3.31) felt that joint efforts would lead to improved relations with the police. The security officers (94%, mean = 3.23) believe that joint efforts could be established through regular meetings and that creation of information databases for joint use could further enhance crime control (94%, mean =3.21). Ninety-three percent of the security officers (mean = 3.19) believe that networking with the SPF is a good idea and that participation (92 %, mean=3.26) would a good mechanism to improve joint policing efforts. Security officers also strongly endorse the view that they should have opportunities to work with the police to solve specific types of crimes (92%, Mean =3.13) and exchange personnel for training (88%, mean = 3.17). Ninety-four percent of all respondents believe that security agencies should fund police organization to establish better communications (Mean = 3.23). Interestingly, there are many similarities in the responses (represented by mean scores) between companies A, C, and D. The overall findings from this study reflect the growing acknowledgement among the private security professionals to build strong ties with law enforcement personnel, a trend similar to the developments in other emerging markets (Nalla, Morash, Vitaratos, and Lindhal 1997).

Views on Improving Relationships with Auxiliary Officers

Security officers' views on improving relationships with auxiliary officers are presented in Table 4. Virtually, every item in this table has almost 90 or more percent agreement with the statements that tap into ways to improve relationships between security officers and auxiliary police officers. The item that received the lowest score (71%) was related to "providing funds to the police to establish better communication." The findings are fairly similar to the findings reported above. That is, security officers are very optimistic about the various strategies to improve relations with auxiliary police

Table 4. Perceptions of guards (PSO) on improving working relationships with auxiliary police agencies (APF) in Singapore (N=300)

Variable	$x^2(df)$	Comp.A.		Comp.B.		Comp.C		Comp.D		Total	
		A/SA[a]	Mean[b]	A/SA	Mean	A/SA	Mean	A/SA	Mean	A/SA	Mean
APF and Private Security Relationship											
1. Improve inter-agency communication	31.89 (9)***	61/98.4	3.35	65/91.5	2.96	79/95.2	3.37	73/93.6	3.23	278/94.5	3.23
2. Create information database for joint usage	21.32 (6)**	56/91.8	3.26	59/83.1	2.90	78/94.0	3.24	65/83.3	3.10	258/88.1	3.13
3. Exchange personnel for training	25.61 (9)**	58/93.5	3.23	58/81.6	2.89	74/90.2	3.27	69/88.4	3.21	259/88.4	3.15
4. Conduct regular meetings of agency representatives	14.58 (6)*	59/95.2	3.29	65/91.6	3.03	75/91.5	3.27	72/92.3	3.17	271/96.5	3.19
5. Provide funds to police to establish better communication	31.80 (9)***	50/83.3	3.03	44/62.0	2.58	61/75.3	2.96	50/65.0	2.79	205/71.0	2.84
6. Work together on specific types of crime	26.87 (9)**	59/95.2	3.19	65/91.5	2.99	78/93.9	3.31	71/91.0	3.09	273/92.9	3.15
7. Network with area law enforcement agencies	19.52 (6)**	58/96.6	3.25	61/85.9	2.93	76/92.7	3.24	72/92.3	3.10	267/91.7	3.13
8. Participate in joint training programs	19.52 (6)**	61/98.4	3.34	62/87.3	2.93	74/90.2	3.27	73/93.6	3.28	270/92.1	3.20
9. Joint community efforts to protect citizens	40.82 (6)***	61/98.4	3.48	65/91.5	2.99	81/98.8	3.48	76/97.4	3.38	283/96.6	3.33

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[a] = A= Agree; SA=Strongly agree; N / %
[b] = 1:Strongly Disagree, 2: Disagree, 3:Agree, 4:Strongly Agree
   (*** <= .001 **<= .01 *<= .05)

officers in order to improve crime prevention activities. A comparison of means scores across this table suggests that companies A and C are most alike, Company D shows a greater similarity to A and C, while Company B has lower mean scores on all items on this issue. However, given the similarity among the various mean scores for each of the four companies, it was difficult to interpret these differences in the context of their organizational culture. Overall, these findings are similar to views expressed by security personnel in other emerging markets (Nalla and Hummar 1999, 1999a).

On the future of law enforcement and security relations

Findings on security officers' views on future relations with police and auxiliary officers are presented in Table 5. Four questions were asked about the future public and private police relationships. The findings suggest that security officers are extremely optimistic about more cooperation between police and auxiliary police in the future (95%, Mean = 3.28). A similar sentiment was echoed on the issue of future cooperation between police and private security in the future (94%, mean=3.28). Nearly 90% of the security officers felt that more joint activities between security, police, and auxiliary officers will become common in the future. Only 70% of the security officers felt that in the future, all three organizations would be undertaking similar tasks, suggesting the blurring of boundaries between public and private police. A comparison of means among the four companies shows statistically significant findings, with companies A, C, and D being more similar than B. This finding is similar to the findings in previous tables.

Additional Analysis

We conducted factor analysis to determine the structure of various responses. Six factors emerged, as shown in Table 6. Among these six, two factors had two items each

Table 5. Perceptions of guards (PSO) on the future of public and private policing in Singapore (N=300)

Variable	x^2(df)	Comp.A.		Comp.B.		Comp.C		Comp.D		Total	
		A/SA[a]	Mean[b]	A/SA	Mean	A/SA	Mean	A/SA	Mean	A/SA	Mean
Future of Public/Private Policing											
1. Foresee more cooperation between police and auxiliary police in the future	17.08 (9)*	57/93.5	3.26	60/93.7	3.09	80/97.6	3.39	74/94.8	3.28	271/95.1	3.27
2. Foresee more cooperation between police and private security in the future	29.06 (9)**	59/96.7	3.28	64/91.4	3.07	81/97.6	3.42	73/92.4	3.30	277/94.	3.28
3. More joint activities between SPF, APF, and private security will be common in the future	30.12 (9)***	61/100	3.33	60/85.8	2.97	75/90.4	3.33	66/83.5	3.14	262/89.5	3.19
4. There will be no difference between tasks done by 2.84 SPF, auxiliary police and private security in the future	24.87 (9)**	47/77.1	2.92	56/80.0	2.91	59/71.1	2.94	43/54.4	2.62	205/70.0	

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[a] = A= Agree; SA=Strongly agree; N / %
[b] = 1:Strongly Disagree, 2: Disagree, 3:Agree, 4:Strongly Agree
(*** <= .001 **<= .01 *<= .05)

Table 6. Factor Loadings and Mean Scores for Survey Respondents (N=172)

Scale Means*(1-4)	Factor Loading	
Working Relationship		
1. Overall relationship (mean =3.10)		
PSO and APO cooperate in crime prevention	**.68**	
3.13		
PSO and SPF officers cooperate in crime prevention	**.75**	
3.27		
Current relationship between PSO and APO is very good	**.70**	**2.97**
Relationship between PSO and SPF officers is very good	**.82**	**3.08**
PSO agencies are willing to share information with SPF officers	**.70**	**3.21**
PSO agencies are willing to share information with APO	**.52**	**2.96**
Cronbach's Alpha = .85		
2. PSO should do more for better relations (mean=3.19)		
PSO should do more to improve relations with auxiliary police	**.86**	
3.13		
PSO should do more to improve relations with SPF	**.80**	
3.25		
Cronbach's Alpha = .71		
3. PSO have a positive opinion of others (mean=3.11)		
In general, PSO have a positive opinion of APO officers	**.88**	**3.04**
In general, PSO have a positive opinion of SPF officers	**.77**	**3.18**
Cronbach's Alpha=.73		
SPF and Private Security Relationship (mean =3.22)		
Improve inter-agency communication	**.70**	**3.29**
Create information database for joint usage	**.73**	
3.19		
Exchange personnel for training	**.78**	**3.16**
Conduct regular meetings of agency representatives	**.77**	
3.23		
Work together on specific types of crime	**.75**	**3.14**
Network with area law enforcement agencies	**.83**	**3.18**

Participate in joint training programs	**.84**	**3.26**
Joint community efforts to protect citizens	**.73**	
3.31		
Cronbach's Alpha= .90		
Auxiliary and Private Security Relationship (mean= 3.14)		
Improve inter-agency communication	**.81**	**3.22**
Create information database for joint usage	**.84**	
3.11		
Exchange personnel for training	**.82**	**3.14**
Conduct regular meetings of agency representatives	**.77**	
3.19		
Provide funds to police to establish better communication	**.62**	**2.84**
Work together on specific types of crime	**.76**	**3.15**
Network with area law enforcement agencies	**.81**	**3.12**
Participate in joint training programs	**.82**	**3.21**
Joint community efforts to protect citizens	**.73**	
3.32		
Cronbach's Alpha= .92		
Future Relations (mean = 3.16)		
Foresee more cooperation	**.86**	
3.27		
between police and auxiliary police in the future		
Foresee more cooperation	**.87**	
3.29		
between police and private security in the future		
More joint activities	**.83**	**3.22**
between SPF, auxiliary police and private security will be common		
There will be no difference between tasks done by	**.51**	**2.87**
SPF, auxiliary police and private security in the future		
Cronbach's Alpha = .77		

Mean score =1:Strongly Disagree, 2: Disagree, 3:Agree, 4:Strongly Agree

though the factor loadings were high and the scales statistically significant. We dropped these scales and labeled the remaining factors Working Relationship, Police and Security Relationship, Auxiliary Police and Security Relationship, and Future Relations.

When testing for reliability, Cronbach's alpha scores in each scale were greater than .80. For each scale, we calculated the mean score reflecting the importance of the subject. For example, the mean score for the items loading on Factor 1 (working relationship) was 3.1; the mean score for the items loading high on Factor 2 (police and security relationships) was 3.11; auxiliary police and security (mean 3.14); and, future relations (mean 3.16).

To determine whether the respondents from various groups held different views about the importance of topic areas and subjects for undergraduate security education, we employed t tests and analyses of variance (ANOVA) to compare the mean scores for the scales. Specifically, we compared the means of all four factors for respondents as grouped by selected demographic characteristics.

The findings are presented in table 7. Overall, the findings did not yield statistically significant mean differences for various demographic characteristics except for marital status and relations between auxiliary police and security. Married respondents appeared to agree less (mean=3.11) than never married and single respondents (mean=3.25) with statements relating to improving relationships with auxiliary police. However, the most important finding we can draw from this analysis is that the mean differences among the four companies in this analysis on each of the four scales were statistically significant. For the scale of overall relationships companies C (mean=3.22) and D (mean=3.15) were more similar in their responses than companies A and B. This is not surprising given the similarity of organizational culture. Companies C

Table 7.Comparison of Mean Differences (AVOVA) for Respondents Characteristics

Independent Variable	Factor			
	Overall Relationship Future	SPF & Private Security	Auxiliary & Private Security	Private Security
Age				
Young (15-40)	3.11/132	3.23/121	3.17/135	3.16/133
	(.44) [a]	(.44)	(.49)	(.46)
Old (41-68)	3.09/134	3.23/135	3.14/139	3.18/140
	(.47)	(.42)	(.39)	(.51)
F-Value	.16	.02	.36	.07
Education				
Some secondary and <	3.12/136	3.21/129	3.15/140	3.15/141
	(.42)	(.39)	(.42)	(.49)
GCE "O" levels and >	3.07/121	3.25/113	3.16/124	3.17/124
	(.48)	(.45)	(.45)	(.48)
F-Value	.71	.67	.10	.14
Marital Status				
Now Married	3.11/174	3.20/170	3.11/182	3.16/181
	(.46)	(.40)	(.40)	(.49)
Never married and other	3.15/86	3.28/79	3.25/85	3.17/89
	(.42)	(.43)	(.47)	(.46)
F-Value	.57	2.53	6.28**	.01
Years working in present field				
Less than 4 years	3.10/130	3.24/120	3.13/133	3.17/128
	(.45)	(.43)	(.45)	(.45)
4 years and more	3.06/111	3.19/108	3.11/115	3.13/117
	(.46)	(.43)	(.45)	(.50)
F-Value	.35	.84	.05	.47
Prior Experience in Police/Security Field				
No	3.15/128	3.24/118	3.18/134	3.18/129
	(.41)	(.39)	(.39)	(.41)

Yes	**3.07/129**	**3.20/125**	**3.12/130**	**3.12/137**
	(.49)	**(.44)**	**(.45)**	**(.52)**
F-Value	**1.94**	**.50**	**1.09**	**.96**
Title or Designation				
Guard	**3.14/102**	**3.22/97**	**3.14/103**	**3.15/105**
	(.40)	**(.38)**	**(.37)**	**(.43)**
Guard supervisor	**3.11/88**	**3.24/81**	**3.16/90**	**3.20/89**
	(.42)	**(.42)**	**(.46)**	**(.45)**
F-Value	**.24**	**.20**	**.21**	**.43**
Company				
A	**2.91/55**	**3.25/53**	**3.27/58**	**3.20/60**
	(.49)	**(.37)**	**(.44)**	**(.46)**
B	**3.07/71**	**3.06/69**	**2.91/71**	**3.08/64**
	(.37)	**(.34)**	**(.33)**	**(.40)**
C	**3.22/77**	**3.31/78**	**3.26/79**	**3.27/82**
	(.43)	**(.49)**	**(.46)**	**(.52)**
D	**3.15/73**	**3.27/65**	**3.14/77**	**3.09/78**
	(.47)	**(.45)**	**(.45)**	**(.52)**
F-Value	**5.76*****	**4.75*****	**11.09*****	**2.68****

[a] = Mean scores / number of cases; (standard deviation)

Mean score = 1:Strongly Disagree, 2: Disagree, 3:Agree, 4:Strongly Agree

(*** <= .01 **<= .05 *<= .10)

and D were driven by leaders who do not have police or military backgrounds but are primarily business entrepreneurs. However, for the scales of relationships between police/private security and auxiliary police/security, the mean differences between companies A (mean=3.27), C (mean=3.26) and D (mean=3.14) are very similar. These findings were found to be statistically significant. Interestingly, the findings for the last factor, future of police/security relations the findings were slightly different. There was a greater consistency between companies B and D (means=3.08/3.09) and between A and C (means=3.2/3.27).

Discussion and Conclusion

In this study we examined the perceptions of security officers towards police officers and auxiliary police in Singapore. In contrast to the findings from the previous study (Nalla, Hoffman, and Christian 1996) results from this research show that Singaporean security officers feel very positively about their relationships with fellow police officers and auxiliary police officers. The security officers also believe that they contribute to the general social order of society and help customers and clients and organizations of their sponsors with support from the police and auxiliary forces. They are also very optimistic that in the future the relations will continue to grow stronger and that the nature of work will become more similar than dissimilar.

Another significant finding from this study is that there are variations in how respondents from each company perceive issues relating to relationships with police and auxiliary police. Though there is some indication that respondents from companies, which are run by chief executive officers with prior police background, appear to differ from those that are run by primarily business executives. The assumption is that those with police backgrounds are likely to drive a culture that recreates a police culture in how the security work is perceived, for instance, similar to police work, discipline, and organization of tasks. It is also fair to assume that those with prior police backgrounds seek to maintain closer working relationships with police. These findings however, do not support the assumption that companies that are run by executives with police backgrounds are more likely to agree than those without police backgrounds. At a minimum we find that there are statistically significant mean differences between the companies. Further, whether such a generally positive view of the industry prevails among all security officers is uncertain given that the sample was drawn from four companies. While this is a limitation, it leaves open the avenue for further research to develop more refined scales that would distinguish between the varieties of cultures among security agencies. This research is also limited in the sense that it is unclear if officers from the police force and auxiliary services feel similarly, as the public law enforcement organizations did not approve of our administering the survey to their two forces.

Undoubtedly, private security would like to be aligned closely with law enforcement to not only lend legitimacy to security work but also to raise the level of visibility, professionalism, and quality of their service to the public. Assessing reciprocal attitudes of each group towards the other would have helped provide a framework for shaping policies, which foster more effective working relationships between the groups.

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Project Polar Star in Hong Kong:
An innovative police strategy to deal with deviant juveniles

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Abstract

Project Polar Star was an innovative programme specifically designed to prevent juvenile crime in the Yuen Long Police District in Hong Kong from February 1998 to August 2002. The project team members employed informal, friendly and outreaching methods to approach delinquent juveniles and invited them to participate in the project. The primary goal of the project was to save their targets from criminal settings and bring them back to other social control agencies in the community. Although the project was an effective community policing programme to prevent juvenile crime, this paper finds that project officers encountered several problems as the project moved on. These problems included target selection, the role conflict between a law enforcer and a social worker, working together with other agencies and

the assessment of the project.

Project Polar Star

The Hong Kong Police Force was established in 1844. With the 27,000 disciplined officers, it is one of the largest city police forces in the world. Hong Kong is divided into 6 police regions and 21 police districts. Owing to the rapid development of the new town in Hong Kong, the Yuen Long Police District had a large group of delinquent juveniles in the last decade. For instance, the district had about 450,000 population but 587 juveniles aged from 7 to 15 were arrested by the police in 2002. In Hong Kong the total number of the juveniles arrested by the police was 5,335 in the same year. The Yuen Long Police District shared 11 % of the total arrested cases in Hong Kong (Hong Kong Police 2003). Therefore, prevention of juvenile crime has become a major police concern in the district. In the late 1990s senior police managers found that traditional 'hard policing' which emphasized fighting crime and arresting criminals might not be able to prevent juvenile delinquency effectively in the Yuen Long district. They wondered whether 'soft' social work outreaching methods were a good alternative policing strategy to tackle the problem.

The Yuen Long Police District formally launched Project Polar Star (PPS) on 28 February 1998. The project was an innovative programme specifically designed to prevent juvenile crime in the district. The project team, including one Sergeant, one Police Constable (PC) and two Woman Police Constables (WPC), employed informal, friendly and outreaching methods to approach delinquent juveniles and invited them to participate in the project. The primary goal of the project was to save their targets from criminal settings and bring them back to other social control agencies in the community. This was an experimental programme initiated by a local police district. The project terminated in August 2002. It lasted for 4 and half years.

Although the overall feedback of the project was positive, it should be noted that project officers encountered several problems as the project moved on. First, they wondered whether they should target ordinary delinquent juveniles, high-risk delinquent juveniles or hard-core delinquent juveniles. Second, sometimes project officers were confused that they should perform the role of a law enforcer or a social worker. Third, project officers needed to take a mulit-agency approach to implement the project. However, it might not be easy for police officers to work together with other public agencies and community organisations. Finally, the project was an innovative policing strategy to deal with juvenile delinquency. It might not be fair to use traditional police methods to assess its effectiveness and its officer's performance. The aim of this paper is to examine the project from four perspectives including target selection, the role conflict between a law enforcer and a social worker, mulit-agency approach and the assessment of the project.

The data used in this paper mainly come from 3 Project Polar Star Progress Reports, media coverage about the project, 5 interviews with project officers, 1 interview with a senior police officer who did not get involved in the project and 2 field observations on how project officers handled deviant juveniles in 3 video game centres and a tree-planting activity. As one of the project advisors, the author was able to gain access to its documents, meet project officers regularly to discuss its progress and participate in the activities with its clients.

The Client and Success Rates

1 The Number of Clients

During the first phase from February to August 1998, a total of 138 youngsters were contacted and 39 targets agreed to participate in the project. In phase two from September 1998 to February 1999, the project was extended to Tin Shui Wai which was a newly developed town in the Yuen Long Police District. Within this period, 92 youngsters were contacted and 49 of them took part in the project. In phase three from March to September 1999, 166 youngsters were contacted and 99 of them participated in the project. In phase four from October 1999 to December 2000, a total of 434 youngsters were contacted and 142 joined the project (Yuen Long Police District 2001) (see Table 1).

Table 1: Number of Youth Approached and Participants in Phase 1-4

In total, the project team contacted 830 youngsters and 329 agreed to join the project from February 1998 to December 2000. Among 319 clients, some earlier cases had no complete records and a small number of cases were referred to other no-government organisations (NGOs) for follow-up counselling services. In the end the project team had 239 cases for the following analysis (Yuen Long Police District 2001).

2 Social Profile of Clients

Among the 239 clients, 136 were boys and 103 were girls. The age ranged from 10 to 18. The age group from 13 to 16 was the majority with 198 members (see Table 2). Eight-three percent of the members were students. Twenty-three percent came from single parent households. In addition, 26.36% of the members had conviction record before joining the project and the most common offence they committed was theft (Yuen Long Police District 2001) (see Table 3).

Table 2: The Age Range of the Participants

Table 3: Types of Offence Committed by Participants (%)

* Assault occasioning actual bodily harm

3 Sources of Clients

Among the 239 clients, 122 were located by the project team members at youth haunts, 29 clients were referred by schools, 39 were requested by their parents and 44 were referred by the Divisional Commander and 5 were referred by fellow police officers in the police district (Yuen Long Police District 2001) (see table 4).

Table 4: Sources of Participants

4. Success Rates and Quality Comments

According to project officer's own assessment, out of the 239 clients, 45 (1

9%) showed remarkable improvement, 175 (73%) showed moderate improvement and

19 (8%) were found to be incorrigible. In addition, before joining the project, 63

(26.36%) participants have conviction record. Having participated in the project, their

recidivism ratio dropped from 63 (26.36%) to 20 (8.37%) and then to 1 (0.42%) after

staying in the project for 12 months (Yuen Long Police District 2001) (see Table 5).

Table 5: Conviction Ratio of Participants

Before i	After	Staying in the	Staying in the	Staying in the
26.36%	8.37%	2.51%	2.09%	0.42%

The overall comments on the project from their client, client's families, community organisations and media were favourable. As a parent says: "The project helps us to get our son back, which in turns assists us in restoring family happiness." (Yuen Long Police District 2001, Annex "F"). A community worker observes: "The advent of Project Polar Star gives people a ray of new hope." (Yuen Long Police District 2001, Annex "C"). Reporters found the project interesting. They came to interview project officers and used feature story to introduce the project (*Ming Pao Daily News* 22 May 1998, *Ta Kung Pao* 7 February 1999; *Apply Daily*, 31 December 2000).

Target Selection

Since Project Polar Star was an experimental programme, there were no clear guidelines about how to run the project. Consequently, 'trial and error' became the major principle to implement the project in the early stage. Project officers simply recruited all deviant juveniles to the project without considering their various delinquent backgrounds and their own ability to handle the targets. In addition to dealing with their crime and delinquent problems, project officers were also requested to help their clients solve their trouble in relationships, families, schools and employment. The situation would get even worse when project officers kept taking new cases but never closed the old ones. Project officers gradually found it difficult to handle all the cases (Police Interview, 8 March 2000).

To make the project more effective, target selection was necessary. In fact, three types of delinquent juveniles could be identified in the district. Ordinary delinquent

juveniles frequently hanged around video games centres, discos, billiard halls, shopping centres and parks. They liked speaking foul languages, smoking, gambling and making noise in public areas. High-risk delinquent juveniles not only have the above characteristics but also they affiliated with young criminals and triads in the district. Some of them committed pretty crime occasionally (Field Observation on 23 October 2001; Chu 1999; HKFYG 2000).

For hard-core delinquent juveniles, their families were unable to supervise them because they always stayed outside and they had poor relationships with other family members. If they were still in school, teachers might have given them up because they were at the bottom of the class and they created many troubles in school. Most of them had joined triad societies and committed a variety of petty crimes in the district. Although school and outreaching social workers might have worked for them, they were considered too 'bad' to save. Some juveniles might have already been under the supervision of the 'Care or Protection Order' or the 'Superintendent's Discretion Scheme', but the programmes had little deterrence on them. Since they were young, anti-social, and not supervised by conventional social control agencies, they had a very good chance to become street gangsters and then career criminals if specialist services were not available to them (Police Interview 26 December 2000; Luk 2002).

Since human and financial resources were limited, it was not wise for project officers to pay equal effort to all kinds of delinquent juveniles. Project officers might contact and recruit all types of delinquent juveniles in their programme. However, more energy should be put on the serious high-risk delinquent juveniles and hard-core delinquent juveniles because the community might have abandoned them. Traditionally, this type of juveniles was hostile to police officers because tended to believe that police officers were either to harass or arrest them (Lee 2002). Friendly, helpful, and caring project officers might help to change this stereotyped view and this might attract them to join the project. Therefore, the project might be the last resort to take serious high-risk and hard-core delinquent juveniles out of criminal settings and bring them back to the community.

The Role Conflict

Project officers were serving police officers in the Yuen Long Police District. They were seconded to work for the project on a two-year basis. As a police officer, it was their duty to arrest persons if they knew that they had committed crime. However,

Project Polar Star was an innovative programme to deal with delinquent juveniles. Project officers adopted outreaching methods to approach their targets and bring them back to other social control agencies in the community through providing counselling services and a variety of social activities. Therefore, their primary goal should not be collecting specific criminal intelligence. Otherwise, their actions would damage the working relationship with their clients.

This role conflict sometimes put project officers in a difficult position. For instance, they were not sure whether they should take legal actions if they knew that their clients or their clients' friends had committed crime. A project officer recalls a case. One of his clients claimed that he was a triad member in a social gathering. If he treated himself as a law enforcer, he should arrest the boy in the scene immediately because claiming to be a member of a triad society was a criminal offence in Hong Kong. If he saw himself to be a social worker, however, he might talk with the boy afterwards but no legal actions would be taken (Police Interview, 8 March 2000). Therefore, project officers might get confused whether they were working as a social worker or a law enforcer. In fact, it was also questionable whether project officers were able to take the role of a professional social worker because they did not receive prior training in the field.

Compared with social workers, indeed project officers had some competitive advantages in dealing with serious high-risk juveniles. They felt more confident to go to the No-Go Area in the district to contact their targets because they had strong police back up. In addition, they could gain access to criminal records and obtain intelligence from other colleagues in the force such as the anti-triad unit. Therefore, it was much easier for them to identify gang leaders and their up-to-date activities in the district. Furthermore, project officers were working on a flexible schedule. They could get in touch with their clients at any time through their mobile telephones and pagers (Police Interview, 6 December 2003).

If their clients were in crisis, project officers could offer immediate advice and assistance. For instance, when a client was asked by his Big Brother to participate in a gang fight, the project officer could explain to him the serious consequence of his action and advise him not to go. More important, the officer would follow up the case and protect the client from revenge (Police Interview, 6 December 2003). Once a juvenile had joined a triad society or got involved in serious criminal activities, it might be difficult for his parents, teachers and social workers to offer assistance because they were in fear of revenge from their gang members. They usually referred

the case to the police. The project officers, with a strong organisational back up, were able to intervene the case immediately. They could even take the client away directly from the criminal setting if necessary.

Project officers came from the police force. They were in an authoritative position in explaining to their clients how the criminal justice system dealt with juvenile offenders. In addition, they could use many lively cases to demonstrate the legal consequence of committing a specific crime. In many cases, juveniles did not realise what they did were criminal offences. For instance, they might not understand that having sex with a girl less than 16 years was a criminal offence even though the girl consented to it (Police Interview, 6 December 2003). After joining the project, clients could now seek advice from the officer before they took actions. As a result, many juvenile crimes could be prevented.

Since project officers have an authoritative image, parents were more willing to send their naughty children to join the project. By the same token, parents would take the project officers' advice more seriously than that of teachers and social workers. Consequently, parents were more likely to work with project officers to solve their children's problems. A project officer remembered how a father spoke to him: "Sir, my son won't talk to me anymore. You are Ah Sir [an officer], he will listen to you. Please help to teach him." (Police Interview, 8 March 2000).

With police knowledge and organisational back up, project officers were in an advantageous position in handling serious high-risk delinquent juveniles in the earlier stage. However, it should be noted that their advantages would loose gradually in the later stage. Project officers were not trained to be a professional social worker. They were not well equipped with professional skills and community resources to provide counselling and follow-up services to their clients. In other words, project officers were good at approaching their targets and taking high-risk juveniles out of criminal settings but it was not easy for them to bring the juveniles back to the community.

Although it was true that project officers employed outreaching social work methods to deal with delinquent juveniles, they should always bear in mind that they were not and should not be social workers. They were still police officers although they might be seen to be a new type of cops from their police colleagues. The project supervisor says: "Personally I don't think it is appropriate to ask police officers to do the job because they haven't received social work training. When I was in charge of the project, I tried to look for the officers who had social work or related field background

and invited them to join the team." (Police Interview, 9 December 2003).

Multi-agency Approach

Stars can give a direction to the people walking at night. However, stars become dim when the sun arises. The project team had a Sergeant, 2 female Police Constables and 1 male Police Constables. They were seconded to implement the project from the Yuen Long Police District. Project officers might find it easy to approach their clients and help them out of trouble. However, with this was a weakness in providing aftercare services to their targets. Their prior training and police resources made it difficult for them to offer long-term and unlimited social services to their clients. As a female project officer recalls: "In the beginning, we even don't know how to open a file for each case and write the progress report. It takes us some time to get used to doing this kind of paper work." (Police Interview, 8 March 2000). Another project officer points out

> We need to keep changing our office because our police station cannot
> arrange a fixed room for us. Our team has four people. For a time, we
> can only share one desk and a telephone. It is difficult for us to
> organise activities for the kids and talk about their problems in the
> station. If we go out to have drinks with them, we cannot expect them
> to pay. Although I still keep some receipts, I know that it is hard for
> me to claim the money from the Force because the project has a very
> tight budget.

> (Police   Interview,   26
> December 2000)

Therefore, project officers had to take a multi-agency approach to mobilise various community resources to solve this specific community problem. >From November 1999 to December 2000, for instance, the project team organised 16 social services, 12 visits, 4 training camps and 8 seminars for their members (see Appendix). Most project activities were jointly organised with Junior Police Call and NGOs to maximise the utilisation of resources. A project officer says: "Although we want to design and organise all activities for our kids, we lack resources. Therefore, we need to keep looking around for any appropriate activities organised by other organisations.

We are careful when we select our members to join other agency's programme because they are naughty kids." (Police Interview, 6 December 2003).

The Yuen Long Police District had no specific budget for Project Polar Star. To launch various social activities for their members, project officers needed to apply for funds from the Police Headquarters and the local community. In the phase four of the project from October 1999 to December 2000, the project obtained an operational fund of HK$29,000 from the Police Headquarters and received HK$10,000 from the Yuen Long District Fight Crime Committee (Yuen Long Police District 2001). However, project officers expressed that they did not feel very comfortable asking for sponsorship from other agencies (Police Interview, 9 December 2003).

Different Views Within the Force

In contrast with traditional 'hard' policing which emphasizes crime fighting and arresting criminals, the project team adopted informal, friendly and outreaching methods to approach delinquent juveniles and prevent them from committing crime. It might not be easy for project officers to convince their senior police officers to support the project. Some senior police managers might think that police officers were professional law enforcers and they should not get involved in other profession's work. As a senior police officer says: "I don't support this kind of project. Honestly, this is not our duty. We shouldn't waste resources on it and we should be very careful because social workers may accuse us of stepping in their territory." (Police Interview, 7 December 2001). It was also not easy for their fellow officers to understand Project Polar Star. A project officer recalls:

> We always invite naughty kids to have chats with us in our police
> station. You know before that we wouldn't be nice to them because
> they were arrested and taken here. Therefore, our fellow colleagues
> sometimes have a strange look at us because we are now very kind to
> them. They don't understand what we are doing and we also don't
> know how to explain to them our work.
>
> (Police Interview, 23 October
2001)

Since Project Polar Star was an innovative policing programme which made use both of police and community resources to prevent juvenile delinquency, it might not be fair to assess the performance of project officers by the clearance rate of juvenile crime cases. In addition, the project might have effects on the rise and decline of overall juvenile crime in the Yuen Long Police District. However, the project was quite small. It was unrealistic to expect that the project could reduce the juvenile crime rate significantly in the district.

Criminal intelligence was also not a good indicator to assess the project. It should be noted that the primary goal of the project was to prevent juvenile crime. In order words, project officers were not undercover agents and their clients were not police informants. Project officers might contribute to general criminal intelligence so that the police had updated information about the current activities of individual delinquent juveniles and juvenile gangs in the district. However, senior police managers should not expect project officers to provide specific intelligence which could lead to a number of successful operations and arrests.

Further Recommendations

Project Polar Star was initiated by the Yuen Long Police District as an experimental programme to tackle juvenile crime. It was officially launched on 28 February 1998. One Sergeant and 3 Police Constables were seconded from the police district to implement the project. Since the project was not a formal police programme, it was regularly reviewed by the Police Headquarters. After implementing the project for 4 and half years, the Hong Kong Police decided to terminate it in August 2002. If the project is launched again in the future, senior police managers may consider the following suggestions.

1 The Length of a Case

It is understood that the police force has limited resources to support Project Polar Star. Although project officers can contact and recruit all kind of delinquent juveniles, they have to bear in mind that they should leave ordinary delinquent juveniles to other governmental departments or voluntary agencies. When their major targets have become stable, project officers should also refer them to other Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) to follow-up on the case.

It will be good if every case did not go beyond six months. The first three months is the first stage. After a target is identified and recruited into the project, the officer should have frequent contacts with the client, finding out his/her specific problems, visiting his/her home and school, offering counselling services, and encouraging the client to participate in project's group activities. The second stage includes the fourth and fifth month. When the client has made improvements and become stable, face-to-face contacts could be gradually reduced, but telephone contacts should continue. In addition, project officers should encourage the client to join other youth programmes offered by voluntary agencies or government departments in the district. If the client's improvement is not satisfactory, the officer may need to decide whether he/she should make more effort on this client or refer the client to other appropriate helping agencies.

The sixth month is the final stage. When the client has made great improvements, the officer should close the file. It is also appropriate for the officer to put the client to 'Project Polar Star Volunteer Group' or recommend the client to participate in other youth societies e.g. the Police Junior Call, Scout, or Social Service Groups organised by other NGOs. If the client's problematic behaviour remains virtually unchanged, it should be treated as a failed case and the officer may need to close the file and tries to refer the client to other helping agencies.

Project officers are good at taking serious high-risk and hardcore delinquent juveniles out of criminal settings, but it is not easy for them to bring the juveniles back to the community. If a voluntary agency in the Yuen Long Police District can set up a team of social workers to organise a follow-up programme specifically designed to help Project Polar Star's clients reintegrate into the community, the project may achieve better results because aftercare is usually very important with this kind of youth group. In addition, the involvement of social workers in the project may help relieve some of their anxiety that the police are encroaching on their area of expertise and this will further help to develop collaboration with voluntary agencies. Therefore, senior police managers may consider working with local voluntary agencies to find out the possibility of setting up a specific follow-up programme for Project Polar Star.

2 Selections and Training

Although project officers adopt a social work approach to deal with delinquent juveniles, project officers are not trained to be social workers. Consequently, they are

not well equipped with professional skills and community resources to provide counselling and follow-up services to their clients. Senior police managers may consider appointing an experienced outreaching social worker to be the project adviser. In doing so, regular meetings can be arranged to discuss how to improve project officers' outreaching strategies, counselling skills, and techniques about paper work.

The project is an innovative and proactive policing strategy to deal with juvenile delinquency. Its success largely depends on the quality of the project officers. Therefore, the officers who are selected to join the project should be energetic, innovative, caring, and with a strong sense of crisis management. In the long run, senor police managers may consider recruiting officers who are interested in this project and have social work or related professional training. This may help the officer work together more easily with various community organisations to handle delinquent juveniles. In the last phase of the project, a WPC with a certificate of education was recruited to join the project. It showed that her teacher training could help her to deal with deviant juveniles.

3 Community Resources

Apart from offering crisis intervention and counselling services, project officers needed to organise regular social activities for their members to keep them in the project. Since their members were young, energetic and anti-social, project officers may need to use their police background and community resources to run more tailor-made programmes to attract their targets.

For instance, visits to different criminal justice agencies and informal chats with criminal justice personnel such as prosecutors and judges should be helpful to make their members understand the serious consequences of committing crimes. Some more exciting programmes such as wild camping, night hill walking, boxing and boot camps (military training camps) should be organised. Most target juveniles may lack confidence in their everyday life. It may be good to invite some popular TV and film stars or singers to share their successful experiences with them. It is also good to arrange for them to do community services so that they can learn how to be a responsible citizen. However, the programme should be interesting.

It is understood that the Police District may not be able to offer sufficient financial support to the project. The project team should continue to make use of community resources to finance their project activities. In the long run, senior police managers may consider registering Project Polar Star as a formal society. If so, a committee consisting of a group of community leaders, professionals, and scholars can be set up to supervise the project and raise fund and other resources necessary for the project. With sufficient and stable financial support, project officers may be able to rent an office in the town to facilitate their work.

4 Assessment

The project aims to take delinquent juveniles out of criminal settings and bring them back to the community. Since project officers are providing a specialist service to their clients, it is hard for the officers to deal with too many cases at the same time although it is understood that a minimum number of cases should be set for each project officer. It is also not fair to assess the project and the officer's performance simply based on quantitative indicators. Various types of assessment should be employed.

If one of the major objectives of the project is to promote the police-public relationship and enhance the popularity of the police in the community, evaluators may consider assessing the feedback from the target juveniles, community organisations, and the public to see whether the project can help to increase the police popularity in the community. In addition, the project is an innovative policing strategy to deal with juvenile delinquency in the district. If its activities can attract positive district and general media attention, it means that the project can help to promote the image of the police force. Last but not least, project officers can use case studies to show how they help their targets cope with their crises or prevent them from committing crimes.

Concluding Remarks

The rapid urbanisation of the Yuen Long Police District will go on and this will continue to produce a large number of delinquent juveniles. Project Polar Star, as a pilot programme, has proven its effectiveness to prevent juvenile crime. Other police district commanders may consider running a similar project if their districts have

serious juvenile delinquency problems. Since the police alone cannot solve this problem effectively, project officers need to work together with different community organisations to bring these delinquent juveniles back to the right track in the community. 'Community policing' may be a useful concept to enlighten the police on how to target this group from a multi-agency approach.

Waring (1991) defines community policing as a necessary partnership between the police and the community forged to ensure that the criminal justice system continues to operate effectively in maintaining community standards of behaviour. Four basic elements distinguish community policing from other forms of police and/or community endeavour: (1) community-based crime prevention; (2) proactive servicing as opposed to emergency response; (3) shifting of command responsibility to lower rank levels; and (4) public participation in the planning and supervision of police operation. In the last decade a number of research showed how community policing could help to prevent crime (Rosenbaum, 1994; Gilling 1996; Alpert and Piquero, 2000). For instance, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) describe how community policing can make a unique contribution to the problems posed by illicit drugs.

If we treat Project Polar Star to be a community policing programme specifically designed to prevent juvenile delinquency in the district, the way project officers handle delinquent juveniles will be very different from conventional 'hard' policing which emphasizes fighting crime and arresting criminals. Therefore, a number of new policing problems will emerge such as the police role, recruitment, training, accountability, cop culture, assessment and so on. Further research should be undertaken to work out how the police and the community can adopt a partnership approach to tackle juvenile delinquency problems.

Appendix

Project Polar Star Activities

(1) Social Services

Date	Location	Event	Co-operation Agencies
1999.11	Yuen Long District	Fright Crime Comic and Slogan Competition	District Fight Crime Committee, Yuen Long
1999.12.04	Yuen Long Police Station	Fright Crime Comic and Slogan Competition Assessment	District Fight Crime Committee, Yuen Long
2000.01.15	Sun Yuen Long Centre	Fright Crime Comic and Slogan Competition Presentation Ceremony	District Fight Crime Committee, Yuen Long
2000.01.16	Fairview Park	Fight Crime Carnival	District Fight Crime Committee, Yuen Long
2000.01.23	Shui Pin Tsuen Football Playground	'You are worth being appreciated' Action	Social Welfare Department
2000.02.26	Yuen Long Town Hall	Yuen Kong District Fight Crime Karaoke Competition	District Fight Crime Committee, Yuen Long
2000.03.04	Tai Wai Dragon Park	Junior Police Call BBQ Night	Yuen Long Junior Police Call
2000.03.19	Hung Hom Stadium	Pok Oi Night	Pok Oi Hospital
2000.03.25	Tuen Mun Hospital	" Anti-smoking Programme 1999 " Presentation Ceremony	Tuen Mun Hospital
2000.05.14	Shing Mun River, Shatin	Junior Police Call Dragon Boat Race Training	Yuen Long Junior Police Call
2000.05.27	Shing Mun River, Shatin	Junior Police Call Dragon Boat Race Training	Yuen Long Junior Police Call
2000.06.06	Shing Mun River, Shatin	Junior Police Call Dragon Boat Race Training	Yuen Long Junior Police Call
2000.05.28	Tin Shui Estate	"Tin Chin Sun Ka" Inaugural	Evangelical Lutheran Church of Hong

		Ceremony	Kong Tin Shui Wai Outreaching Social Work Team
2000.07.28	Yuen Long Town Park	Invitational tournament of Fight-crime Orienteering of Yuen Long Junior Police Call	Yuen Long Junior Police Call
2000.11.11	Yuen Long Stadium	Yuen Long Sports Festival Opening Ceremony	
2000.11.12	Tin Shui Wai Indoor Recreation Center	Shaolin Martial Arts Performance	

(2) Visits

2000.02.19	Sai Kung	Sai Kung Long Kae Treatment Centre	
2000.06.17	Tsing Ma Bridge and Airport	Tsing Ma Bridge Control Centre and airport	Yuen Long Junior Police Call
2000.06.30	Marine North Police Station	Marine North Police Base	Yuen Long Junior Police Call
2000.07.05	Pok Fu Lam	Police Force Museum	Yuen Long Junior Police Call
2000.07.12	Shatin	Swire Coca-colar HK Ltd.	Yuen Long Junior Police Call
2000.07.14	Sheung Wan	Medical Museum	Yuen Long Junior Police Call
2000.07.20	Tsim Sha Tsui	HK Science Museum	Yuen Long Junior Police Call
2000.08.04	Sai Kung	Pak Uk Detention Centre	Evangelical Lutheran Church Social Service-HK Tin Shui Wai Children & Youth Integrated Team
2000.08.12	Sai Kung	Visiting Tak Sang Drug Treatment Centre	The Friends of Scouting-Long Ping Children & Youth Centre
2000.08.21	Tuen Mun	Tuen Mun Court	
2000.11.17	Fanling	Police Tactical Unit	
2000.11.25	Wong Chuk Hang	Police Training School	Hong Kong Police

		Open Day	

(3) Training Camps

2000.01.30	Tin Fu Chai of Tai Lam	War Game of Project Sun Shine	Social Welfare Department
2000.08.01 to 2000.08.03	Cheung Chau Caritas Camp	Project Polar Star Summer Training Camp 2000	
2000.08.15	Tung Tze Camp	Summer Camp of Primary School Students Entering Secondary School	
2000.12.21 to 2000.12.23	Cheung Chau Cartias Camp	Project Polar Star Winter Training Camp	

(4) Seminars

2000.01.29	Yuen Long Town Hall	War Game of Project Sun shine – Briefing	Social Welfare Department
2000.03.08	Yuen Long Police Station	Seminar on High Risks Problems in Yuen Long Police District	Yuen Long Police Station
2000.03.19	Tuen Mun Jockey Club Theatre	'Joining Together to be Bright' Show	
2000.04.07	Wai Chau Primary School	Seminar on Acclimatization of Primary School Students Entering Secondary School	
2000.05.08	Wai Chau Primary School	Seminar on Acclimatization of Primary School Students Entering Secondary School	
2000.05.17	Yuen Long Town Hall	Meeting of Local Youth Service Committee	Youth District Services Committee
2000.08.09	Yuen Long Town Hall	Project Polar Star "Youth Problem Talk''	KELY Support Group

| 2000.08.23 | Yuen Long Town Hall | Project Polar Star "Parents Talk" | Hong Kong Family Life Education Unit |

Source: Hong Kong Police (2001)

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Yakuza Membership: A Historical Analysis and Theoretical Application

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Abstract

This work provides an initial portrayal of the historical evolution of the Japanese Yakuza, providing the reader with a general notion of the Yakuza subculture's development. From this point, theoretical applications are utilized to explain why individuals acculturated in Japanese mainstream society may choose to enter a subculture of crime and violence. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is employed as the primary theory in explaining initial selection and life-long membership within the Japanese Yakuza subculture. The contention is that members of the Yakuza have both extrinsic and intrinsic needs that are met by the unique structure of the Yakuza subculture. Thus, membership attraction may go well beyond simple monetary rewards that are often associated with organized crime elements.

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INTRODUCTION

The Japanese Yakuza have survived over the course of several centuries, numerous emperors, and countless government attempts at suppression. This ability to survive is due in large part to social, political and economic environments that are conducive to these organized crime groups. Since World War II Japanese organized crime, called the boryokudan, has gone through five developmental periods, each separated by cultural, societal, economic, and governmental events (Ministry of Justice, 1989; National Police Agency, 1989; Huang & Vaughn, 1992). These periods are frequently referred to as the Confusion Period (1945-1950), the Conflict Period (1951-1963), the Disorganization Period (1964-1970), the Reorganization Period (1971-1980), and the Reformation Period (1981-1988) (Huang & Vaughn, 1992). One final period, the Globalization Period, was added to this paradigm to account for the years between 1988 to present.

Regardless of the exact developmental period, the long-term survival of the Yakuza has had as much to do with the individual members as it does with the various outside influences (i.e. social, political, and economic) external to the Yakuza organization itself. Paradoxically, these various external influences are what determine the likelihood of initial entry into the Yakuza organization. These influences result in the Yakuza drawing their ranks from those who are typically considered the "dregs" of Japanese society (Seymour, 1996). It is important to understand that this has been true throughout the history of the Yakuza. Similarly, the Yakuza organization itself is not held in high regard among members of Japanese society. Thus, it may simply be that individuals in Japanese society join the Yakuza simply because they are already at the bottom of Japanese culture and have nothing to lose by allying with an organization consisting of similarly ranked individuals. But this cannot be the sole reason for individual membership, particularly when one considers the seriousness of joining the Yakuza. Upon joining, membership is typically life-long, outside of certain costly exceptions, carrying a stigma that lasts indefinitely, whether or not one stays in the organization.

It is the contention of this article that individuals within Japanese society join the Yakuza because such membership provides for the gratification of a multitude of needs. These needs are frequently basic physiological needs based on money, shelter, sex, and safety. But membership can also bring a variety of intrinsic forms of satisfaction that are derived from a sense of belonging and achievement. Thus, while most members may perceive themselves as initially joining the Yakuza to secure

extrinsic and/or physiological needs, their ultimate life-long membership is sustained by the gratification of higher order intrinsic needs. These needs can be likened to the schema created by Abraham Maslow (1954), where needs are divided into various levels, physiological needs being primary and esteem needs being secondary. According to Maslow (1954), as basic primary needs are met individuals begin to seek more from their lives, which results in the desire for esteem, belongingness, and meaning. This is precisely the point presented in this article. Specifically, it is proposed that Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs (1954) can be used to explain both initial and sustained membership of individuals in the Yakuza.

This is important because such an explanation is not frequently cited in the literature. Given the communal nature of Japanese society, the reasons for individuals to stigmatize themselves within such a culture would have to be so rewarding as to offset the social consequences. However, in the case of the Yakuza, this is exactly what happens, with the Yakuza subculture replacing the broader culture in providing structure, purpose, and belonging for Japanese individuals who desire such gratification, but cannot obtain it within mainstream Japanese society.

Lastly, the application of Maslow's theory applies to all periods of Yakuza history. Some of these periods have been more effective than others in meeting the needs of the individual Yakuza member. The social, political, and economic factors referred to earlier, work to either perpetuate or limit the Yakuza subculture's ability to meet both the basic and primary needs of its members. Therefore, it is necessary to present a brief historical background of the Yakuza to illustrate how certain points in time have allowed the Yakuza to both survive and thrive. This ability to thrive is historically linked to the Yakuza organization's ability to meet the needs of its individual members. It is precisely this point that will be presented in this article with examples and theoretical applications. The contemporary Yakuza subculture has therefore not only become adept at committing a variety of organized crimes, but has also become well-suited at meeting the personal needs of its individual members. This ability to meet the personal needs of Yakuza members has been one source of longevity for the organization as a whole. To demonstrate the adaptable nature of the Yakuza subculture despite numerous changing environmental demands, and to demonstrate the gradual development of the Yakuza into a needs fulfilling criminal organization, a brief historical analysis of the Yakuza through the major developmental periods will follow.

YAKUZA ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY

Confusion Period: 1945-1950

The immediate post-WWII Confusion Period is marked in history as a time of "lawlessness and anarchy," coupled with a great deal of economic deprivation (Reischauer, 1988; Huang & Vaughn, 1992). During this time, not only was the "upperworld" of mainstream Japanese society in a state of social disarray, but so was the "underworld." Immediately following World War II, the street gangs (called *gurentai,* or "street hoodlums") began to struggle with the older, more established gangs over gambling profits, territory, and monopolies (National Police Agency, 1989; Reischauer, 1988). It was also during this time that the number of organized crime groups began to rise, in terms of both the size and number of groups. The boryokudan began to develop "various rackets such as street hawking, black markets, gambling, group robberies, and strong-arm protection" (Shikita & Tsuchiya, 1990, p. 81). The gangs became "armed with military weapons…fired on each other indiscriminately, thus causing much public uneasiness" (Shikita & Tsuchiya, 1990, p. 81). During this period the police countermeasures to the Japanese underworld's struggle for survival was minimal because of allied occupation in Japan and budgetary issues that severely limited the funds available to police agencies to perform their job effectively and efficiently.[6]

Conflict Period: 1951-1963

Out of the Confusion period rose the conflict period, a full eight years longer than the Confusion period. The Conflict Period was a time in which the boryokudans began to rise to power and prosper in Japan.[7] It is estimated that by the end of this period that there were 5,216 organized gangs in existence with more than 184,000 members throughout Japan (Iwai, 1986). Shikita & Tsuchiya (1990) have indicated that membership in the boryokudan during this period reached a post war high.

Success of the boryokudan during this period has been given partially to the American war effort on the Korean peninsula (Huang & Vaughn, 1992). During the Korean War, the Japanese economy grew as the United States gave millions of dollars to Japan in hopes of reviving the economy (Reischauer, 1988). Because of this seeming prosperity, "prostitution, gambling, and illicit businesses grew to record-setting levels" (Huang & Vaughn, 1992, p. 25-26). In response to the drastic increase in prostitution throughout Japan, in 1956 the Prostitution Prevention Act was enacted

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[6] This struggle was for gambling, prostitution, and drug profits (Yokoyama, 1991).

[7] In terms of organized crime, "prospering" means that the group is earning money and is gaining insulation from the government via political corruption.

(Japan, 1957; Kanematsu, 1988; Tomita, 1989). Also, drugs, specifically methamphetamines, were recognized as legitimate dangers to society (Yokoyama, 1991).

The rise in the potential to make significant monetary gains during the Conflict Period created and enhanced existing tensions between boryokudan organizations. This time of conflict is analogous to the Confusion Period fighting between the gurentai (street hoodlums) and the older established gangs. It was during this time that the gurentai gained control of the streets and targeted businesses to establish networks of criminal enterprises. Like the tekiya and bakuto groups that formed protective institutions that served to limit competition in gambling and prostitution, the emerging gangs had to similarly form protective barriers and continue the centuries old turf battles (De Vos & Mizushima, 1973; Vanzi, 1967).[8] It was the forming of alliances and the growth of boryokudans that led to the Disorganization Period

The Disorganization Period: 1964-1970

In response to the gang wars of the Conflict Period, the police were pressured from a number of sources into quelling the illicit activities of the seven largest boryokudan organizations (Shikita & Tsuchiya, 1990). From 1964-1970, public opinion in Japan of the boryokudan dropped to the point that there was a great deal of pressure placed on politicians who, in turn, placed pressure on the police to ameliorate the wars between the various gangs that were causing the most social disruption.

The police attempted to intercept those boryokudans gaining power through the suppression of illegal gambling and prostitution. This interception included interprefectural police cooperation and coordination, victim assistance, witness protection, and increased community involvement (Fukutake, 1974; National Police Agency, 1978). During this time, the police also began to use public relations techniques to stigmatize boryokudan activities as being inherently antithetical to the Japanese value system, a value system that is deeply ingrained in the people of Japan. During this public campaign against the boryokudan, three groups dissolved completely: the Sumiyoshi-kai, the Kanto-kai, and the Kinsei-kai (Huang & Vaughn, 1992). As will be seen in the forthcoming the Reorganization Period, the members of these groups did not absolve themselves from a life of crime. Rather, they joined other larger and more established groups who were more resistant to police and societal pressure.

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[8] The term "turf" used in this context denotes not only physical ground or soil, such as U.S. street gangs would fight over, but also economic markets such as drugs, gambling, and prostitution.

The Reorganization Period: 1971-1980

Between 1971 and 1980, the boryokudans began to reorganize and rise to power yet again. During this period the various gangs expanded their operations. This expansion is due in large measure to the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, which slowed economic growth and spurred inflation (National Police Agency, 1989). During this period of economic distress, like the time shortly after World War II, the koiki boryokudan, just as any successful corporation would do, took advantage of the moment and reorganized (In the Land, 1989).

The koiki boryokudans are large, well-structured organized crime organizations and include the Yamaguchi-gumi, Inagawa-kai, and the Sumiyoshi-rengo (Support the Proposed Organized Crime Law, 1991). During the Reorganization Period these large gangs consolidated and strengthened by absorbing smaller gangs who could not resist the pressure placed upon them by the public and the police. Upon absorbing the smaller groups, the koiki boryokudans began to move quickly and heavily into the stimulant drug market (Fukutake, 1974; Public Relations Office, 1981; Yokoyama, 1991).

Evidence of the koiki boryokudans moving into the stimulant drug market was revealed in a 1980 self-report survey, conducted by Japan's National Police Agency, of 552 known users of stimulant drugs. Respondents reported that methamphetamines were routinely supplied by "gangsters" (Parker, 1987). Nakasato and Tamura (1974) reported that 20% of drug users had gang connections and 50% were gang members. Although Japan's problem with stimulant drugs is miniscule when compared to that of the United States, the prevalence of drugs during the reorganization period "posed real dangers to Japan's social order during the reorganization period" (Huang & Vaughn, 1992, p. 27).

The Reformation Period: 1981-1988

By the time of the reformation period (1981-1988), boryokudans in Japan had become "highly structured and well managed" (Huang & Vaughn, 1992, p. 27). Inter-gang rivalries still existed, however. The conditions that made these rivalries sustainable are analogous to the tekiya and bakuto battles during the 18th and 19th centuries, which were fought primarily over turf and power/authority, which includes social status. In 1981, after the Yamaguchi-gumi's third-generation master died, the gang split into two rival groups, each of which was willing to kill for the leadership position (Hirose, 1990; Masayuki, 1985; Huang & Vaughn, 1992). The result of this rivalry was a new Yamaguchi-gumi and a splinter Yakuza group, the Ichiwa-kai (Roscoe, 1985). After a caustic five-year battle, the members of the Ichiwa-kai made

peace with the Yamaguchi-gumi (Hakozaki, 1987). A clause of the peace accord was that the Ichiwa-kai would disband only if its members were both accepted into the Yamaguchi-gumi and were also allowed to be involved in the decision-making processes (Yamamoto, 1989). Thus, after the reformation period, the Yamaguchi-gumi became, and remain today, the largest and most sophisticated koiki boryokudan in Japan. [9] This highly sophisticated organization is what led many in law enforcement to recognize the need for international cooperation to combat the koiki boryokudans.

The Globalization Period: 1988 - Present

Since the passage of the Reorganization and Reformation periods, Japanese police have had to adopt a strategy of international cooperation to fight this burgeoning global threat. For instance, just after these periods Japan held a Pacific-Asian conference with Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Hong Kong (National Police Agency, 1990). This conference was designed to address the problems of transnational organized crime in the Pacific-Asian areas only. Recently, however, boryokudans such as the Yamaguchi-gumi have expanded their operations, causing much concern to other countries and forcing Japanese policy makers to consider a new paradigm on crime: *transnationality*. Boryokudan assets have now been traced to "gambling casinos, pornography trade, real estate business, night spots, restaurants, souvenir shops, and travel agencies" (Kakimi, 1988, p. 162; Huang & Vaughn, 1992). In attempting to combat these transnational koiki boryokudans, the National Police agency established the Boryokudan Overseas Intelligence Center (Huang & Vaughn, 1992). This center operates in cooperation with INTERPOL, foreign customs officers, as well as federal and regional police agencies in an active exchange of information. The effectiveness of this program in the fight against international organized crime is yet to be determined.

BEYOND THE HISTORY: WHY DO THEY JOIN?

Criminological researchers have often speculated as to why some individuals are drawn into organized crime (Abadinsky, 2002). Among these researchers, variations of Merton's Strain Theory and/or Subcultural explanations are given to explain the process by which individuals become associated with organized crime groups. Accordingly, Strain Theory would hold the activities of the Yakuza to be "innovative" in that members have created alternative means to achieve success,

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[9] Sophisticated in terms of hierarchal stability as well as its ability to withstand pressures from the public, law enforcement, and a gang war.

despite the fact that mainstream Japanese society has restricted them from traditional means of success (Merton, 1938). Certainly, joining an organized crime group can be lucrative, and just as certainly, this can be a primary motivation to join such a group. Japanese culture, however, places emphasis on success in a variety of spheres that are not limited to monetary success. Also, regardless of the potential monetary benefits, there are also inherent dangers to joining such as group. Thus, the reason for sustained commitment among members of the Yakuza must consist of more than simple monetary rewards.

From a sub-cultural viewpoint, the definition by Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) is the most appropriate to consider. A subculture "implies that there are value judgments or a social value system which is apart from a larger or central value system" (Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967, p. 99). The Yakuza certainly qualify as a subculture given this loose interpretation. But the contention of this paper is that the social value system, consisting of sub-cultural norms possessed and perpetuated by Yakuza members, serves to not only form a sense of cohesion among the group, but also provides for certain needs expected by organizational members. This concept is very important as it is the breaking point between prior theoretical explanations and that provided within the framework of a hierarchy of needs.

As members become more enmeshed within the Yakuza subculture, member expectations and desires will change and develop to be more congruent with those held by the subculture itself. Thus, engaging in behaviors that are reinforced by the Yakuza culture provides the member with a sense of security and belonging. This paradigm is more consistent with long-term individual commitment than is the notion that members simply following sub-cultural norms due to their antithetical values that conflict with mainstream Japanese culture.

Strain and sub-cultural theories cannot adequately account for the finer nuances associated with Yakuza membership. Frustrations may in fact produce motivation to join the Yakuza, and access to alternative norms may provide a means of obtaining goals, but the actual mechanisms by which continued intrinsic loyalty, commitment, and motivation are obtained consist of a more comprehensive set of desires and expectations. Strain theories and Subcultural Theories, when applied to organized crime, are simple and unidimensional in nature, typically revolving around aspirations of money and/or prestige (Abadinsky, 2002). To presume that these are the sole motivators for membership in the Yakuza is to be extremely short-sighted. The concepts loyalty and motivation among Yakuza members is probably much more multidimensional in nature, encompassing the full array of needs that are inherent to all humans. With this in mind, a concise description of Maslow's theory will be presented to demonstrate its applicability to the unique conditions surrounding

membership in the Yakuza, particularly when considered relative to broader Japanese culture.

MASLOW'S NEED HIERARCHY APPLIED TO THE YAKUZA INDIVIDUAL

It is perhaps most important to first realize that individuals who join the Yakuza organization come from Japanese culture. When attempting to understand Maslow's theory applied to the Yakuza member, it is necessary to understand the mindset among members of the broader Japanese culture. Though Yakuza members are part of a subculture, they are nonetheless affected by their native Japanese society. Japanese society is more closely characterized as a collection of groups as opposed to individuals. The identity and self-concept of the Japanese individual is almost completely defined by his or her membership in a group (Durlabhji, 1993). In nearly all encounters that the Japanese have in the outside world, that individual is considered to be a representative of their group. In all circumstances the Japanese are likely to ask not "What should I do?" but rather, "What am I expected to do?" With respect to these groups, they become family-oriented and, once formed, are expected to endure (Durlabjhi, 1993).

This is important to understand because the "Group over the Individual" socialization makes the Yakuza distinct from many other forms of organized crime. As has been observed with such groups as the Italian Mafia in the United States, the Russian Mafiya, Colombian drug cartels, Chinese Triads, and numerous other groups, the idea that the group is more important than the individual has weakened over the years (Moran, 2002). Mafia members today are much more likely to turn state's evidence than the "Mustache Pete's" of yesteryear. Evidence of this comes from the ease of prosecution today of Mafia figures as compared to 20 or 30 years ago. For the Yakuza, however, the group remains more important than any single member.

Physical and Safety Needs as Applied to the Yakuza Member

Physical and safety needs reflect material concerns in a society that rigidly determines exactly how material resources may or may not be required. These needs are the ones most likely to provide motivation for entry-level members within the Yakuza organization. However, for those members who are born into the organization, higher order needs are more likely the actual drive toward participation, for these individuals know no other lifestyle than the tight knit boryokudan. Regardless of their initial entry, the Yakuza organization provides a means of securing satiation of the physical appetites and needs. Monetary needs, basic living considerations, etc…are all

met by the Yakuza organization. This system provides food, clothing, medicines and shelter for their members, who in turn, owe labor, loyalty, and unquestioning obedience to the organizational rank structure (Huang & Vaughn, 1992). Further, the Yakuza organization provides for the safety needs of their members as well, which is important as such organizational needs come from both other organized crime competitors and from the police. Likewise, when a member enters the organization, they take a seihai-gishiki, or oath of alliance, to verify their trustworthiness. This is important because trustworthiness builds security and emotional safety for both the low- and high-ranking members. Because the organization insulates its members from potential troubles and dangers that stem from outside competitors or police officials, and because the organization instills intense affirmations of loyalty and trustworthiness from its members, the whole organization operates as an system providing relative safety and security for each member within.

It is likely that the Yakuza clan was most focused on these needs during the early periods of Yakuza history. This is particularly true during the Confusion Period of 1945-1950 when both the upper and under worlds of Japanese society were recovering from the aftermath of World War II. During this period, meeting basic needs such as food, shelter, and especially safety were extremely critical to many members of Japanese society. It was during this period that the Yakuza member was least secure in his ability to achieve these basic needs. The Confusion Period was marked by tumultuous social upheavals within the Yakuza ranks and rapid and unpredictable change in the broader Japanese society. Thus, the Yakuza member was less likely to have the luxury of worrying about higher order needs. This proved to be an advantage for the Yakuza clan since it is unlikely that such organizations could actually provide any satisfactory gratification of the individual's higher order needs. Thus, a symbiotic form of needs assessment predominated both the clan and the individual, with these needs being the result of social forces outside of the organization due to the American occupation of Japan and its influence on Japanese culture. During the conflict period this level of basic needs was probably even more difficult to obtain, with safety needs being greatly jeopardized by inter-gang rivalry. Therefore, many of the members who joined during this time are likely to have been among the most desperate of the desperate. This is somewhat true during the disorganization period of 1964 - 1970 as well. However, safety needs were centered more around evading law enforcement detection and official punishment rather than inter-gang violence. In both cases, the actual ability of the Yakuza member to meet physiological and safety needs was severely restricted. Members in these illicit organizations are not likely to have had many other options open to them in Japanese society. If they had, they probably would have avoided the strict loyalty required for

such a potentially risky endeavor.

During the reorganization period of 1971 – 1980, the average member was likely to have mixed levels of need gratification. If the member found himself in a smaller clan, fulfillment of the higher order needs would have been a futile pursuit. For the member of the larger clans that dominated and overtook smaller clans, basic needs were more easily met. Indeed, for many members of larger clans it is likely that they were able to achieve some sense of security that provided the potential for higher order need fulfillment. Members from smaller rival clans that eventually merged with the larger clans most likely began to achieve this level of satisfaction as well, though to a lesser extent than those already in the larger Yakuza conglomerates.

During the reformation period of 1981 – 1988, the Yakuza subculture experienced its most significant growth. It was during this period that Yakuza members had the opportunity to grow beyond the basic safety needs that predominate many other members of the Japanese "fringe" society. Indeed, this is the primary benefit to membership. No longer is such membership risky at the basic level for the organization can effectively compensate the majority of these needs, even if their members should be incarcerated for a period of time. This is significant because it marks long-term security for individual's within the organization. Just as nomadic societies were better able to meet their needs upon learning sedentary agricultural methods, the Yakuza were better able to meet their needs now that the chaos and constant transitions of previous eras had given way to increased stability. Thus, the reformation period is marked for its ability to provide members with heightened levels physical safety, and security.

Love Needs as Applied to the Yakuza Member

With respect to love needs, the definition used by the Yakuza subculture is likely to be a modified version of Maslow's (1954) original construction. In effect, a strong sense of camaraderie is developed which is accomplished and reinforced by Yakuza rituals, ceremonies, and other social mechanisms. These forms of social rites foster loyalty and also create mutually enduring relationships. Within the Yakuza organization, members are treated as family. This familial environment serves as a bonding agent for the members and provides the acceptance and reciprocal relationships necessary in attaining the love needs. The longer the member is involved in the Yakuza organization the more likely they are to be promoted within the organization. This results in ever further commitment and immersion in the Yakuza family. Thus, those individuals who are in the midlevel of the Yakuza ranks are likely to play key roles in the "family" structure. These individuals are likely to play the role of "older sibling" for the lower ranking members while playing the role of protégé

and confidant with those who are higher up. This results in a duality of roles that places the mid-ranking Yakuza member in a key position for "family" cohesion and harmony. These mid-ranking members are likely to meet the love needs of both lower and higher ranking members within the organization. At the same time, since they play such crucial roles in linking the "family," they are also likely to feel extremely needed, perhaps to the point of being needed too much. This provides a sense of belonging and serves to enmesh members at this level deeper within the Yakuza subculture. Further, because the sense of purpose is so great and the organizational needs so strong, members at this level are likely to feel an overwhelming sense of purpose and obligation. This results in many members at this level having love needs met with a craving for advanced needs beyond those currently encountered. The member at this stage of development will likely set their desires toward an ever-higher formation of needs, which ultimately results in movement to the next stage of needs gratification for the successful Yakuza member.

It is not very likely that the Yakuza clan was adequately equipped to meet these needs during the early periods of Yakuza history. During the Confusion Period of 1945-1950, when both the upper and under worlds of Japanese society were recovering from the aftermath of World War II, the Yakuza could gather some sense of belonging, but their identity as outcasts may not have been as pronounced due to the suffering Japanese economy. While the organization is likely to have provided basic support among its members, the unpredictability of Japanese society during this period may have hampered the effectiveness of the organization to meet true belongingness needs.

During the Reorganization Period of 1971 – 1980, the average member was more likely to experience a sense of belongingness. This is especially true with the mergers and consolidation of the various clans. While members of smaller clans may not have felt the same degree of safety and belonging, those of the more prominent clans experienced a sense of family and belonging that was greater than during the preceding Confusion Period. This is important because this point in the history of the Yakuza represents a growth in needs fulfillment for members as a whole. This growth is not simply in being able to better meet basic physiological needs, but includes meeting belongingness needs as well.

The Reformation Period of 1981 - 1988 was a time in which the Yakuza subculture experienced its most significant growth and likewise was best able to meet the needs for belongingness among its individual members. Because of this growth, the organizational need for the individual member is high. This provides a definite sense of belonging and serves to enmesh members deeper within the Yakuza subculture. The sense of purpose and obligation within the growing organization was

likely to be emphasized more than any of the previous periods. Therefore, individual members should feel a sense of inclusiveness and belonging capable of commanding the utmost loyalty among members. Rites and rituals serve to increase the mutual sense of belonging shared among the various members. Thus, the Yakuza of the reformation period were ripe for further actualization, dependent on particular circumstances that surrounded the individual.

Esteem Needs as Applied to the Yakuza Member

Esteem needs come in many forms within the Yakuza subculture. The ultimate definition for esteem needs within the Yakuza organization comes in the form of respect that is attributed to members from others within the organization. Individuals at this level of involvement are often fairly well placed within the organization and, as a result, are afforded a great degree of respect from both lower and higher ranking members. These individuals have worked hard and proven both their loyalty and competency within the Yakuza ranks (Seymour, 1996). Their reputations precede them and they are completely intertwined with the organization (Seymour, 1996). These individuals have achieved a high level of discipline, which is a key value within the Yakuza organization (Seymour, 1996). This level of discipline commands respect from lower ranking members and draws favors from those higher up (Seymour, 1996). It is precisely this high degree of discipline that has, in part, been responsible for their successful promotions through the Yakuza ranks. It is also because of this discipline that they are afforded such great deference. Traditions such as tattooing serve as outward indicators of this discipline and provide visual reinforcement for this individual and other members as well. Within this subculture, tattoos become engrafted into the sub-culture as a method of strength, denial, and self-control. Tattoos, then, are an advertised "badge of station" that concretely demonstrates their commitment and success within the subculture. Traditional values of obligation and duty, coupled with empathy and humaneness, are valued within the Yakuza subculture and supplemented with aggression, exclusiveness, and fatalism (Huang & Vaughn, 1992). All of these values are internalized by Yakuza members who reach this stage of development. These values demonstrate how the Yakuza go well beyond the simple street thug, and instead operate on a level of organization that rivals that of most big businesses (which includes the organizational component). Further, this group provides more than just income, it provides the full range of needs that a mentally healthy individual may require. And since crime and criminal acts are not themselves a sign of mental pathology, members are defined as mentally healthy. This is demonstrated in the apparent adaptability and long-term survival of the Yakuza within Japanese culture.

Lastly, the issue of fatalism supports the contention that the Yakuza are aware of the constant potential for death within their organization's means of gratifying group needs. But these norms demonstrate values that are similar to those of the samurai, who during death as in life, never lost self-control, never allowing the human frailties such as fear, doubt, love, or even hate to interfere with the performance of their duties (Durlabhji, 1993). Many of the traditions of the Yakuza are borrowed from the samurai code *Bushido* (e.g., "the way of the warrior"). Notions of fatalism, and the

proscribed means of facing this inevitability, reflect the subcultural values of the Yakuza.

According to Huang and Vaughn (1992), within the Yakuza organization, each member has a specified position and each must perform their role effectively while at the same time maintaining a code of conduct that requires the member to maintain kao (face), otoko (masculinity), and ikka (a whole family). Members who have achieved this level of emotional adaptation have managed to balance these three requirements. Members at this point have a well known reputation and generally have little to worry about with respect to "saving face," as most members would never dream of challenging such well-renowned members. Similarly, the masculine characteristics of this individual have long since been settled by proxy of the position that they hold, if nothing else. Lastly, these members are venerated within the organization and are entrusted with a great deal of authority and power by the top leaders. Much of this is because in addition to "learning the ropes" within the criminal underworld of the Yakuza, these individuals have likewise employed rich family relationships where other loyal members have been treated with empathy and humanity. In effect, these individuals have become both motivators and the motivated, and their self-imposed sense of responsibility and duty has effectively been paired with a degree of kindness and fairness toward others who prove themselves loyal. This should not be taken as a weakness, but instead a form of "honor among thieves" that serves to increase the individual's reputation within the organization. This "firm but fair" family image reinforces the loyalty they generate from other members within their family, and is often noticed by those above them. This familial governance helps to add order to the family and provides a sense of security and belongingness for the lower level Yakuza membership. These individuals maintain their family obligations through various means that go well beyond mere loyalty and include many other qualities that serve to elicit loyalty and respect from others within the family. Those that reach this point of adaptation have achieved a rich and multifaceted life within the organization that goes well beyond simply meeting organizational requirements.

During the Confusion and Reorganization Periods, it was highly unlikely that the Yakuza organization could provide assistance to members in meeting esteem needs. When these needs were met, it likely occurred among those who maintained positions of rank within the organization. However, the Reformation period provided many avenues for esteem needs to be met. It is this period that provided the fertile ground necessary for actualization among individual members, which is not possible without at least vaguely meeting the individual's esteem needs. Earlier periods in Yakuza history were far less likely to have met these needs. During those times when these needs were successfully met, it was probably due to the unique circumstances

and idiosyncrasies ascribed to the individual. Interestingly, the farther one goes back into Yakuza history, the less likely the organization will have met higher order needs. Thus, historical analyses pertaining to self-actualization are not necessary in this last and ultimate stage of personal development. Rather, the characteristics of the individual relative to Japanese culture are the likely determinants for self-actualization among Yakuza members. Despite this it is still important to note that self-actualization is a very rare phenomenon among the general population and as such is perhaps even more rare among a subgroup such as the Yakuza.

Self-Actualization Needs as Applied to the Yakuza Member

Because the identity and self-concept of the Japanese individual is almost completely defined by his or her membership in a group (Durlabhji, 1993), individuals who self-actualize within the Yakuza will simply reflect a total commitment to the organization and its goals. As Maslow (1954) contends, these individuals will tend to be focused on problems and tasks outside of themselves. Maslow (1954) also asserts that the task is not always something they would prefer or choose, but may be a task that they feel is their responsibility, duty, or obligation. This fits nicely within Japanese culture, which places greater emphasis on the group identity rather than the individual identity. Thus a self-actualized member will be one who is totally committed to the organization and feels an intense sense of duty or obligation to the Yakuza organization.

It is expected that these feelings of obligation and duty are only intensified with time, particularly if the individual moves up the social ladder within the Yakuza organization. Thus it is more likely that self-actualized persons within the organization will frequently be those holding positions of power. While the sense of loyalty to the organization is likely to become further entrenched, the transformation to self-actualization within the Yakuza ranks is much more comprehensive in how it affects the individual member. This individual essentially becomes the organization, possessing a sense of mutual dependence from the social group, but showing individual resourcefulness and strength that will carry the organization to achieve its primary goals. Individuals who self-actualize become the epitome of the quintessential Yakuza member. It is their ability to withstand pressure and stress that has allowed them to achieve such high rank. Because of this, these individuals will become "microversions" of their organization. Further, the means by which the organization adapts to social changes and pressures will be a direct reflection of Yakuza leadership. Ironically, it is the Yakuza organization itself that has shaped the leadership personality of the high-ranking member, forming an almost symbiotic relationship between the self-actualized individual and the social group identity. The

two become one in the way that they operate and may indeed be indistinguishable when separated.

This symbiosis can almost transcend reality and enter a "Zen like" state of "effortless effort." This Zen state of total concentration through relaxation is deeply ingrained within the Japanese culture (Durlabhji, 1993). The self-actualized individual at the leadership level is likely to obtain this state of being within the organization, as the two essentially become one. Further, there is a bit of irony in that the self-actualized individual performing a leadership role possessed traits that set them apart from their group, yet by the same token this sense of interdependence has allowed them to have their esteem and belongingness needs met; needs that are required if an individual is to self-actualize. Thus the self-actualized member will have both of the traits previously outlined. It is at this point that the individual is truly employing all of their potential and, as a result, both the individual and the group benefit from this. It is also at this point that the individual has become the true "master" within the organization and will traditionally embody all the characteristics that the group venerates in their individual pursuits toward actualization within the Yakuza organization. The top leader within the Yakuza organization becomes something akin to a near religious icon.

The process of self-actualization within the Yakuza organization will be influenced by the broader Japanese values of Bushido and Confucianism. Indeed, Bushido is the way of the warrior, and is tied with the traditions of the samurai. Many Yakuza lineages can be traced to a variety of samurai know as "ronin" who were essentially samurai that lacked a master, or Daimyo. These wandering warriors lacked purpose and organization, yet were extremely well versed in both martial and aesthetic forms of training. The Yakuza in many ways are a microcosm reflection of this broader Japanese historical phenomena. Many samurai ronin banded together with Yakuza to increase survivability and to engender some form of purpose in their existence. This has led to a sense of "kaisha," or group consciousness, that becomes a symbolic expression for organizational members (Durlabhji, 1993). This *kaisha* is a form of thinking where the individual refers to the social group of belonging as "my" or "our" identity (Nakene, 1970). Thus, the self-actualized Yakuza member has this identity well etched into their psyche forming a sense of pristine purpose within the broader cosmos.

Confucianism, as opposed to Bushido, promotes a sense of harmony within the individual and society (Durlabhji, 1993). The overriding concern in Confucian thought is social harmony, and the central path to such harmony is the creation and maintenance of primary social relations at every level of society (Durlabhji, 1993). This has translated to the Yakuza organization and is evident in the social customs

and ceremonies that serve to reinforce this harmony within the group. Confucian thought holds that social harmony is demonstrated through propriety in personal relationships. Among these rules of propriety, filial piety is considered the most sacrosanct (Durlabhji, 1993). Honor and respect for family is all important. At the heart of this honor is the concept of "Jen" (not to be confused with "Zen"). Roughly speaking, *Jen* refers to compassion, and it is the way of *Jen* that must be followed in all human affairs for harmony and social order (Durlabhji, 1993). This ties in with Maslow's (1954) description of self-actualized people who develop warm and empathetic bonds toward those around them. This requires an integration of self-improvement and social zeal (Maslow, 1970), which are fully consistent with Confucian and Zen Buddhist ideals. Truly, many of the Confucian concepts are almost interchangeable with those contained in much of Maslow's work on religious values and peak experiences (1970). Maslow also adds that many of the basic and higher order needs can only be met through other human beings (i.e. society and social groups) (Maslow, 1970). Social harmony within the Confucian belief system is similar to the private religious experiences discussed by Maslow. Indeed, Maslow states that "this private religious experience is shared by all the great world religions including the atheistic ones like Buddhism, Taoism, Humanism, or Confucianism" (1970, p. 28).

This is extremely important because self-actualization is often described by Maslow (1954; 1970) as a quasi-spiritual experience. Since Confucianism and Buddhism are directly mentioned by Maslow in describing self-actualization, they are apparently consistent with this frame of mind. Given this, and the fact that these belief systems are inherent parts of Japanese culture, they must be considered for the self-actualized Yakuza. Further, since Bushido, Buddhism, and Confucianism are all intertwined aesthetically, these values have affected the Yakuza, who value the warrior mentalities of Bushido, the state of the unconscious mind from Zen Buddhism, and the social harmony and family loyalty of Confucianism. The Yakuza organization is not isolated from these beliefs within the broader Japanese culture, for most members have been socialized through these belief systems. As Maslow (1954;1970) points out, these forms of thought are conducive to self-actualizing peak experiences. Therefore, Japanese culture facilitates self-actualization for its citizenry, and the Yakuza subculture promotes this even further among its members in clearly structured yet highly adaptive forms of ascension. The Yakuza values, rituals, ceremonies, etc…, when placed against the backdrop of the broader Japanese culture, increases the opportunity for the Yakuza top leadership to ultimately self-actualize. The subcultural means of obtaining self-actualization are different from most social groups, but the essential need to self-actualize within the Yakuza is nonetheless the same.

Lastly, notions of fatalism have been previously described under esteem needs within the Yakuza subculture. This form of loyalty even in death helps to prepare the Yakuza for what is essentially an honorable retirement. As mentioned above, such notions come from the old samurai Bushido code that emphasizes self-control. Since survival is perhaps one of life's deepest instincts, having control over the fear of death indicates mastery and complete control over one's instincts (Durlabhji, 1993). According to Maslow (1970), this is the ultimate in self-actualization for the individual has made peace with death. Indeed, humanist psychology, as purported by Maslow (1970) emphasizes the ultimate desire to die with dignity and purpose. In this respect, the value of an existence is determined not only by how one chooses to live, but also by how one *chooses* to die. This is crucial to understanding self-actualization in both western and eastern thought. In coming to terms with how individuals will face death, the self-actualized Yakuza has obtained mastery over his unconscious mind. Indeed, "when one is resolved to die and the thought of death is wiped off the field of consciousness, there arises something in it the presence of which one has never before been aware of…. When this strange presence directs one's activities in an instinctual manner, wonders are achieved" (Suzuki, 1959). This is paramount to understanding the ultimate end for the self-actualized person, and is completely consistent with Yakuza subcultural teachings of fatalism. Thus, these values within the Yakuza subculture serve to further increase the likelihood of self-actualization among its members, particularly those at top levels of leadership. The reciprocal effect of the group and the individual tend to reinforce this through group norms that cultivate self-actualization among members in leadership roles; with high-ranking leaders promoting the ideals of the group to the lower ranking members. This cycle of organizational beliefs perpetuates a system that promotes ultimate self-actualization for its members. The result then translates to overall group effectiveness and adaptability when transacting with the broader Japanese culture.

LIMITATIONS

Although Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is intuitively appealing it has several limitations, two of which will be discussed here. First, Maslow's needs theory fails to make specific predictions as to the actions an individual will take to satisfy a level of need and move up the scale. Knowing this would be particularly important in the prevention of Yakuza development, as well as organized crime (and likely terrorism) generally. However, awareness of the general nature of human needs is intrinsically useful to law enforcement and political decisions makers.

A second limitation to the current application is that Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is more than 40 years old. Although the theory has seemingly withstood the

test of time, what it may not have adapted for is the changing nature of the social world. Changes in demography as well as cultural, political, and economic trends have, with little reservation, altered social needs. It can be argued, however, that Maslow's needs theory applies to those needs intrinsic in every human regardless of the social times.

CONCLUSION

It would appear that Maslow's Hierarchy of needs could serve as an effective approach in determining motivational and need-base factors among Yakuza members. Though unorthodox in application, this theory explains the manner in which individuals obtain much more than simple economic benefit from their membership in the Yakuza. Rather, members of the Yakuza may experience a transmuted form of psychological growth and development that is different from the broader Japanese culture. The results of this application assist law enforcement by identifying those factors, albeit social, that contribute to the development of criminal organizations. With this in mind, it is perhaps wise to reevaluate the actual function of organizations such as the Yakuza. Such organizations can prove to be much more dynamic and resilient due to factors that go well beyond the activities of an organized crime faction. Indeed, this resilience can provide a sense of effective adjustment to societal stressors that would otherwise engulf its individual members. It is recognized that much more research needs to be done in the area of applying psychological models to such complex behaviors as organized crime. This is but one attempt to explore this area of theoretical development.

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Assessing Professionalism, Goals, Image, and Nature of Private Security in South Korea

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ABSTRACT

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has made significant progress in the market sector in the past four decades. Relative to its neighbors in Asia, South Korea has increased its market base both in terms of production and consumption. Along with economic growth, South Korea has also experienced an increase in the employment of private security personnel. Despite large increases in the growth of the private policing industry in the last four decades in the emerging markets, we know very little about how the public perceives agents of private policing. In this paper we examine South Korean youth perceptions of private security officers. Responses were received from 172 college students. The findings suggest that respondents generally held positive attitudes toward security work and security officers.

KEY WORDS: Private police; private security; security officers; security guards; citizen perceptions; Private Security Businesses in Korea

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a growing number of countries such as Korea (Republic of or South Korea), Taiwan, and Singapore, with attractive features such as economic liberalization, low labor costs, and enormous growth rates, has drawn the interest of multinational companies. These markets have not only demonstrated strong economic development but also offer promising opportunities for trade, manufacturing, and sourcing. The U.S. Department of Commerce lists eighteen such markets including China, Hong Kong, Taiwan (The Chinese Economic Area), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei (ASEAN), South Korea, Vietnam, India, Turkey, Poland, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The *Economist* modified this list by including Chile, Venezuela, Greece, Israel, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Russia making a total of 26 emerging markets (Cavusgil 1997).

All these countries, however, share common and identifiable characteristics. Their markets have a young labor force and a sizeable middle class that offers opportunities for both production as well as market consumption. Though these markets have less than U.S. $10,000 per capita income, they enjoy good economic growth rates and show prospects for market expansion. As a group, they constitute half the world's population and exert major economic and political influence in their regions.

Relative to private security the public law enforcement is typically limited to providing safety and welfare for all the citizens while the organizations develop strategies to secure its primary assets, namely, people, premises, and proprietary information. Consistent with the historical development of private security in industrially developed countries, it is apparent that similar trends are witnessed in the emerging economies. Countries that have grown rapidly in economic production and industrialization have also shown a strong increase in the emergence of a private police industry. For example, countries such as Singapore (Nalla and Lim 2003), India (Nalla 1997), South Africa, Brazil, and Russia (Nalla, Morash, Vitaratos, and Lindhal 1997) report a rapid development of private police agencies employing a large number of security personnel engaged in various protective services for their organizations.

The focus of this paper is on Korea, one of the leading emerging markets. In conjunction to its economic development, in the last ten years Korea has experienced a dramatic increase in the number of private security agencies as well as the personnel employed by these organizations. While the security industry has achieved significant growth in recent years it is unclear how the industry has grown over the years and

how the people subject to regulation by security personnel perceive them. Thus, the aim of this paper is twofold: first, we examine the nature of private security in today's Korea, and secondly, we assess how the public perceives private security personnel. More specifically, we surveyed college students' impressions about various facets of private security.

SOUTH KOREA – A MARKET SUCCESS

South Korea constitutes a land area of 98,190 square kilometers and over 45 million people (2001 estimate) with large resource bases, and domestic market. It is considered to be one of the powerhouses in Asia with considerable political, economic, and social clout. Despite a slowdown in its economic growth in the latter part of the 1990s, they have recovered and are progressing toward achieving an explosive growth of global trade. With over 22 million in its labor force, South Korea is one of the most productive emerging market (Korea National Statistical Office 2003). South Korea balances its budget, offering remarkable incentives for private enterprise, and has kept its unemployment rate below 4 percent, demonstrating its emphasis on market economy policies (Korea National Statistical Office 2003). It has achieved remarkable success in turning around a depressed economy with a DGP per head of US$15,770 in 2001 up from US$12,249 in 1998 (Economist.com: Country Briefings: South Korea 2003).

South Korea compares well with the other emerging markets in various measures. According to *Market Potential Indicators for Emerging Markets* (1998), overall, in 1998 South Korea ranked third (after Singapore and Hong Kong respectively) among all the emerging markets. It ranked second only to Singapore on Country Risk for investments, third in Market Growth Index, fifth in Economic Freedom, and sixth in Market Size and Market Consumption categories. On a Commercial Infrastructure scale, South Korea ranked thirteenth, suggesting greater strides are needed in this area.

Despite the Korean society's reliance on agriculture with over 13,530 square kilometers of irrigated land, the country has emerged as an industrial giant in the latter half of the 20th Century. At the end of 2000, the number of manufacturing companies reached was 98,110, an increase of 7.6% from 1999 and the number of workers in the manufacturing sector is estimated to be 2.65 million, up 5.8% from the previous year (Korea National Statistical Office 2003). Other sectors such as the industrial electronics, consumer electronics, and motor vehicle production have all experienced a healthy recovery since the economic downturn in 1998 (Korea National Statistical Office 2003).

ORIGINS AND PRESENCE OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN KOREA

No matter where one goes in Korea, in the countryside or cities, one can see that the living and working areas do not face the street directly, and the protected areas are surrounded by barriers separating them from the "outside." From the smallest country farmhouse to the largest edifices in cities, there are walls or fences and front and rear gates. This pattern is similar to those found in China, Japan, and other Asian cultures. All public buildings and enterprises are likewise made secure. Indeed, the "taemun" or main gates are often attractive works of art, as can be seen at the old national airport, Kimpo.

The modern private security business in Korea began in the early 60's, when the 8th U.S. Army in Korea requested such services as guarding the army facilities (Korea National Police Agency [KNPA] 2002). The enactment of the Security Service Business Act in 1976 gave much impetus to the growth of security industry (KNPA 2002). In 1977, nine private security business groups, employing a little over 5,000-security officers, were in existence and the industry growth accelerated during the 1980s when Korea successfully conducted two major international sporting events namely, the Asian Games (1986) and the Seoul Olympics (1988).

The decades of the 70s and 80s were also significant for Korea. The country emerged to become one of the powerhouses of industrial production and trade in the region. With large business enterprises that include automobile plants, shipbuilding centers, microcomputer companies, and other large commercial operations, demand for security ranging from proprietary security inside the companies to perimeter security around the plants and factories has increased. Some huge business conglomerates have employed and trained their own security professionals. Sam-Sung, one of the conglomerates in Korea, for example, has developed the biggest security company, S1, which hires and trains security personnel both for work in Sam-Sung and other companies throughout Korea. The security companies develop and sell surveillance electronic equipment to companies and agencies involved in the security operations. Accordingly, the private security service providers moved from the law-enforcement styled security of the past to the equipment-based security. The 1993 "Taejon Expo," which showed the international development of high technology in mechanized security systems, as well as the television advertisements provided by Korea's two biggest security companies, S1 and CAPS, demonstrated to the general public the necessity for private security systems along with security professionals (KNPA 2002).

Private security agency personnel have not been allowed to carry guns and so

many of them carry pepper gas weapons which resemble a firearm in holsters. However, in recent years, the amended Security Service Act of 2001 provides for a limited number of special private security officers to possess firearms in special circumstances (KNPA 2002).

Growth in Private Security Services

In 2001, there were approximately 97,000 security professionals in 1,929 security business groups (KNPA 2002). The service trend of the private security business changed from manpower-based to enhanced service using high technologies and mechanized security systems. Table 1 shows the rapid growth of the private security business in Korea.

Table 1. Private security vendors and security officers in Korea.

Year	Security Vendors	Security Officers	Percentage Change Vendors/Officers		
1977*	9	5,022			
1992	420	31,341			
1993	539	37,607	28.3	/	20
1994	690	40,223	28	/	7
1995	785	44,720	13.8	/	11.2
1996	975	52,489	24.2	/	17.4
1997	1,151	62,419	18.1	/	18.9
1998	1,357	52,343	17.9	/	-16.1
1999	1,707	71,481	25.4	/	36.6
2000	1,882	81,618	10.3	/	14.2
2001	1,929	97,117	2.5	/	0.2
Change from 1977			21,333%	/	1834%
Change from 1992			359%	/	210%

Data from KNPA (2002).

* Lee (1995)

Data from Table 1 suggest that both the number of private security vendors as well as the employees in this field have witnessed a phenomenal increase over the last two decades. Though the increases have slowed down in the latter half of the last decade such trends appear to parallel developments in

other emerging nations such as Singapore (Nalla and Lim 2003), India (Nalla 1997), and the United States (Shearing and Stenning 1983). Lee (1995) points out that despite such extraordinary growth, the private security industry faces some constraints. These include:

- **Korea's emphasis on man-power based operations and lack of imagination for systems integration into security services.**
- **The predominant presence of security services in the Seoul-Inchon area.**
- **A few security companies dominate nearly 60% of the total security market, thus, effectively suppressing the growth of private security industry in a competitive market.**
- **A lack of police support for private security enterprises.**

Despite these teething problems which are fairly consistent across all developing economies, the average Korean citizen is familiar with the presence of private security. There are a large number of high-rise apartments and large U.S. style shopping malls in Korean cities which exhibit a strong presence of uniformed private security professionals. Industrial complexes often encompass several square miles and fences or walls enclose them with security professionals both inside and outside the property. There are also huge department stores and shopping malls around cities with security professionals in nice looking uniforms.

PRESENT STUDY: COLLEGE STUDENT'S PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

Given the above-mentioned conditions, we expect a large number of people in Korea come in contact with security officers on a regular basis either as customers or employees. We refer to them as clients of private security. In the following section, we examine the perceptions of one group of clients, namely, college students, and how they view various issues relevant to private security including security officers' training, nature and goals of security, and imagery surrounding security officers.

The data for this research were gathered from college students and graduates

attending a career fair in Seoul in July 2002. One of the instructors of the institute

explained the nature of the survey and described to the attendees about the voluntary

nature of participation in the study. To assess the student perceptions of private

security officers, a questionnaire was developed with items from an earlier research

conducted by the first author in the United States and in Singapore. The questionnaire

was modified to suit the demographic characteristics of Korea. Responses were

elicited on a Likert Scale with the range of 1 (Strongly agree) to 4 (Strongly disagree).

The questionnaire, which was written in English, was translated into Korean and

validated by native speaking Korean educators in Michigan and in Seoul. A total of

200 questionnaires were distributed out of which 172 useable surveys were returned

representing an 86 percent response rate.

Respondent Characteristics

The demographic characteristics of all survey respondents are presented in Table 2. Respondents were evenly split in terms of age, with 49 percent in the age group of 18 to 21 years and 51 percent over 23 years. Of those who responded, 56 percent were male and the remaining female. A majority of the students (83%) were enrolled in a four-year college and 16 percent in two-year colleges. A majority of the respondents live with their parents (59%) with the remaining living in rental accommodation (37%), and university housing (4%). Forty three percent of the respondents' parents' annual income is less than $ 20,000 while nearly a third of the sample earn between $20,000 and $30,000 annually and the remaining earn more than $30,000. Only 14 percent of the respondents work. As such, very few respondents actually come in contact with private security officers in the work context. However, this does not mean that they do not encounter them in apartment complexes and shopping malls.

Table 2. General Characteristics of Respondents (N = 172)

Demographics	N=	Percentage*
Age		
18 – 22	83	48.8
23 and above	87	51.2
Gender		

Female	95	55.6
Male	76	44.4
Currently a student in		
2-year college	25	16.2
4-year college	127	82.5
MA/MSc program	2	1.3
Current residence		
University housing	6	3.6
With parents/family	99	59.3
Rental	62	37.1
Annual family income		
<$20,000	64	43.2
>$20,000 and <$30,000	43	29.1
>$30,000> and <$40,000	29	19.6
>$40,000	12	8.1
Work		
No	146	86.4
Yes	23	13.7
Parents/relatives in law enforcement		
Yes	81	48.2
No	87	51.8
Parents/relatives in private security		
Yes	15	9.0
No	151	91.0
Security devices/systems in parents' homes		
Yes	16	9.5
No	152	90.5
Encounter with security officer		
Yes	55	32.9
No	112	67.1
Do you characterize your encounter as		
Positive	55	75.3
Negative	18	24.7
What was the nature of the encounter		
Needed some information	24	40.0
Asked if needed help	12	20.0
Other	24	40.0

In terms of family work history, nearly half of the respondents' parents or relatives work in law enforcement and 9 percent work in private security. About 10 percent of the respondents have security devices installed in their houses. Interestingly, nearly one third of the sample had come in contact with a security officer of whom over three-fourths indicated a positive interaction. Within the survey there was also a relatively even distribution for the variable of encounter or interaction with a security officer. Of those who had an encounter with a security officer, 75 percent indicated their interaction as positive. Among those who had interacted with an officers, nearly 40 percent sought information and in 20 percent of the cases a security officer approached them asking if they needed help.

Findings

Table 3 displays the percentage of subjects who expressed a strong agreement or agreement to various statements listed in the survey. More specifically, we asked the respondents' views on what they believed about the professionalism of security officers, goals of security officers, image of security officers, evaluation of security officers, nature of security work, and organization of security work. The respondents were asked on a 4-point Likert scale to rank their opinion on questions that pertain to the nature of security work with 1 being strongly agree and 4 being strongly disagree.

Professionalism: One of the dominant issues regarding security work relates to how professional security officers are in executing their work. Over three-fourths of the respondents feel positively about security officers' helpfulness. Findings indicate that a little over half of all the respondents believe that security officers are well trained and honest, and slightly less than half (47%) think that security officers are professional. Over three-fourths of all the respondents view that security officers have poor planning skills and are not well educated. Security officers play a very important role as guardians of peace and property, as well as public relations representatives for the owners of the company.

Goals: Nearly three-fourths of the people believe that both security and police officers together protect the public from criminals. Interestingly, 60 percent of them believed that in the future many police functions will be taken over by private security. This may be in part due to their belief that security and

police officers work together (**59%**) and that security work is generally structured similar to police work. Though only a third of the respondents believed that security departments are structured similar to police departments, an overwhelming majority had no questions about distinguishing a police officer from a security officer. This suggests that the public generally has a pretty good sense of how security officers look and also the nature of security work despite the fact that security officers often wear similar uniforms like those of police officers and drive around in patrol cars that are similarly painted with all the accoutrements that accompany a patrol car.

Imagery: In this section we asked the respondents about a security officer's role in security work. More than three-fourths of the respondents said that security work relates to helping protect customers (**83%**) and making society a better place (**78%**). Further, over three-fourths of all the respondents believe that security officers are not only poorly paid but also believe (**69%**) that they should be allowed to use force to arrest, though only **59** percent believe that they face non-criminal situations at work.

Table 3: Percentage of Respondents for Questions used in Scale Construction (N=172)

Variable	**Strongly**
Agree/Agree	
	N
%	

Professionalism of Security Officers

1. Security officers are well trained   **97**

56.4

2. Security officers are professional   **81**

47.4

3. Security officers have good planning skills   **42**

25.4

4. Security officers are well educated   **38**

22.2

Goals of Security officers

5. Security officers work toward making society better for everyone   **129**

77.7

6. Security and police officers together will protect the public from criminals   **122**

72.6

7. Security officers act as social workers   **106**

62.7

8. In the future, many police functions will be taken over by private security   **99**

59.6

9. Security officers are sensitive to the public   **79**

46.2

Image of Security Officers

10. Security officers get injured in the course of their duty   **148**

88.1

11. Security officers help protect customers   **141**

83.4

12. Security officers in general are helpful   **142**

82.6

13. Security officers should be paid well   **132**

79.0

14. Security work is dangerous   **114**

69.1

15. Security officers should be allowed to use force to arrest suspects   **119**

69.6

16. Security officers have a lot of discretion   **31**

18.1

17. The primary role of security officers is to apprehend criminals   **26**

15.5

Evaluation of Security Officers

18. Security officers provide valuable service to their organizations   **112**

67.1

19. Security officers are generally honest   **95**

55.9

20. The public generally trust security to protect property and lives   **97**

57.7

21. Security officers are unaware of customer's needs   66

38.8

22. Security officers abuse their powers   30

17.6

Nature of Security Work

23. Security officers help reduce losses for business   147

89.6

24. Security work is stressful   120

72.3

25. Security officers face noncriminal situations while working   100

58.5

26. Security officers spend little time apprehending criminals   92

53.8

27. Law violators are always detected by security departments   37

22.3

28. Suspects are more likely to be released after officers recover stolen property   24

14.7

Organization of Security Department

32. Security and police work together   87

58.8

29. Security work is generally structured similar to police work   84

51.2

30. Security departments organized similar to police agencies   57

34.1

31. Difficult to distinguish security officer from police officers   25

14.5

Evaluation of Security Officers: **Nearly two-thirds of all respondents felt that security officers provide valuable service to their organizations and a little over half of those surveyed believed that officers are honest and can be trusted.**

*Nature of Security Work***: Nearly 90 percent of all the respondents indicated that security work relates to helping businesses reduce losses and nearly two-thirds of them felt that security work relates to providing valuable service to their organizations. Only half of the respondents (54%) believe that**

security officers spend little time in apprehending criminals a majority felt that security work is stressful (72%).

Organization of Security Department: **A little over half (59%) of the respondents believe that security and police officers work together and that security work is generally structured similar to police work (51%). Most college students do not have problems distinguishing security officers from police officers.**

Additional Analysis

We conducted factor analysis to determine the structure and reliability of various elements of security functions. Four factors emerged, as shown in Table 4. We labeled these factors Professionalism of Security Officers, Goals of Security Officers, Image of Security Officers, and Organization of Security Department. The scales are reliable with Cronbach's alpha greater than .69.

To determine whether the respondents from various groups held different views about various components of security work and security officers, we employed analyses of variance (ANOVA) to compare the mean scores for the scales. Specifically, we compared the means of all four factors for respondents by selected demographic characteristics.

Table 4. Factor Loadings and Mean Scores for Survey Respondents (N=172)

Scale **Means*(1-4)**	**Factor** **Loading**	

Professionalism of Security Guard (**Mean= 2.65**)

Security officers are well-trained	**.668**	
2.44		
Security officer are well educated	**.721**	**2.82**
Security officers are professionals	**.820**	**2.53**
Security officers have good planning skills	**.493**	**2.80**
Crombachs Alpha = .7392		

Goals of Security Officers (**Mean=2.30**)

Security professionals and police officers together will protect the public	**.732**	
2.16		

Security officers work toward making society a better place for everyone   **.712**
2.17

Security officers are sensitive to the public   **.652**
2.53

Security officers act as social workers   **.706**
2.37

Crombachs Alpha = .7280

Image of Security Officers (**Mean=2.30)**

Security officers in general are helpful	**.446**	**2.12**
Security officers should be paid well	**.601**	**2.17**

Security work is dangerous   **.586**
2.26

Security officers get injured in course of their occupation   **.592**
2.07

The primary role of security officers is to apprehend criminals   **.488**
2.95

Security officers should be able to use force to arrest suspects   **.607**
2.22

Crombachs Alpha = .6780

Organization of Security Department (**Mean=2.58)**

Security work is generally structured similar to police work   **.778**
2.49

Security departments are organized similar to police agencies   **.750**
2.67

Crombachs Alpha = .6921

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*1: Strongly Agree, 2: Agree, 3: Disagree, 4: Strongly Disagree

The comparison of mean differences for professionalism, goals, image, and organization scales by respondents' characteristics are presented in Table 5. Given the nature of college students' age groups, we classified the sample into two groups representing 18-22years and 23 years and above. The mean differences for age groups reveal very few statistically significant findings. Younger college students (18 – 22 years) were more likely to have a positive image of security officers than older

college students (Mean 2.23 v.2.35). Female students were more positive above security goals

Table 5.Comparison of Mean Differences (AVOVA) by Respondents Characteristics

Independent Variable	Factor[a]			
	Professionalism	Goals	Image	
Organization				
Age				
18-22	**2.64/ 81**	**2.29 / 79**	**2.23 /79**	**2.57 / 80**
		(.49)	(.48)	
(.35)	(.54)			
23 and above	**2.66 / 85**	**2.30 / 81**	**2.35 / 83**	**2.59 / 82**
	(.39)	(.42)	(.37)	(.54)
		F Value	.085	. 042
4.767**	. 038			
Gender				
Female	**2.59 / 93**	**2. 22 / 89**	**2.24 / 92**	**2.58 / 92**
	(.49)	(.45)	(.33)	(.52)
Male	**2.71 / 74**	**2.39 / 72**	**2.37 / 71**	**2.58 / 71**
	(.46)	(.42)	(.40)	(.57)
F Value	**2.673**	**5.548 ****	**5.912****	**.002**
School Status				
2-year college	**2.74 / 24**	**2.31 / 24**	**2.29 / 24**	**2.38 / 24**
	(.60)	(.43)	(.42)	(.61)
4-year college	**2.64 / 125**	**2.30 / 122**	**2.29 / 124**	**2.63/ 125**

(.40)	(.45)	(.36)	(.52)

F Value 1.072 . 031 .004

4.502**

Housing

With parents/Family	**2.61 / 97**	**2.28 / 94**	**2.30 / 96**	**2.60/ 94**
	(.47)	(.44)	(.38)	(. 57)
Rental	**2.73 / 60**	**2.31/ 59**	**2.30 / 59**	**2.57 / 61**
	(.40)	(.45)	(.34)	(.50)
F Value	**2.787***	**.114**	**.002**	**.061**

Work

No	**2.63 / 142**	**2.28 / 137**	**2.26 / 141**	**2.58 / 139**
	(. 43)	(.45)	(.33)	(.50)
Yes	**2.77 / 23**	**2.38 / 23**	**2.52 / 22**	**2.61 / 23**
	(. 53)	(.45)	(.48)	(.74)
F Value	**2.005**	**.902**	**10.493 *****	**.059**

Encounter with security officer

Yes	**2.59 / 52**	**2.22 / 51**	**2.34 / 53**	**2.53 / 53**
	(.55)	(.44)	(.40)	(.61)
No	**2.68 / 111**	**2.34 / 107**	**2.27 / 109**	**2.61 / 108**
	(.39)	(.45)	(.35)	(.50)
F Value	**1.389**	**2.843***	**1.221**	**.836**

Positive or negative encounter

Positive	**2.56 / 54**	**2.26 / 52**	**2.33 / 54**	**2.48 / 53**

	(.53)	(.45)	(.37)	(.60)
Negative	**2.97 / 17**	**2.57 / 17**	**2.40 / 17**	**2.81 / 18**
	(.32)	(.52)	(.38)	(.46)
F Value	**8.898*****	**5.552****	**.510**	**4.425****
Perceptions of the security				
Not negative	**2.63 / 79**	**2.23 / 77**	**2.23 / 79**	**2.53 / 79**
	(.48)	(.48)	(.41)	(.54)
Negative	**2.80 / 29**	**2.41 / 29**	**2.37 / 29**	**2.73 / 28**
	(.41)	(.40)	(.38)	(.60)
F Value	**3.078***	**3.383***	**2.648**	**2.840***

[a] = Mean scores / number of cases; (standard deviation)

*** <= .01   ** <= .05   * <= .10

(Mean 2.22 v. 2.39) and image (Mean 2.24 v.2.37) than male college students. Both these findings were statistically significant at .05 levels. Students in 4-year colleges were more certain of the differences between how security and police organizations were structured than those in 2-year colleges (Mean= 2.63 v.2.38). Among the other significant findings include the differences between those who work and those who do not. Compared to those who worked, respondents who did not work were more likely to hold a positive image of security officers (Mean 2.26 v.2.52). We have to be cautious in generalizing this finding given the smaller N values of those who work (23). In addition, we also found those who had encounter or interaction with a security officers had a positive view of the goals of security work than those who did not have an encounter (Mean 2.34 v 2.22). However, this finding was only marginally significant ($p = .10$).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this study we examined the nature of private security in Korea. In addition, we have examined college students' perceptions of private security work and officers. Given the significant amount of growth in the employment of private security officers, it is important to assess how the clients of security view an officer's work as well as security work in general. The findings suggest that, overall college students have a very positive view of security officers. They believe that for the type of work that involves security that officers are not paid well enough. They also believe that security officers should be able to use force. Overall they think positively of their work in terms of interaction with clients as well as encountering clients. For instance, they felt that while security officers are polite and sincere, they do not release offenders after property is recovered, but follow up through formal channels that involve law enforcement. Respondents also believe that private security would make the world a better place and that security officers serve a positive role in helping organizations where they work and the clients that the organizations support. A large number of them also believe that security work is stressful and dangerous, although most are aware that normal security work involves little time in apprehending criminals. In the area of professionalism, however, only half them believe security officers are trained and professional and over three-fourths of the respondents think that security officers do not have planning skills and are not well educated.

These findings suggest that relative to other emerging markets, security work and security officers enjoy a greater sense of acceptance from their clients, particularly younger clients. Though we are cautious of generalizing these findings to a larger society of young consumers and the general public, due to the size of our sample, these findings suggest that more research are needed in this area. Given the rate of growth in the private sector in Korea, as well as the belief among respondents that while they see private security as emerging they do not necessarily replace police officers it is important to examine how security officers view their role as well as their own relationship with the public law enforcement.

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The Evidence-Oriented Crime Control Policy: An Analysis of Police Data and Public Opinion in Taiwan

by

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Abstract

Good social order is an important condition for human living. People are happy to live in the circumstances of no or less fear of crime victimization. The purpose of this study is to explore an evidence-oriented and feasible crime control policy for local government and citizens. The research setting for this study is located in Taipei county, the largest county both in terms of overall population and population density 3.51 million, population density 1,711 per square kilometer in Taiwan. Furthermore, Taipei county covers approximately 2,052 square kilometers and can be divided into urbanized, rural, coastal and mountainous areas. In general, Taipei county can represent the typical features of Taiwan's geography.

In order to achieve the purpose of this research, data were collected through qualitative and quantitative approaches. There are four major sources of data on crimes of Taipei county the ten-year statistics on crimes collected from the Taipei County Police Department TCPD , focus group interviews to investigate and comprehend the police officers' recognition and viewpoint of the content of the public need for social order and suitable crime control policy , analysis of the 109,351 citizen calls to which the police officers of TCPD were dispatched from year 1999 to 2000, and public opinion survey including 3,026 respondents in the sample .

According to the analysis of empirical data collected in this research, the crime control policy was yielded as the following items:

1. Increasing police patrol density.
2. Imposing stronger control on hot spots of crime.
3. More law enforcement on traffic violation.
4. Improving police service quality.
5. Implementing community policing.
6. Strengthening the function of community and apartment managing committee.
7. Increasing the police forces.
8. Innovating the police training and education program.

Keywords: Crime Control, Public Policy, Policing, Hot Spot of Crime, Empirical Study.

Introduction

Taiwan has experienced significant changes in its social and cultural system due to economic growth and political reform. For example, the per capita GNP has increased tremendously from US$ 389 in 1970 to US$ 14,216 in 2000. The lifting of the Martial Law also pushed Taiwan into a new era of development. Although this dramatic progress has paved the road for successful modernization and social and economic development, adverse effects–such as increasing crime rates and public fear of crime–have also emerged. Data from the Crime Statistics reported by the Criminal Investigation Bureau (1998) indicates that the crime rate was 42.17 per 10,000 in 1989 but increased to 88.58 per 10,000 in 1998　motorcycle theft was not included　. Ever since the lifting of the Martial Law in 1987 and permission of travelling between Taiwan Straits, "Incremental Social Defense" and "Victim Awareness Movement" are the two major themes of public responses to deteriorating social order in Taiwan. They can be further described as follows (Sheu, 1998):

1. Prison population has grown substantially in the past 30 years. The imprisonment rate has doubled. Prisons are rather over-crowded. A project is undertaken to examine the possibility of prison privatization in Taiwan　Ministry of Justice, 1999　.

2. The police are requested by many public sectors to transform from centralization to decentralization, although many difficulties exist. Community policing has become a primary strategy among police work. To some extent, it represents a potentially momentous shift in the location of authority over the police.

3. Many new laws have been enacted creating new categories of crime and more restricting or complicated procedures as well as heavier penalties. These laws can be listed as:
   • Organized Crime Control Act of 1996,
   • Children and Juvenile Sex Transaction Prevention Act of 1996,
   • Money Laundering Prevention Act of 1996,
   • Vagrant Control Act of 1996,
   • Firearms and Weapons Control Act of 1997 (revision),
   • Sexual Assault Crime Prevention and Treatment Act of 1997,
   • Domestic Violence Prevention Act of 1998,

4. The public are taking many protective measures to safe-guard themselves against crimes
   • The private security corporations have increased from 17 in 1990 to 79 in 1996. The private security personnel increased from about 20,000 to more than 40,000 (Hou, 1998).

• Neighborhood watch programs are growing rapidly and encouraged to be set up by government.

It is rather clear that this trend toward greater expansion and more investment in criminal justice system is not able to reduce crimes effectively. The development of new crime control policy seems to be more urgent than ever before. This research attempts to explore an evidence-oriented and feasible crime control policy. The research setting for this study is located in Taipei county, the largest county both in terms of overall population and population density 3.51 million, population density 1,711 per square kilometer; Bureau of Census, 2000 . Divided into 29 administrative districts, Taipei county covers various geographical areas such as urbanized cities, rural towns, coastal towns and towns adjacent to mountains. In general, Taipei county can represent the typical features of Taiwanese geography. Due to its large number of population and various geographical features, Taipei county was selected to be the research setting in this study.

Crime in Taipei County

According to the data from the National Police Administration (NPA, Crime Statistics 1999), as shown in table 1, the crime rate of Taipei county is the highest one among all the sixteen counties in Taiwan. In 1999, the total offenses known to the police in Taipei county were 63,949, and the crime rate was 183.48 offenses per 10,000 persons. With respect to the number of offenses in 1999, the number in Taipei county is 113 percent higher than that in the Taoyuan county (its offenses number is in the second place among 16 counties) and about 100 times of the least-offense county, Penghu county. Obviously, Taipei county reached the first position on the offense number and crime rate among all the counties in Taiwan.

Table 1 Number of Offenses and Crime Rate of Sixteen Counties in Taiwan (1999)

County	Offenses Known to the Police	Crime Rate	Rank of Crime Rate
Taipei County	63,949	183.48	1
Taoyuan County	30,012	179.59	2
Hualian County	5,338	149.88	3

Kaohsiung County	18,307	148.99	4
Pingtung County	12,407	136.37	5
Miaoli County	7,448	133.04	6
Changhua County	16,900	129.65	7
Nantu County	6,911	126.82	8
Hsinchu County	5,363	124.47	9
Taichung County	18,319	124.24	10
Ilan County	5,502	118.24	11
Tainan County	10,119	91.82	12
Taitung County	2,278	91.53	13
Yunlin County	6,572	87.91	14
Chiayi County	4,698	83.27	15
Penghu County	647	72.50	16

Source: National Police Administration, *Crime Statistics–1999.*
Note: Crime Rate = (Offenses Known to the Police ÷ Yearly Average Population) × 10,000.

Crime statistics, reported by the NPA, reveal that Taipei county constitutes 15.84% of Taiwan's population yet accounts for 18.70% of its larceny occurrence, 21.06% of its motorcycle theft occurrence and 17.38% of its obscenity (shown as table 2). In other words, these three patterns of crime in Taipei county are the serious issues of social order.

Table 2 The Percentage of Population and Offenses Between Taipei County and Taiwan Area

Area	Yearly Average Population	Larceny	Motor Vehicle Theft	Motorcycle Theft	Murder	Robbery and Forceful	Kidnapping

						Taking
Taipei County	3,485,271	8,097	5,368	38,564	158	895	6
Taiwan Area	22,010,489	43,311	39,835	183,103	1,215	5739	55
Percentage	15.84%	18.70%	13.48%	21.06%	13.00%	15.60%	10.91%

Area	Yearly Average Population	Intimidation	Drug Crime	Obscenity	Rape	Smuggling	Bodily Harm
Taipei County	3,485,271	263	4,454	424	200	37	386
Taiwan Area	22,010,489	1,723	38,395	2,439	1,330	396	7,450
Percentage	15.84%	15.26%	11.60%	17.38%	15.04%	9.34%	5.18%

Source: National Police Administration, *Crime Statistics–1999.*

As table 3 indicated, the trend of clearance rate of crime in Taipei county, from 1995 to 1999, presented a decreasing tendency. The volume of crimes of those five years, however, was not corresponding with this tendency. In table 3, the crime occurrence reached the peak at the number of 80,230 in 1997 and reduced to 63,949 in 1999. Although the offense volume was decreasing, the rate of unsolved crimes was increasing. There were about 60% of crimes unsolved in 1998 and 1999.

Table 3 Clearance Rate of Crime in Taipei County

Year	Offenses Known to the Police	Offenses Solved	Clearance Rate
1995	76,721	37,733	49.18
1996	77,811	37,926	48.74
1997	80,230	36,039	44.92
1998	74,842	29,735	39.73

1999	63,949	24,698	38.62

Source: Taipei County Police Department.

In sum, the current condition of crime in Taipei county can be described as follows:

1. Taipei county owned the largest number of offenses and the highest crime rate among all the counties in Taiwan in 1999.
2. Three types of crime, larceny, motorcycle theft and obscenity, are the serious issues of social order that deserve more attention in Taipei county.
3. Although the crime occurrence was decreasing from 1997 to 1999, however, the clearance rate of crime was also declining. The proportion of unsolved offenses was increasing substantially.

Research Setting and Methods

The purpose of this study is to explore an evidenced-oriented and feasible crime control policy. However, there are sixteen counties and seven municipalities in Taiwan. Every county or municipality owns its demographic and cultural features. Therefore, it is difficult to explore effectively all counties and municipalities in one study. In order to achieve the purpose of this study, Taipei county was selected as the research setting because of its large number of population and representative geographical features. Taipei county is the largest county both in terms of overall population and population density 3.51 million, population density 1,711 per sq. km; Bureau of Census, 2000 . Furthermore, Taipei county covers approximately 2,052 square kilometers and can be divided into urbanized, rural, coastal and mountainous areas. In general, Taipei county can represent the typical features of Taiwan's geography.

Data were collected through qualitative and quantitative approaches. There are four major sources of data on crimes of Taipei county police statistics, focus group interviews, analysis of all dispatched calls for police service in one year, and public opinion survey.

Since Taipei county covers multiple geographical areas, police statistics on crimes were collected from the overall police stations in Taipei county. Taipei County Police Department, the headquarter of the Taipei county police, subordinates fifteen police stations under its authority. Simply put, there are fifteen precincts in Taipei county. In each precinct, there is a police station under direct control of the police department. The longitudinal police statistics on crimes were collected from the fifteen precincts.

These data were composed of ten-year primary crime statistics, from 1990 to 1999, of each precinct. The primary crimes are the offenses that usually generate public fear, serious or obvious harm, and public concerns. These crimes include larceny, motor vehicle theft, motorcycle theft, murder, robbery, forceful taking, kidnapping, intimidation, drug crime, obscenity, rape, smuggling bodily harm, gambling, and offense against public safety. The crime issues of Taipei county will be more precisely and widely explored thanks to the analysis of longitudinal data from the fifteen precincts.

In order to investigate and comprehend the police officers' recognition and viewpoint of the content of the public need for social order and suitable crime control strategy, this study employed the focus group interviews to collect these data. Eight police stations were randomly selected from fifteen police stations. In each selected police station, several police officers were chosen purposely to form a "focus group". The focus group was consisted of the deputy chief, supervisor of administrative division, supervisor of criminal division, supervisor of security division, superintendent of police substation whose beats with the largest number of crime incidence, and the superintendent of police substation whose beats with the least number of crime incidence. The chief of police station was not selected into focus group because he is usually occupied with meetings or other affairs. Furthermore, since the chief owns the coercive and reward authority (ex. promote subordinates), his presence in focus group interviews may influence other officers' expression. The deputy chief, a police officer with long-term seniority, is usually able to realize clearly the public opinion in his precinct. Other officers were chosen into focus group because their work were highly related with social order or crimes. For example, the administrative division is in charge of special business such as business related with obscenity and gambling, the criminal division is in charge of handling criminal cases, and the security division is in charge of public security affairs and social information investigation.

The content of citizen calls for police services was the third source of data that was collected and analyzed in this study. A sophisticated computerized communication center and 110 system, namely the Operational Command and Control Center OCCC , was established in Taipei County Police Department in early 90s to simplify and expedite public access to the police. The data, collected from the PDDC of Taipei County Police Department, includes the 109,351 citizen calls to which the police were dispatched. These over one hundred thousand calls were the calls of one-year period, from the April of 1999 to March of 2000. The purpose of this approach is to comprehend the types of the cases that citizen calls for police services, and to explore the geographical concentration of these cases. Theoretically, if the tendency

of geographical concentration of these cases is significant, these hot spots can become an important criterion for the allocation of crime control resources　Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993; Buerger, Cohn & Petrosino, 2000　.

Finally, in order to realize the public opinion concerning the social order and the suitable government response, a questionnaire was designed and conducted through telephone survey approach. After a careful pretesting of the survey, a revised version of the questionnaire was used to measure public opinion by telephone. The questionnaire consists of three parts. In the beginning, the instrument contains ten questions related to the social order information of the respondents' residing area. The second part of the questionnaire is composed of two questions designed to examine the following issues:

1. In order to improve the social order and quality of life in your residence surroundings, what is the most necessary work that the police should do?
2. In addition to the police work, what is the most necessary work that Taipei county government should do to improve the social order and quality of life in your residence surroundings?

The last part of the questionnaire contains several demographic variables related to the background information of the respondents. These variables include: gender, age, residence area, income, and education level. Reported here are the results from a random probability sample of adult residents, aged from 25 to 65, from the Taipei county. Of the 3,569 individuals included in the initial sample, 543 people refused to be interviewed. Finally, 3,026 people provided usable data.

Results

I. Results of Police Statistics Analysis

Data presented in Table 4 indicate the number of crime incidence of the fifteen police stations' precincts in the recent ten years, from 1990 to 1999. Since the "Motor Vehicle Theft" and "Motorcycle Theft" cases were not recorded in the police statistics by 1995, it revealed a big gap of crime incidence between the period before and after the year 1995. The volume of these two types of crime was so significant that it influenced the police statistics seriously. Accordingly, the data from 1995 to 1999 became the primary data to be analyzed in this research.

Table 4 Crime Incidence of the Fifteen Police Stations' Precincts, Taipei County

Station	Panchiao P. S.	Haishan P. S.	Hsin-chuang P. S.	Sanchung P. S.	Chungho P. S.	Yungho P. S.	Luchou P. S.	Hsintien P. S.	Shulin P. S.	Hsichuh P. S.	Sanhsia P. S.	Tanshui P. S.	Tucheng P. S.	Chinshan P. S.	Juifan P. S.

Year \ P. S.															
1990	1175	--	791	1031	915	767	244	577	869	251	371	336	--	77	187
1991	1813	--	1025	1168	1241	732	535	572	620	189	397	434	--	152	217
1992	2168	--	1424	1284	1533	847	548	859	1043	197	446	594	--	141	352
1993	1112	741	825	1083	1159	582	577	685	869	264	678	490	--	174	350
1994	767	882	783	854	791	543	459	593	549	166	429	399	59	124	316
1995	7254	7447	12093	11690	8077	4067	4298	3557	3090	1287	1702	2160	4099	389	736
1996	7106	7662	10849	10616	9053	4813	5094	3924	2697	1363	2182	2177	4525	552	757
1997	5835	6831	10873	9412	9035	4516	4955	4104	2398	1314	2558	2308	4336	422	721
1998	6412	6994	10441	9164	7574	4116	4948	4019	2861	1776	2532	2720	4695	477	682
1999	5868	5619	7879	7539	6050	3568	4076	3470	2355	1664	2104	1772	3725	418	664
Sum of 1995 ~ 1999	32475	34553	52135	48421	39789	21080	24371	22074	13401	7404	11078	11137	21380	2258	3560

Source   Taipei County Police Department.

Note   1. The Haishan Police Station was established in the March of 1993. Before it was established, its precinct belonged to the Panchiao Police Station.

2. The Tucheng Police Station was established in the October of 1994. Before it was established, its precinct belonged to the Shulin Police Station.

3. Each police station began to record the incidence of "Motor Vehicle Theft" and "Motorcycle Theft" in the police statistics from 1995, therefore there was a huge difference of crime incidence between the period before and after the year 1995.

Crime Incidence

Table 5 reveals the average incidence per year, from the year 1995 to 1999, of each police station's precinct in Taipei county. Referring to Table 5, the precinct of the Hsinchuang Police Station and Sanchung Police Station has the highest crime incidence; the average incidence per year is about 10,000 criminal cases. The precinct of the Chinshan Police Station and Juifan Police Station has the lowest crime incidence; the average incidence per year is about 450~700 criminal cases.

Table 5 The Average Incidence Per Year of Each Police Station's Precinct, Taipei County

Rank of Crime Incidence	Police Station's Precinct	Average Incidence Per Year
Highest	Hsinchuang P. S.	About 10,000

	Sanchung P. S.	
High	Panchiao P. S. Haishan P. S. Chungho P. S.	About 6,000~8,000
Median	Yungho P. S Luchou P. S. Hsintien P. S. Tucheng P. S	About 4,000~5,000
Low	Shulin P. S. Hsichuh P. S. Sanhsia P. S. Tanshui P. S.	About 1,500~2,500
Lowest	Chinshan P. S. Juifan P. S.	About 450~700

Source　Taipei County Police Department.

Crime Rate

Table 6 reveals the crime rate, from the year 1995 to 1999, of each police station's precinct of Taipei county. Among all the police station's precincts, the precinct of the Panchiao Police Station and Haishan Police Station is special and needs to be explained. There are twenty nine administrative districts in Taipei county. Most police stations' precincts contain one or several whole administrative district(s) such as city or town, except the Panchiao Police Station and Haishan Police Station. The Panchiao City, a city with the largest population volume in Taipei county, is divided into two precincts. One precinct is charged by the Panchiao Police Station and the other is charged by Haishan Police Station. It is difficult to find the exact number of the yearly average population of both precincts in the recent five years. Therefore the crime rate of the Panchiao City, as shown in the second column in Table 6, is calculated to represent the crime rate of both police station precincts.

Table 6 Crime Rate of the Police Stations' Precincts, Taipei County

Station　Year	Panchiao Haishan P. S.	Hsin-chuang P. S.	Sanchung P. S.	Chungho P. S.	Yungho P. S.	Luchou P. S.	Hsintien P. S.	Shulin P. S.	Hsichuh P. S.	Sanhsia P. S.	Tanshui P. S.	Tucheng P. S.	Chinshan P. S.	Juifan P. S.
1995	275.01	279.47	306.43	203.59	171.54	202.14	125.44	233.61	111.27	122.92	188.45	227.85	79.75	86.91
1996	280.14	243.57	280.25	235.12	207.54	227.65	136.46	195.84	110.43	152.24	183.10	231.69	112.85	90.97
1997	242.69	238.2	248.9	234.7	196.5	268.8	140.1	163.9	112.4	140.4	210.2	208.6	85.76	56.59

		7	9	9	0	0	3	7	5	9	8	6		
1998	257.87	224.31	242.06	195.69	180.30	202.13	135.39	196.20	122.92	164.81	211.04	216.88	96.12	85.00
1999	220.03	166.52	198.72	155.06	156.71	161.70	115.98	157.77	110.02	133.49	133.84	167.53	83.14	84.59
1995~1999 Average	255.15	230.43	255.29	204.85	182.52	212.48	130.68	189.50	113.42	142.71	185.34	210.52	91.52	80.81

Source: Taipei County Police Department.

Note: 1. Crime Rate = (Offenses Known to the Police ÷ Yearly Average Population) × 10,000.

2. Most police stations' precincts contain the whole administrative area such as city or town, except the Panchiao Police Station and Haishan Police Station. The Panchiao City is divided into two precincts, one is charged by the Panchiao Police Station and the other precinct is charged by Haishan Police Station. Therefore the crime rates of both police station precincts are combined together as the second column of the table 6.

Table 7 reveals the average crime rate, from the year 1995 to 1999, of each police station's precinct in Taipei county. Referring to Table 7, the precinct of the Sanchung Police Station and the Panchiao City (Panchiao Police Station + Haishan Police Station) has the highest crime rate; the average crime rate is about 255 offenses per 10,000 population. The precinct of the Chinshan Police Station and Juifan Police Station has the lowest crime rate; the average crime rate is about 85 offenses per 10,000 population. Table 8 indicates the rank of both crime incidence and crime rate of all police station precincts in Taipei county.

Table 7 Average Crime Rate of Each Police Station's Precinct, Taipei County

Rank of Crime Rate	Police Station's Precinct	Average Crime Rate (1995~1999)
Highest	Sanchung P. S. Panchiao P. S. (=Panchiao City) Haishan P. S.	255 offenses per 10,000 population
High	Hsinchuang P. S. Luchou P. S. Tucheng P. S. Chungho P. S.	215 offenses per 10,000 population
Median	Shulin P. S. Tanshui P. S. Yungho P. S.	185 offenses per 10,000 population
Low	Sanhsia P. S. Hsintien P. S.	130 offenses per 10,000 population

	Hsichuh P. S.	
Lowest	Chinshan P. S. Juifan P. S.	85 offenses per 10,000 population

Source: Taipei County Police Department.

Table 8 The Rank of Crime Incidence and Rate of Police Station Precincts, Taipei County

Rank of Crime Incidence	Police Station	Rank of Crime Rate
1	Hsinchuang P. S.	4
2	Sanchung P. S.	1
3	Chungho P. S.	7
4	Haishan P. S.	2
5	Panchiao P. S.	2
6	Luchou P. S.	5
7	Hsintien P. S.	12
8	Tucheng P. S.	6
9	Yungho P. S.	10
10	Shulin P. S.	8
11	Tanshui P. S.	9
12	Sanhsia P. S.	11
13	Hsichuh P. S.	13
14	Juifan P. S.	15
15	Chinshan P. S.	14

Source: Taipei County Police Department.
Note: The crime rate of Panchiao City represents the crime rate of the Haishan Police Station Precinct and Panchiao Police Station Precinct.

Results of the Police Statistics Analysis, In Sum

According to the above analysis of the police statistics, the issues of social order of Taipei county can be summarized as follows:

1. A large number of crimes occurred in the Hsinchuang, Sanchung, Chungho, Haishan, and Panchiao police station precincts.
2. The Hsinchuang, Sanchung, Chungho, Haishan, Panchiao, Luchou , and Tucheng police station precincts have a higher crime rate than other precincts in Taipei county.
3. Although the Luchou and Tucheng police station precincts have a median crime incidence, however, both precincts have a higher crime rate than other precincts with median crime incidence.

4. Motorcycle theft, larceny, motor vehicle theft, drug, and gambling are the most common offenses in all police station precincts.

II. Results of the Focus Group Interviews

Public Opinion of the Social Order and Suitable Crime Control Policy---The Police Perspective

All of the focus group interviewees, the police officers, were required to provide two or three items that they recognized as the most necessary public need in social order and suitable crime control policy. As indicated in Table 9, a higher percentage of interviewees expressed that reducing theft, improving the police service quality, improving the traffic condition, improving the police manner of service delivery and law enforcement, and increasing the clearance rate are the most necessary public need in social order and suitable crime control policy.

Table 9 Public Need in Social Order, the Police Perspective

Need Item	Frequency f	Rank
Reduce Theft	23	1
Improve the Police Service Quality	20	2
Improve the Traffic Condition	15	3
Improve the Police Manner of Service Delivery and Law Enforcement	13	4
Increase the Clearance Rate	12	5
Promote the Police-Community Relationship	5	6
Improve the Obscenity Problem	3	7
Improve the Traffic Violation of Trucks	3	7
Increase Patrol	2	9
Provide the Legal Consultation	2	9
Improve the Drug Crime	1	11
Reduce the Gun Prevalence	1	11
Protect the Campus Security	1	11
Improve the Juvenile Delinquency Problem	1	11
Improve Financial Crime	1	11

N=48

The items of public need in social order and suitable crime control policy can be categorized into three types such as the crime investigation and prevention, order maintenance, and service. Referring to Table 10, "crime investigation and prevention" and "service" seem to be more frequently emphasized by the police as the primary public need in social order and suitable crime control policy.

Table 10 Type of Public Need, the Police Perspective

Type of Public Need	Item of Public Need
Crime Investigation and Prevention	Reduce Theft f=23 , Increase Clearance Rate f=12 , Obscenity Problem f=3 Drug Problem f=1 , Gun Problem f=1 , Juvenile Delinquency f=1 , Financial Crime f=1 .
Order maintenance	Improve Traffic Condition f=15 , Traffic Violation by truck f=3 , Enhance Patrol f=2 , Campus Security f=1 .
Service	Increase the Police Service Quality f=20 , Improve the Police Attitude f=13 Police-Community Relationship f=5 , Legal Consultation f=2 .

Difficulties in Implementing the Work Related to Social Order

The focus groups revealed the following items as the major difficulties in implementing the work related to social order:

1. Lack of enough police force.
2. Policing equipment and facilities need to be updated.
3. Improving the traffic engineering.
4. Lack of a specific division in police station to deal with traffic affairs.
5. Promoting the quality of training on job in policing, such as interpersonal communication skills, the ability to recognize and analyze problems, and community work skills, etc.
6. Simplifying the police work toward crime control.
7. Clarifying the regulation of the police power.
8. Limited budget.

III. Results of the Analysis of Citizen Calls to the Police

Table 11 Types of Citizen Calls for the Police Service and Case Occurring Places

Occurring Place (Police Station)	Specially Registered Criminal Cases	General Criminal Cases	Traffic Cases	Service Cases	Whistle-blowing Cases	Calamity Cases	Total
Panchiao P. S.	38	4722	2310	940	451	22	8483
Haishan P. S.	39	4977	2705	1156	573	29	9479
Sanchung P. S.	36	7404	4471	1850	897	48	14706
Hsinchuang P.S.	29	6815	5603	1509	734	52	14742
Chungho P. S.	22	4956	4182	1520	613	50	11343
Yungho P.S.	16	3362	1778	889	391	32	6468
Hsintien P. S.	35	2955	3345	1035	400	41	7811
Luchou P. S.	46	4312	2598	854	418	27	8255
Tucheng P. S.	63	3281	2175	889	251	14	6673
Shulin P. S.	10	2035	1712	707	194	16	4674
Sanhsia P. S.	4	1785	1628	556	171	17	4161
Tanshui P. S.	19	1602	1426	471	166	10	3694
Hsichuh P. S.	9	1533	1878	746	201	13	4380
Chinshan P. S.	7	236	198	70	44	5	560
Juifan P. S.	14	426	215	112	70	1	838
Others	10	1003	1547	239	273	12	3084
Total	397	51404	37771	13543	5847	389	109351

Source: Taipei County Police Department.

Note   These calls are the calls to the police from April 1999 through March 2000.

"Others " means the occurring place of the case is not located in Taipei county.

As data indicated in Table 11, there are more cases concentrating in the Hsinchuang, Sanchung, Chungho, Haishan, Panchiao, and Luchou police stations' precincts. The following types of citizen calls for the police service, from most to least, are identified:

General Criminal Cases (47.01%), Traffic Cases (34.54%), Service Cases (12.39%), Whistle-blowing Cases (5.35%), Specially Registered Criminal Cases (.36%), and Calamity Cases (.36%). The top three types, General Criminal Cases, Traffic Cases and Service Cases, occupy 93.93% of total cases. In order to explore effectively and clearly the geographical concentration tendency of crimes and related events, this research used the smallest police jurisdiction, the police beat, as the final unit of analysis. The General Criminal Cases, Traffic Cases and Service Cases were employed to be the primary data for concentration analysis. The Whistle-blowing Cases and Specially Registered Criminal Cases were not analyzed due to their limited volume.

Geographical Concentration of the General Criminal Cases

According the record from the Operational Command and Control Center of Taipei County Police Department, the motorcycle theft, larceny, motor vehicle theft and drug crime were the primary offenses of the general criminal cases. These four kinds of crimes occupied about 96% of the general criminal cases. In each police station, the top five beats were selected in accordance with their highest occurrence volume of the general criminal cases. Then, the percentage of the total beats of each police station by its five beats was calculated, as shown in the column 2 of Table 12. The percentage of the total general criminal cases of each police station by the general criminal cases of its top five beats was also calculated , as shown in the column 3~6 of Table12.

Referring to Table 12, it clearly reveals, in the Panchiao police station's precinct, only 3.03% of all beats produced 23.61% of the calls of motorcycle theft to which the police were dispatched. In the Chungho police station's precinct, only 1.88% of all beats produced 42.02% of the calls of drug crime to which the police were dispatched. Averagely, 30.33% of the calls of motorcycle theft, 29.49% of the calls of larceny, 30.87% of the calls of motor vehicle theft, and 35.84% of the calls of drug crime concentrated in about 4.33% of the police beats. Simply put, these police beats were the small places in which the occurrence of general criminal cases was so frequent that it was highly predictable.

Table 12 Geographical Concentration of the General Criminal Cases

Police Station	(5 Beats ÷ Total No. of the Beats of Police Station)×100	Motorcycle Theft	Larceny	Motor Vehicle Theft	Drug Crime
		(Offenses No. of Top 5 Beats ÷ Total Offenses No. of the Police Station ×100	(Offenses No. of Top 5 Beats ÷ Total Offenses No. of the Police Station ×100	(Offenses No. of Top 5 Beats ÷ Total Offenses No. of the Police Station ×100	(Offenses No. of Top 5 Beats ÷ Total Offenses No. of the Police Station ×100
Panchiao P. S.	3.03	23.61	19.81	25.21	19.27
Hsinchuang P. S.	1.95	20.29	17.94	16.01	20.00
Sanchung P. S.	2.11	14.85	17.51	21.16	23.44
Haishan P. S.	2.58	25.70	29.44	28.57	27.15
Yungho P. S.	2.72	32.73	37.67	31.56	47.50
Chungho P. S.	1.88	29.95	31.67	28.70	42.02
Tucheng P. S.	4.81	31.85	25.53	29.41	36.81
Luchou P. S.	3.76	29.16	28.23	21.58	31.58
Shulin P. S.	6.33	30.02	27.46	34.40	48.15
Sanhsia P. S.	5.44	29.34	20.07	34.71	31.61
Hsichuh P. S.	6.25	45.10	41.58	40.94	47.83
Hsintien P. S.	2.05	28.76	29.15	23.47	27.91
Tanshui P. S.	5.32	30.63	40.63	28.43	52.17
Chinshan P. S.	11.36	38.64	39.24	54.16	44.00
Juifan P. S.	5.38	44.25	36.46	44.74	38.21
Mean Value	**4.33**	**30.33**	**29.49**	**30.87**	**35.84**

Note "Top 5 Beats" represents the 5 beats that occurred the most general criminal cases among the all beats of police station.

Geographical Concentration of the Traffic Cases

According the record form the Operational Command and Control Center of Taipei County Police Department, the general vehicle accident was the primary event of the traffic cases. The general vehicle accidents occupied about 99% of the traffic cases. In

each police station, the top five beats were selected due to their highest occurrence volume of the general vehicle accidents. Then, the percentage of the total beats of each police station by its five beats was calculated, as shown in the column 2 of Table 13. The percentage of the total general vehicle accidents of each police station by the general vehicle accidents of its top five beats was also calculated , as shown in the column 3 of Table13.

Referring to Table 13, it clearly reveals, in the Hsinchuang police station's precinct, only 1.95% of all beats produced 27.74% of the citizen calls of general vehicle accident to which the police were dispatched. Furthermore, in the Chungho police station's precinct, only 1.88% of all beats produced 36.19% of the citizen calls of general vehicle accident to which the police were dispatched. Averagely, 33.53% of the citizen calls of general vehicle accidents were concentrated in about 4.33% of the police beats. Similarly, these police beats were the small places in which the occurrence of general vehicle accident was so frequent that it was highly predictable.

Table 13 Geographical Concentration of the Traffic Cases

Police Station	Percentage of the Total Beats of Each Police Station by Its Five Beats	*General Vehicle Accident* Percentage of the Total Vehicle Accident Cases of Each Police Station by the Vehicle Accident Cases of Its Top Five Beats
Panchiao P. S.	3.03	26.68
Hsinchuang P. S.	1.95	27.74
Sanchung P. S.	2.11	19.99
Haishan P. S.	2.58	34.62
Yungho P. S.	2.72	36.19
Chungho P. S.	1.88	36.33
Tucheng P. S.	4.81	36.46
Luchou P. S.	3.76	26.76
Shulin P. S.	6.33	35.70
Sanhsia P. S.	5.44	32.00
Hsichuh P. S.	6.25	51.15
Hsintien P. S.	2.05	33.03
Tanshui P. S.	5.32	28.76
Chinshan P. S.	11.36	37.06
Juifan P. S.	5.38	40.47
Mean Value	**4.33**	**33.53**

Note "Top 5 Beats" represents the 5 beats that occurred the most general vehicle accidents among the all beats of police station.

Geographical Concentration of the Service Cases

According the record from the Operational Command and Control Center of Taipei County Police Department, the fight, noise making, patient and injured saving, and family dispute were the primary events of the service cases. These events occupied about 96% of the service cases. In each police station, the top five beats were selected due to their highest occurrence volume of the service cases. Then, the percentage of the total beats of each police station by its five beats was calculated, as shown in the column 2 of Table 14. The percentage of the total service cases of each police station by the services cases of its top five beats was also calculated , as shown in the column 3~6 of Table14.

Referring to Table 14, it clearly reveals, in the Panchiao police station's precinct, only 3.03% of all beats produced 20.42% of the citizen calls of fight cases, 24.52% of noise making cases, 32.56% of patient and injured saving cases, and 34.78% of family dispute cases to which the police were dispatched. Furthermore, in the Juifan police station's precinct, only 5.38% of all beats produced 65.79% of the citizen calls of fight cases, 66.67% of noise making cases, 71.43% of patient and injured saving cases, and 87.50% of family dispute cases to which the police were dispatched. Averagely, 32.67% of the citizen calls of fight cases, 38.84% of noise making cases, 41.70% of patient and injured saving cases, and 43.03% of family dispute cases were concentrated in about 4.33% of the police beats. Similarly, these police beats were the small places in which the occurrence of service cases was so frequent that it was highly predictable.

Table 14 Geographical Concentration of the Service Cases

Police Station	Percentage of the Total Beats of Each Police Station by Its Five Beats	Fight Percentage of the Total Fight Cases of Each Police Station by the Fight Cases of Its Top Five Beats	Noise Making Percentage of the Total Noise Making Cases of Each Police Station by the Noise Making Cases of Its Top Five Beats	Patient and Injured Saving Percentage of the Total Patient & Injured Saving Cases of Each Police Station by the Patient & Injured Saving Cases of Its Top Five Beats	Family Dispute Percentage of the Total Family Dispute Cases of Each Police Station by the Family Dispute Cases of Its Top Five Beats
Panchiao P. S.	3.03	20.42	24.52	32.56	34.78
Hsinchuang P. S.	1.95	16.36	25.23	25.71	26.83
Sanchung P. S.	2.11	14.34	19.11	21.11	25.51
Haishan P. S.	2.58	25.03	23.18	26.31	28.81
Yungho P.	2.72	37.44	32.19	47.50	44.44

S. Chungho P. S.	1.88	27.76	29.41	33.82	38.88
Tucheng P. S.	4.81	29.17	33.06	30.44	44.44
Luchou P. S.	3.76	31.54	32.37	41.67	45.48
Shulin P. S.	6.33	29.48	41.32	40.00	42.00
Sanhsia P. S.	5.44	32.87	45.00	31.81	41.93
Hsichuh P. S.	6.25	42.68	52.28	58.62	45.23
Hsintien P. S.	2.05	24.17	28.57	25.80	28.57
Tanshui P. S.	5.32	32.08	46.37	52.00	33.33
Chinshan P. S.	11.36	60.98	83.33	86.67	77.77
Juifan P. S.	5.38	65.79	66.67	71.43	87.50
Mean Value	**4.33**	**32.67**	**38.84**	**41.70**	**43.03**

Note ”Top 5 Beats” represents the 5 beats that occurred the most service cases among the all beats of police station.

Results of the Analysis of Calls to the Police, In Sum

According to the above analysis of the citizen calls to the police, the results can be summarized as follows:

1. There were 109,352 citizen calls to the Operational Command and Control Center (110 Call System) of Taipei County Police Department, from April 1999 to March 2000, which resulted in the police responses.

2. The general criminal cases, traffic cases, and service cases constituted about 94% of the entire citizen calls to which the police were dispatched.

3. The motorcycle theft, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and drug crime constituted about 96% of the general criminal cases.

4. Only 4.33% of the police beats produced 30.33% of the calls of motorcycle theft, 29.49% of the calls of larceny, 30.87% of the calls of motor vehicle theft, and 35.84% of the calls of drug crime to which the police were dispatched.

5. The general vehicle accidents constituted about 99% of the traffic cases.

6. Only 4.33% of the police beats produced 33.53% of the calls of general vehicle accidents to which the police were dispatched.

7. The fight, noise making, patient and injured saving, and family dispute cases constituted about 96% of the service cases.

8. Only 4.33% of the police beats produced 32.67% of the calls of fight cases, 38.84% of the calls of noise making cases, 41.70% of the calls of patient and injured saving cases, and 43.03% of the calls of family dispute cases to which the police were dispatched.

9. The tendency of geographical concentration of crimes and related events is so clear that these hot spots of crime can become a functional criterion for the allocation of crime control resources.

IV. Results of the Public Opinion Survey

There are ten questions to examine the social order information of the respondents' residing areas. The ten questions include the seriousness of the burglary, motorcycle theft, motor vehicle theft, robbery and forceful taking, obscenity, noise making, juvenile delinquency, traffic violation, disorder against the security of female, disorder against the security of the children. Referring to Table 15, more than 50% of the respondents expressed that motorcycle theft crimes and traffic violations were at least somewhat "serious" in his or her residing area. More than 50% of the respondents revealed that burglary, motor vehicle theft, robbery and forceful taking, obscenity, noise making, juvenile delinquency, disorder against the security of female, and disorder against the security of the children were "not serious" in his or her residing area. Obviously, motorcycle theft crimes and traffic violations were regarded by higher percentage of respondents as the issues deserving more attention.

Table 15 Seriousness of Crimes and Related Events by Public Opinion

Types of Crimes and Related Events	N	Very Serious	Serious	Somewhat Serious	Not Serious
Burglary	3026	20.3% (613)	8.9% (269)	14.6% (441)	55.3% (1673)
Motorcycle Theft	3026	23.2% (703)	12.1% (365)	15.0% (454)	46.9% (1420)
Motor Vehicle Theft	3026	10.8% (326)	6.4% (194)	12.7% (383)	65.2% (1973)
Robbery and Forceful Taking	3026	9.8% (298)	6.6% (199)	16.3% (493)	65.3% (1977)
Obscenity	1076	5.3% (57)	2.5% (27)	5.9% (63)	84.0% (904)
Noise Making	3026	10.3% (311)	6.4% (195)	20.2% (610)	63.1% (1908)
Juvenile Delinquency	3026	8.9% (270)	7.5% (228)	12.8% (387)	65.9% (1995)
Traffic Violation	3026	25.8%	11.6%	16.8%	44.2%

		(782)	(352)	(507)	(1336)	
Against the Security of Female	3026	7.1% (216)	7.3% (221)	14.1% (426)	69.9% (2114)	
Against the Security of Children	3026	6.1% (185)	6.8% (207)	12.9% (389)	72.4% (2191)	

The citizens were also asked to identify the most necessary work that the police should do to improve the social order and quality of life in their residence surroundings. The following items, from most to least, were identified:

- Increasing police patrol
- Higher quality of the police personnel
- Severe law enforcement
- More service

This information gave the police good food for thought. The following questions were probed: What are some of the things we could do to increase citizen satisfaction in this area? How can we best respond to their needs? Are there better ways of delivering police services than the ones we have used in the past? If so, what are they?

One point was clearly made in the survey responses: increasing police patrol was the most desired police service in Taipei county. In addition to increasing police patrol, the police should upgrade personnel quality, enforce law severely, and provide more services if the resources are enough.

Furthermore, what is the most necessary work that Taipei county government should do to improve the social order and quality of life in citizens' residence surroundings? The survey also provides the Taipei county government some important information. Strengthening the function of community and apartment managing committees was the most desired government (non-police) service in the Taipei county. In addition to strengthening the function of community and apartment managing committees, if the resources were enough, the local government should increase electronic monitor equipment, advocate legal education, and support poor families.

Table 16 Public Need in Social Order, the Citizen Perspective

Public Need I N		Increase Patrol	Increase the Quality of the Police Personnel	Severe Law Enforcem ent	More Services	All Are Necessary	Other s
The most necessary work that the police should do	3026	25.8% (780)	12.2% (370)	12.1% (365)	9.9% (301)	35.8% (1084)	3.4% (103)

Public Need II N	Strengthen the Function of Community and Apartment Managing Committee	Increase Electronic Monitor	Advocate Legal Education	Support Poor Families	All Are Necessary	Other s
The most necessary work that the local government should do 1079	24.0% (259)	15.0% (162)	20.3% (219)	4.8% (52)	30.1% (325)	4.0% (43)

Results, In Sum

According to the analysis above, the characteristics of social order of the Taipei county can be summarized as follows:

1. Taipei county owned the largest number of offenses and the highest crime rate among all the counties in Taiwan in 1999.

2. With respect to the rate of larceny, motorcycle theft and obscenity, Taipei county is higher than other counties.

3. Although the crime occurrence was decreasing from 1997 to 1999, however, the trend of clearance rate of crime was in the same direction. The proportion of unsolved offenses was increasing substantially.

4. In Taipei county, a large number of crimes occurred in the Hsinchuang, Sanchung, Chungho, Haishan, and Panchiao police station precincts.

5. The Hsinchuang, Sanchung, Chungho, Haishan, Panchiao, Luchou , and Tucheng police station precincts have a higher crime rate than other precincts in Taipei county.

6. Although the Luchou and Tucheng police station precincts have a median crime incidence, however, both precincts have a higher crime rate than other precincts with median crime incidence.

7. The motorcycle theft, larceny, motor vehicle theft, drug, and gambling are the most prevalent offenses in all police station precincts.

8. With respect to the public need, the police perspective seems to be different from the citizen perspective. The citizens regard increasing police patrol as the most necessary service to improve the social order and reduce the fear of crime. However, the police recognize increasing patrol as an item of lower priority.

9. There are some difficulties in implementing the police work, such as lack of police force, unavailable police equipment, need for organizational change, need for specific training, unclear regulation of police power, etc.

10. An analysis of 109,352 citizen calls to the police from 1999 to 2000 found that a small number of hot spots produced a large number of crimes and related events. Only 4.33% of the police beats produced about 30% of the citizen calls of general crimes, traffic cases and service cases which resulted in the police responses.

11. More than 50% of the respondents expressed that motorcycle theft crimes and traffic violations were at least somewhat serious in his or her residing area.

12. A higher percentage of respondents revealed that strengthening community and apartment managing committees was the most desired government (non-police) service in the Taipei county.

Conclusion

The crime control policy is generated as the following items in accordance with the characteristics of social order of Taipei county.

Increasing Police Patrol Density

According to the data collected from the public opinion survey, a higher percentage of respondents revealed that increasing police patrol was a citizen-desired police response to crime. This information implies that increasing the visibility of the police is able to decline citizen's fear of crime. In the face of such public need, the police department should administer and allocate its resource more effectively. In order to achieve the patrol function, the police department should choose the most suitable patrol type ex. foot patrol, automobile patrol, motorcycle patrol, bicycle patrol, etc. in accordance with the characteristics of precincts Clarke, 1997; Clarke & Felson, 1993 . In addition to reducing response time, it is equally important to restore the contact with the community.

Imposing Stronger Control on Hot Spots of Crime

The analysis of citizen calls to the police clearly indicates that a small number of places produce a larger number of crimes and related events. The places of crime occurrence are not randomly distributed. The concentration of crime in few places is identified in this research. Only 4.33% of the police beats produced 30.33% of the calls of motorcycle theft, 29.49% of the calls of larceny, 30.87% of the calls of motor vehicle theft, and 35.84% of the calls of drug crime to which the police were dispatched. Since the jurisdiction of Taipei County Police Department covers a wide area and the number of police is not sufficient, imposing stronger control on hot spots of crime will be a productive and proactive strategy.

More Law Enforcement on Traffic Violation

More than 50% of respondents revealed a serious concern about the traffic violation. Although the events of traffic violation may not be crimes, they usually yield the circumstance of disorder. What make people afraid in their living areas and concerned about their welfare are not only the crimes they see and hear about but also the social signs they see around them that indicate a unsafety or breakdown in society (Kelling, 2000; Doner & Lab, 1998; Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Felson, 1998). Simply put, public fear not only stems from crime but also disorder. Reducing the events of traffic violation is highly possible to alleviate the disorder circumstances Gilling, 1997. Therefore, more law enforcement on traffic violation may contribute toward a lower public fear.

Improving Police Service Quality

The "service cases" are one of the top three types of citizen calls to the police. The police also recognized service quality as an important focus of improvement (as shown in the results of focus group interviews). The police should listen to the citizens, the customers, in new and more open ways. In addition to making better use of available technology, the police should get closer to the people they serve Bayley, 1994; Mon, 1997. "How to provide high-quality, community-oriented police services" has become a new challenge to the police administers.

Implementing Community Policing

In practice, community policing takes many forms, including increased accessibility of police officers to the public through foot and bicycle patrols; the decentralization of police operations through the use of neighborhood substations; the implementation of crime prevention programs; and the long-term assignment of officers to specific beats in an attempt to establish collaborative police-community partnerships to address neighborhood crime-related problems Muraskin & Roberts, 1999.

The long list of programs and initiatives that fall under the general heading of community policing has generated criticism. Some police officers argued (focus group interviews) that the lack of a unitary concept of community policing limited the external validity of evaluation projects and promoted the use of community policing as a slogan for enhancing a police department's public image. Despite this criticism, community policing has emerged as an important policing paradigm in Taiwan today. And at its core, community policing requires, among other things, an organizational commitment to problem solving and customer satisfaction Wikstrom, 1995; Rosenbaum, Lurigio & Davis, 1998.

The police have recognized that they cannot solve the problems of antisocial behavior in their communities alone. Accordingly, the police should develop liaisons with any organization in the community that is interested in contributing to the positive quality of life in the neighborhoods. With limited resources, the police are being pushed into a corner by day-to-day crime problems. For too long, the police have accepted almost sole responsibility for crime and the fear of crime. Community involvement in developing and implementing solutions to crime problems is a viable alternative to policing's current dilemma.

Strengthening the Function of Community and Apartment Managing Committee

The Community and Apartment Managing Committee CAMC   is a citizen-volunteered organization. The purpose of CAMC is to enhance the management and protection of community and apartment. To increase the residents' quality of life is its final goal. In Taiwan, a large number of communities and apartments have established their CAMC.

Although CAMCs are widely prevailed, however, their function varies greatly. Some successful CAMCs not only increase the public security but achieve the community wellness. According to the information collected from focus group interviews, the extent to which citizens are willing partners in the co-production of order appears to be the product of a number of factors. Neighborhood residents tend to express little desire to become partners in CAMC's activities such as community crime prevention because of the following factors: fear of retaliation, apathy, the ambiguous role of residents in CAMC's activities, the highly disorganized nature of some communities, and the intra-group conflict between community leaders and other residents. The local government and the police should establish stronger connection with CAMCs and provide professional support to them. Some benefits or functions are highly predictable. First, they can advise police about local problems and needs. Second, community meetings   CAMC activities   help police educate people about crime and disorder and enlist the cooperation of the public in dealing with them. Third, communities meetings allow people to ventilate grievances against the police face to face, unimpeded by bureaucracy. Fourth, community meetings provide information to the police about the success of their efforts   Bayley, 1994; Mon, 1996; Houston & Parsons, 1998   . Finally, the local government and the police can mobilize communities for their own defense against crime through CAMCs.

Increasing the Police Forces

Although there is clear evidence indicating the fact that differences in crime rates cannot be attributed variations in the number of police   Sherman, 1995   , the police

forces should be evaluated and organized periodically in accordance with the change of social conditions such as population increase. The population volume of Taipei county has changed substantially in the recent decade. The population increased from 2.97 million in 1989 to 3.51 million in 1999　Bureau of Census, 2000　. However, the ratio of police to people has changed in the opposite direction. The ration decreased from 1:504 in 1989 to 1:627 in 1999　provided by Taipei County Police Department　. Compared with the average ratio of police to people in Taiwan area, 1:350　provided by National Police Administration　, the ratio in Taipei county is much lower　Sheu, Hou & Mon, 2000　. The recommendation of increasing police forces of Taipei county should be reasonable.

Innovating the Police Training and Education Program

The hurdle a police administrator will have to overcome in order to implement the above policies is the organizational resistance of the police agency itself. Most police agencies are structured as the quasi-military model. They have ranks, chain of command, regulations, policies, and procedures outlining how specific types of crimes and incidents should be handled. Reactive police theory has dictated the structure of these agencies with little variation. Since the recommended policies are proactive and crime prevention oriented, the police agencies should innovate their training and education program to update the mind of their employees. Some knowledge and skills such as quality and productivity principles, system thinking, running and conducting effective groups, interpersonal skills, community-organizing techniques, and　basic ability of data analysis　ex. representing and graphing data, etc.　should be included into the police training and education program. Besides, in order to respond effectively to the rapid social change and new types of crimes, the police administrators should encourage themselves and their subordinates to pursue higher education and introduce new concepts and methods into police agencies.

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